Zhihua Shen
On October 25, 1950, the Chinese government announced that it would send People’s Volunteers to Korea, thereby involving China in the Korean War in the name of “resisting U.S. aggression, aiding Korea, and defending the homeland.” With China’s entry, the Korean War became a war between China and the United States, and the Korean Peninsula became a battlefield in the larger confrontation between the socialist and capitalist worlds. Moreover, China’s participation cemented the China-U.S.-Soviet triangle that would subsequently shape international relations in the Far East. Thus China’s decision to send troops to Korea has been a key topic of research by scholars all over the world in the fields of Cold War and international relations history.
Scholars have argued that Stalin and Kim Il-sung had agreed far in advance on the deployment of Chinese troops, and that the Chinese leadership had been planning and preparing for the war long before it broke out.[1] Korean researchers have used Soviet archival materials to support a “theory of triangular alliance of communists in East Asia,” which holds that Chinese involvement in the war had been premeditated by Mao, Stalin, and Kim.[2]
However, after careful examination of both Soviet archives and the large quantity of literature and memoirs published in recent years in China, the author has reached a different conclusion. Even though China has not yet made public key archival sources, on the basis of recently published articles and recollections, it is still possible to reach the following conclusion: China’s actions on the Korean question were passive. Mao originally hoped to help Kim Il-sung unify Korea only after liberating Taiwan, but facing decisions already made by Moscow and Pyongyang, he reluctantly supported Kim Il-sung’s war effort; after the outbreak of the Korean War, and especially when North Korean political power faced a crisis, the Chinese Communist Party’s status and responsibility in the socialist camp forced Mao Zedong, under exceedingly difficult circumstances, to dispatch troops to fight in Korea.
I. China did not participate in the planning of the Korean War
As World War II ended, both the United States and the Soviet Union wished to incorporate the Korean Peninsula into its own sphere of influence in the Far East. As a result, the peninsula was divided in two by the 38th parallel. After the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops, the two superpowers manipulated the struggle between North and South from behind the scenes. The Korean conflict became an internal battle between the two rival national governments, both of whom intended to reunify the Korean nation.[3] The world had already divided into two camps, so it was only natural that Kim Il-sung, who had been propped up and trained by the occupying Soviet forces, seek help from the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, both of whom had forged close relations with Korea during the struggle against Japan. Yet, when it came to planning the war, relations between China, the Soviet Union, and Korea were not so simple.
Past research has shown that before the outbreak of the Korean War, China had sent large numbers of soldiers of Korean nationality back home, suggesting that China took part or at least supported North Korean military action. The actual situation was as follows: As early as January 1949, Li Lisan, Zhou Baozhong, Choi Yong-kon and others met in Harbin with Soviet advisors. There, they decided to send 28,000 soldiers of Korean nationality from the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese Communist party back to Korea by the end of 1949. In May 1949, Kim Il-sung sent Kim Il, Head of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army, to visit Beijing. The main purpose of the visit was to ask China to transfer several divisions of soldiers of Korean nationality to North Korea. Mao agreed and in July and August of that year, the Fourth Field Army’s 164th and 166th divisions, consisting of soldiers of Korean nationality, were transferred to North Korea to form the 7th Division of the Korean People’s Army.[4] In January 1950, Kim Il-sung sent Kim Kwang-hyob, Minister of Combat of the People’s Army, to China, asking for the transfer of 14,000 more soldiers of Korean nationality. China agreed; Kim Kwang-hob then asked that the soldiers be allowed to take their arms with them. Nie Rongzhen consulted the CPC Central Committee, and the CC accepted Kim’s request in its reply on January 22, 1950. The soldiers were gathered in Zhengzhou, Henan province, departed for Korea by train, and arrived at Wonsan on April 18th of that year.[5] Objectively speaking, these soldiers bolstered North Korea’s military forces, which was undoubtedly Kim Il-sung’s purpose. Yet it was not necessarily Mao’s intention; in late 1949 and early 1950 he had not at all hoped that Kim Il-sung would settle the question of Korean reunification through war.
Kim Il-sung’s appeal for Chinese support came on the heels of his rejection by Stalin. When Kim visited Moscow in March 1949 to advocate reunification by force, Stalin replied that “it is not necessary” to attack South Korea and that North Korea could cross the 38th parallel only when it was counterattacking South Korean troops.[6] After being turned down by Stalin in March, Kim Il paid a secret visit to Beijing in May. He explained to the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party why North Korea and South Korea could not coexist, and stressed the urgency of forcing a conclusion to the conflict. In their meeting, Mao Zedong said, “Kim Il-sung should make all necessary preparations at all times for guerrilla warfare or protracted warfare.” Mao predicted that Japan might help South Korea in the war and suggested that “China can send its troops to help North Korea if necessary.”
