During this period, Stalin telegrammed again to urge China to send troops: “China will be involved in the war. At the same time, because the Soviet Union and China have a treaty of mutual assistance and alliance, the Soviet Union will also be involved in the war. Are we afraid of this? In my opinion we are not, because we are joined together. We shall be more powerful than the United States and Great Britain.” “If the war cannot be avoided, then let it come now, not several years later when Japanese militarism will recover and become an ally of the United States.”[59] After explicitly stating that the situation was critical, Stalin demanded point blank that China send troops. Stalin also said, if the PLA is defeated, the Soviet Union is willing to become directly involved. This was obviously a provocation of Mao. Although Mao left some leeway on whether or not he would send troops in his October 7 telegram to Mao, in reality he had already decided to send troops to North Korea.[60] On October 8, Mao Zedong issued the order that the Chinese People’s Volunteers be established. He appointed Peng Dehuai as the Commander and Political Commissar of the volunteers and asked the latter to command the 13th Corps and its four armies, and the Border Defense Headquarters and its three artillery divisions. Peng was to wait for orders to set out. Gao Gang was given control of all rear service matters. On the same day, Mao telegrammed Kim Il-sung, notifying him of the decision.[61] The was the second time Mao decided to sent troops to Korea.
The decision to send troops was not an easy one, not least because of the truly backward state of China’s military equipment and the lack of the air force truly necessary to modern warfare.[62] In his October 2 telegram to Stalin, Mao had asked him to provide China with large quantities of military equipment including tanks, heavy artillery, other light and heavy weapons, and thousands of trucks. Mao also asked for Soviet air assistance for Chinese troops when they entered Korea to fight.[63] To ensure victory, and because Stalin had said that the Soviet Union and China would “fight in the war together,” China decided to send Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Union to discuss Soviet aid to China with Stalin. However, when it came to the question of air assistance, Stalin became overly cautious and went back on his word. As a result, China’s decision to send troops to Korea took another unexpected turn.
Zhou Enlai left Beijing on October 8, 1950 and arrived in Moscow, after a stopover, on October 10. On the 11th, accompanied by Bulganin, Zhou took a special plane to Stalin’s resort on the shore of the Black Sea. That afternoon, the two sides held talks. Shi Zhe recalls that the talks covered the following points: (1) Stalin explained that while the Soviet Union had thought of helping Korea, it could not dispatch its own troops because it had long declared that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Korea. Soviet troops could not appear in the battlefield, let alone directly confront the United States. (2) Stalin encouraged China to send troops and promised to provide arms and equipment. (3) Zhou Enlai explained China’s difficulties in sending troops: The Chinese people were war-weary, the economy was in a shambles, and so on, (4) Stalin suggested that if China would not send troops, then Kim Il-sung should be told to cross the Yalujiang River soon to preserve strength. The main force could be withdrawn to China and reorganized in preparation for future fighting.[64] At seven pm that evening Stalin and Zhou sent a joint telegram to the CPC Central Committee explaining the results of the talks. The contents of the telegram have not yet been revealed, but according to Shi Zhe, the telegram might have included the above-mentioned points and a decision that neither China nor the Soviet Union would send troops to Korea for the time being and that Kim should withdraw to areas north of the Yalujiang River. In addition, from Mao’s reply telegram to Zhou on October 13, it is certain that the joint telegram also stated that the Soviet air force was not yet ready and could not be dispatched for the time being, and that the Soviet Union “will not be able to dispatch its air force to support the volunteers in the fighting in Korea until after two and a half months.”[65] The truth may be something like this: Because Zhou Enlai could not realize the objective of having the Soviet Union send its air force to fight in collaboration with the Chinese People’s Volunteers, he and Stalin decided not to send troops to Korea for the time being. After all, the Chinese leadership had had a heated debate over whether troops should be sent, and Soviet air cover had been a lynchpin in the argument that victory was possible.
Because of the five-hour time difference between Moscow and Beijing, the Stalin-Zhou telegram reached Beijing at zero hour on October 12. The Soviet embassy sent the telegram to the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, which probably presented it to Mao in the afternoon of October 12th.[66] When Mao realized the USSR would not dispatch its air force, he sent two urgent telegrams instructing Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang in northeast China and Rao Shushi and Chen Yi in east China that “the order of October 9 should not be carried out for the time being,” that “all the units of the 13th Corps should continue to train where they are and should not set out,” and that “Song Shilun’s corps could continue to be reorganized and trained where it is.” At the same time, Mao invited Gao and Peng for talks in Beijing.[67] Nie Rongzhen, the acting Chief of the General Staff, was afraid that time would be wasted by the delivery of the telegram, so he hurried to the office of the Operational Department of the Central Military Commission at seven pm of the same day and directly telephoned Peng, who was inspecting the ferries in An’dong, telling the latter to come to Beijing for face-to-face talks because the situation had changed.[68] At noon of October 13, Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang arrived in Beijing. In the afternoon, Mao called an emergency Politburo meeting at Yinian Hall to discuss again the advantages and disadvantages of sending troops. Peng Dehuai was angry when he heard the Soviet Union would not provide air support and said he wanted to resign as commander of the volunteers. Mao took control of the meeting and convinced Peng and others that although the Soviet air force could not enter Korea at the beginning of the war, Stalin had promise to provide air protection of Chinese territory and provide China with large quantities of military equipment. In the end, the meeting decided that even without the support of the Soviet air force, when U.S. troops were attacking Korea in force, troops must be sent to aid Korea no matter how great the difficulties. After that, Mao, Peng, and Gao made a careful study of the operational plan for after the volunteers entered Korea.[69] After the meeting, Mao immediately telegrammed Zhou, “I have discussed with the comrades of the Political Bureau and they unanimously hold that it is advantageous for our troops to enter Korea.” Due to lack of air cover, Mao decided that in the beginning the volunteers should only fight South Korean troops. The next day, Mao telegrammed Zhou again, briefing the latter on the specifics of operational deployment and stating that the date the volunteers would set out was October 9.[70] This was the third time Mao made up his mind to send troops to Korea.
On October 15, 1950, Pyongyang reported an emergency. Kim Il-sung sent Park Hon-yong to meet Peng Dehuai in Shenyang and asked China to dispatch its troops as soon as possible. Peng told Park that China had made the final decision that Chinese troops would cross the Yalijiang River in different groups on October 18 or 19. The same day, Mao telegrammed Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, saying that the volunteers should set out earlier. “It is best if our advance army sets out on October 17,” the telegram stated, “the second army can start off on October 18, the rest can follow one after the other and they should all cross the river within ten days.”[71] After receiving the telegram, Peng and Gao went to Andong and called a meeting of officers at or above the division level, announcing the decision of the CPC Central Committee and putting forward the strategic requirements of the troops after they crossed the river.[72]
However, just as the Chinese put the arrow on the bowstring and were about to let it go, the situation in Moscow changed again. Stalin had originally already given Kim notice to retreat to China; after learning of China’s decision on October 14, what Stalin, sending Kim an urgent telegram, did not imagine, was that China still would not go all out without air support.[73]
Although Mao again decided to send troops, uncertainty remained over two vital questions – whether China would really receive Soviet equipment and whether the Soviet air force promised after two and a half months would really materialize. If cash had to be paid for Soviet arms, the delivery would be delayed because China could not pay for the time being. And if air support did not materialize the strategic objectives of the volunteers would be compromised. Therefore, in his October 13 telegram, Mao also instructed Zhou to “stay in Moscow for a few more days” for further discussions with Soviet leaders. Mao said that as long as China could borrow arms, the Chinese army enter Korea with its mind at east and would conduct a long-term war, and the Chinese leadership would remain united. “As long as the Soviet Union can send its volunteer air force to help us fight in Korea in two or two and a half months” and protect some of China’s large cities, “then we will not fear entire air raids.” That night, Zhou met urgently with Molotov, asking him to transmit Mao’s message to Stalin immediately.[74] On October 14, the Soviet government undertook to provide China with military equipment in the form of credit loans and to send the jets of 16 regiments to cover the Chinese volunteers entering Korea to fight. Zhou telegrammed Stalin again at his resort, asking whether the Soviet Union could send bombers in addition to fighter jets to support Chinese troops in battle, whether in addition to sending air power to Korea, the Soviet Union could station its air force in Chinese cities as well, and whether, besides providing China with arms and equipment, the Soviets could also give credit loan conditions for ordering vehicles and key engineering equipment, etc.[75] At the time, however, Stalin reversed course and telephoned Molotov in Moscow, saying the Soviet air force could go only as far as north of the Yalujiang River and could not enter Korea to support the volunteers in combat.[76] Zhou could do no more and left Moscow for China on October 16th.