Yet Mao did not agree to Kim Il-sung’s plan for an immediate reunification of Korea by force. He thought, “It is not necessary for Kim Il-sung to attack South Korea in a short time, for taking the whole into consideration, international circumstances are unfavorable to us and what’s more, the Chinese Communist party is now fighting against Chiang Kai-shek’s troops and therefore is unable to help Pyongyang.” Mao even said that North Korea should fight back if attacked by South Korea but it should not attack the South first, so as not to elicit interference from the U.S. and Japan.[7] Obviously, Mao did not take Kim’s plan seriously, and he set two conditions for sending troops to aid Korea. One was that North Korea was attacked, rather than launching forces on its own initiative. The second was that China realize its own reunification. Thus, China’s decision to allow the transfer of soldiers of Korean nationality hardly indicated agreement with Kim Il-sung’s aggressive position at the outset of negotiations.
Some researchers believe that when Mao visited the Soviet Union for talks with Stalin, the two discussed the Korean War, and perhaps even reached an agreement that the Soviet Union would provide the arms and China, the troops to help Kim Il-sung launch an offensive. Others maintain that Mao, Stalin, and Kim reached a decision to wage war in Moscow. Recently released archival and memoir materials allow us to re-evaluate whether China participated in the planning of the Korean War in early 1950.
Available materials show that Mao did indeed discuss Korea with Stalin during his visit to the Soviet Union. According to the works of Goncharov and others, in 1989 the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party ordered the Foreign Ministry to classify the archives on the Korean War, and in the process discovered a transcript of the talks between Mao Zedong and Mikoyan in April 1956. According to this transcript, Mao recalled that during his visit to the Soviet Union, he and Stalin had discussed the question of Korea.[8] Yet archival materials suggest that their conversation did not include the specifics of Kim Il-sung’s plans. Mao was not supportive of and did not attach importance to Kim’s plan for attacking South Korea, and in fact was worried that the opposite would happen. Mao told Stalin that in Korea, it was not a matter of the North attacking the South, but rather of the South attacking the North. The South’s military force was greater than the North’s, and U.S. forces were stationed there. The North should therefore keep the initiative and always be on guard.[9] This version of events is supported by the work of Petrov, a Russian scholar, who noted that there is no record in the Soviet archives of a discussion between Mao and Stalin about Kim’s plan. Petrov believes that even if Stalin broached the subject of liberating Korea, it was probably in the most general terms. At the time of Mao’s visit, Stalin himself had not yet made the final decision to give Kim the green light. Mao’s main energy, meanwhile, was focused on liberating Xinjiang, Tibet, and above all, Taiwan. Korea, to him, was indisputably Stalin’s responsibility.[10]
Other evidence has surfaced which suggests that Mao, Stalin, and Kim never held three-way talks in Moscow. Stalin telegrammed Kim Il-sung on January 30 approving Kim’s visit to the Soviet Union. It is unclear whether, when Mao left the U.S.S.R. on February 17, Kim had yet arrived in Moscow. Even if he had, there is no evidence of a three-way meeting. Chen Jian cites the memoirs of Mao’s interpreter Shi Zhe, who recalled Stalin commenting to Mao, “Kim Il-sung has told me that he wants to take action against the South. Kim is young and brave but he has overestimated the favorable factors.” Stalin asked Mao what he thought, and Mao responded, “We should help little Kim,” but continued, “Korea is now facing a complicated situation.”[11] If Shi Zhe’s account is correct, we can be certain that even if Mao was aware that Kim had come to visit Stalin with a request to take action against the South, his attitude toward such plans was still skeptical.
Evidence to the contrary, such as a telegrams cited by Volkogonov, is questionable. On January 19, 1950, Shtykov, the Soviet ambassador to Korea, sent Stalin a telegram saying that Kim Il-sung had again raised the question of attacking South Korea and insisted on meeting with Stalin. According to Volkogonov, upon receiving this telegram Stalin “could not make up his mind for more than a week.” Then, Volkogonov writes, he sent Mao a ciphered, carefully-worded telegram stating, “If we are fully sure of winning, this question can be discussed.” The paper also states that after consulting with Beijing again, on February 9, 1950, Stalin agreed to a large-scale military action on the Korean Peninsula.[12] Volkogonov’s argument implies that China was taking part in the planning of the war in early 1950. After all, in the ordinary course of events, it would be impossible for Stalin to telegram Mao agreeing to discuss a question of which Mao was unaware or to which he was even opposed. Yet Stalin already knew that Mao Zedong was opposed to military action. Second, how could Stalin telegram Mao, as he was already in Moscow at the time? (Mao visited Leningrad on January 14 and returned to Moscow on January 17.) Third, on February 9, Stalin had not yet met with Kim Il-sung. How could Stalin agree to “take large-scale military action” on the Korean Peninsula without discussing it with Kim Il-sung? Such questions cast doubt on the material cited by Volkogonov.
Recently, many articles have cited archival materials made public by Russia, stating that in May 1950 Kim Il-sung secretly visited Beijing and secured Mao’s total support for North Korea to launch an attack. Yet this fact cannot prove that China took part in planning the war, either.