The Soviet decision meant that Chinese troops would have no effective air support in the Korean battlefield, forcing China to reconsider, again, its decision to send troops. At 5 pm on October 17 Mao send Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang another emergency telegram changing the date advance units were to set out from October 17 to October 19, stating that we “shall have an official order” on October 18, and asking Peng and Gao back to Beijing for talks.[77] On October 18, Mao again called a meeting of the CPC Central Committee to discuss the sending of troops, at which Zhou, just back from Moscow, briefed the participants on his talks with Stalin, Molotov, and others. Peng explained the volunteers’ preparations for going abroad. Finally, Mao made a judgment. “Now the enemy is besieging Pyongyang, and in a few more days, he will reach the Yalujiang River. No matter what enormous difficulties we have, we cannot change again the plan for the volunteers to cross the river to aid Korea, and the date of the crossing should not be postponed again. The volunteers should cross the river according to the original plan.”[78] After the meeting, at 9 pm Mao telegrammed Deng Hua and other commanders of the volunteers, ordering the troops to cross the Yalujiang River in Andong and Ji’an and fight in Korea according to the original plan.[79] This was the fourth, and the last time Mao Zedong made up his mind.
IV. The Deep Worries of the Chinese Leadership
From the above summary and analysis of the process by which China became involved in the Korean conflict and ultimately sent volunteers to fight there, one can see that though Mao’s mind was made up, the Chinese leadership actually had doubts about entering the war.[80] Then why did Mao decide to do so under such difficult circumstances? Analysis suggests the following three considerations were paramount.
First, from a political standpoint, Mao was trying to prevent New China from being isolated in the socialist camp. Shortly before the Chinese Communist Party seized political power, it announced the diplomatic and political principle of “leaning to one side.” That is, the party made it clear that New China would join the socialist camp. Soon after New China was founded, Mao went to the Soviet Union for negotiations and after much difficulty signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between China and the Soviet Union. Although the treaty contained unequal factors unfavorable to China, China did gain the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in its efforts to obtain international assistance. Furthermore, in talks between the Chinese and Soviet parties, the Soviet Union time and again asked China to establish a communist alliance in Asia and shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of leading the communist movement in Asia. This being the case, when the political power of the Communist Party of North Korea was endangered and when Stalin and Kim asked China for assistance, Mao had to consider his position and reputation in the socialist camp. In truth, the Soviet Union, Korea, and the socialist countries in East Europe were waiting for a decision from the Chinese government. After the outbreak of the war, Stalin sent Mao a telegram saying that China was Korea’s only hope.[81] According to one Chinese diplomat working at the Soviet Embassy at the time, when the Korean situation took a turn for the worse, not only the leaders of the Soviet Union and East European countries, but also public opinion more generally favored Chinese aid to Korea. After China announced it would send volunteers to Korea, the newspapers of these countries hailed the decision; some countries even organized their people to parade in the streets[82], which indicates the sort of pressure the Chinese Communist Party endured.
On the other hand, although China had joined the socialist camp and although China and the Soviet Union had signed a treaty of alliance, Stalin did not trust Mao. Stalin considered Mao a nationalist who might follow in Tito’s footsteps. Failure to send troops would prove Stalin’s doubts, and China would be isolated in the socialist camp. Mao himself had a deep understanding of this. In September 1956 he told a Yugoslavian delegation, “At the time, it was said that there were two Titos in the world, one was in Yugoslavia and the other was in China.” This label was only removed after China sent troops to Korea and attacked U.S. imperialists in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. In July 1958, Mao told Yudin that Stalin had been questioning whether the Chinese were genuine Marxists, and that “until the Korean War broke out he did not change his opinion, and the fraternal parties in East Europe and other countries did not stop their suspicion of us.”[83]
It was obvious that as a poor and backward country that had just been established, China needed political, economic, diplomatic and other support from foreign countries. The U.S. government supported Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war and was antagonistic to China. After the Korean War broke out, the U.S. 7th Fleet entered the Taiwan Straight, clarifying U.S. hostility to New China. Under these circumstances, it was especially important for China to have a place in the Soviet bloc. This was Mao’s first concern.
Second, from a military standpoint, Mao was trying to prevent fighting with the United States, which he considered inevitable, from occurring in northeast China.
In Mao’s opinion, the U.S. objective in crossing the 38th parallel was not only to wipe out North Korea’s political power but also to use Korea as a springboard to enter Chinese territory as the Japanese had done in the past. Mao had always been wary of U.S. ambitions toward Chinese territory. Mao believed that the U.S., either for ideological or “security” reasons, would never be reconciled to losing influence in China, and that it was looking for opportunities to regain control of this Far Eastern continent. Before the founding of New China, Mao worried the U.S. would meddle in China’s civil war and made full military preparations for this. When the Korean situation changed, Mao shifted his attention to China’s northeastern region across the river from Korea. MacArthur’s clamoring for war undoubtedly heightened Chinese concerns about invasion of the northeast. Both MacArthur’s visit to Taiwan and the additional military support the United States gave Chiang Kai-shek led Mao to believe U.S. hostility to China would continue, and that the U.S. would follow an aggressive military policy of expanding from the stronghold of Taiwan. It was natural to also think that once the U.S. seized North Korea, it might attempt to expand into China from there as well. Taiwan and the mainland are divided by the strait; Korea and China are only separated by a river, which would be easy for the U.S. to cross and turn the three northeastern provinces of China into a battlefield. On August 26, 1950, Zhou Enlai transmitted Mao Zedong instructions to a meeting on national defense, instructions that illustrated Mao’s worries. “Many signs show that it is impossible for the U.S. imperialists to wage a third world war soon, but its general attempt is to wage one local war after another to make a world war. We shall defeat it in the local wars it wages one by one.”[84] In Mao’s opinion, since wars would break out in succession, it was better to send troops to Korea to stop the war on Korean territory than to fight the U.S. after it had crossed the river. According to archives revealed in the U.S. later, the crossing of the 38th parallel by U.S. troops was not directed against China, and the United States had no plan to fight China.[85] The Chinese leadership was obviously mistaken in its evaluation of U.S. objectives in attacking North Korea. But at the time, Beijing had no way of knowing of discussions and differences of opinion within the U.S. government. At a time when MacArthur was making overbearing statements in favor of war and Chiang Kai-shek seemed on the verge of starting trouble, Acheson’s statement and guarantee seemed without value and even to have ulterior motives. Later, Zhou Enlai said, “The information we obtained was that they wanted to leave us there first. They will not deal with China until after they cross the 38th parallel. We have seen through this fraud, so we made a statement on September 30: We cannot ignore the invasion of Korea by the imperialist aggressors of the United States.”[86] Whether China was misled by MacArthur’s arrogant words and deed, or whether Mao misjudged the situation, the Chinese leadership did believe that after North Korea, China was next. This was the second worry of the Chinese leadership.