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China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing’s Policy-Making Process

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Mao was worried not only about the United States but also about the Soviet Union. He had every reason to be, for he made the following calculation: once war broke out in northeast China, the Soviet Union would probably send its troops to northeast China according to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. The result would be either the occupation of the northeast by the United States, or Soviet control of the region. In either case, China would lose sovereignty in the region. Mao surely had not forgotten that when World War II was drawing to a close, the Soviet Union sent its troops to northeast China under the guise of fighting Japan. The Soviet Union had also forced Chiang Kai-shek to sign a treaty renouncing Chinese sovereignty over the Zhongdong Railway and the cities of Lushun and Dalian. When Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong visited the Soviet Union, their differences with Stalin were mainly over the question of northeast China, the focus of great concern to both sides. Would it not be possible now for Stalin to return to northeast China with the alliance between China and the Soviet Union as an excuse? Other Soviet actions had also worried the Chinese leadership. When the Korean situation had become serious, Zhahrov, head of the Soviet delegation in Pyongyang, suggested that Kim Il-sung ask China for help and transfer units that had lost fighting capacity to Manchuria for reorganization.[87] In his talks with Zhou, Stalin suggested asking the Korean comrades to organize a retreat according to plan and allow them to withdraw their main force, weapons, and materials, as well as some of their working personnel and cadres to northeast China so they could reenter Korea.[88] Stalin also directly telegrammed Beijing notifying the CPC Central Committee that Comrade Kim Il-sung would organize a government-in-exile in northeast China.[89] The Soviet Union’s saying time and again that the North Korean government and its effective force should use northeast China as a base for launching counterattacks was equivalent to extending the flames of the war in Korea to China. The choice facing China was either to send its troops to fight the United States on the Korean Peninsula outside China or allow the remaining North Korean troops to withdraw into China. The latter option greatly increased the possibility of a U.S. invasion of northeast China in the name of chasing the defeated North Korean troops. In other words, even if China did not send its troops to Korea, a war between China and the United States was inevitable—on Chinese territory. Once the U.S. invaded China, the Soviet Union would send hundreds of thousands of troops from the Far East. Even if China and the Soviet Union jointly defeated the United States, China would again face the difficulty of asking the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces, making a delay in the return of the Zhongdong Railway and the cities of Lushun and Dalian probable. Even U.S. intelligence agencies estimated that once the United States took military action on Chinese territory, the Soviet Union would give China appropriate military support in accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaty.[90] Soviet entry into China’s northeast was the third worry of the Chinese leadership. For China, sending troops to Korea was simply the lesser of two evils.

[1] Mineo Nakajima created the “Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang Scheme Theory” summarizing these views. CF. Mineo Nakajima, “The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its roots in the international background of the Korean War,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.1, 1979.

[2] In July 1994 the government of the Republic of Korea published in a newspaper some of the archives of the former Soviet Union brought back from Russia by President Kim Young-sam. The editing methodology of the Central Daily fully proved this view. Also see the doctorate dissertation entitled “The outbreak and origins of the Korean War” written by Park Myong-lim of Korea University of the Republic of Korea.

[3] This author made a detailed description of this in Chapter 3 of his recently published Chaoxian Zhanzheng jiemi (Secrets about the Korean War revealed) (Hong Kong, 1995)

[4] Chen Jian, “China’s road to the Korean War: The making of the Sino-American Confrontation,” New York, 1994, pp.109-110. A.V. Torkynov, E.P. Wfemczev, “Korean problems: new views, Moscow,” 1995, pp.15-16. Another paper said that these soldiers formed the 5^th and 6^th divisions of the People’s Army. See Park Myong-lim, “The outbreak and origins of the Korean War,” the first chapter.

[5] Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu (Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen),Beijng, 1982, p. 744. Park Myong-lim, “The outbreak and origins of the Korean War.” This shows that more than 40,000 soldiers returned to Korea. After visiting historians of the Chinese military history and consulting with archives, Chen Jian found that the total number of the Korean soldiers who returned to Korea in the spring of 1950 was 23,000. (Chen Jian, “China’s road to the Korean War,” pp.109-110.

[6] Kathryn Weathersby, “To attack, or not to attack? Stalin, Kim Il-sung, and the prelude to war.” Cold War International history Project Bulletin. No.5, Spring 1995, p. 2. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, “Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, pp.135, 328.

[7] Park Myong-lim, “ The outbreak and origins of the Korean War.” the first chapter. This author interviewed Shi Zhe in October 1995 and was told that Mao and Kim Il’s talk was very brief and simple and soon sent him away.

[8] Goncharov, “Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, p.326.

[9] Ching Shih, “Kim Il-sung zuzhi le Mao Zedong jingong Taiwan de jiahua”(Kim Il-sung held back Zedong’s plan for attacking Taiwan), Mingpao Monthly, July, 1994, p. 86.

[10] V. Petrov, “Mao, Stalin, and Kim Il-sung: An interpretative essay,” Journal of the Northeast Asia Studies, 1994, Vol.13, No.2, p. 21.

[11] Goncharov, “Uncertain Partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, pp. 130, 325. The author visited Shi Zhe in October 1995 and found that this was true. Mao Zedong did not meet with Kim Il-sung in Moscow and was not interested in the question of Korea.

[12] Dmitrii Volkogonov, “Sleduyet Li etogo boyat’sia?” (Should we fear this?) Ogonyok (Small Flame), No.26 (June 1993), pp.28-29.

[13] Kim Chullbaum ed., “The truth about the Korean War: Testimony 40 years later,” Seoul, 1991, p.106.

[14] Park Myong-lim, “The outbreak and origins of Korean War,” the first chapter. Ching Shih, “ Kim Il-sung zuzhi le Mao Zedong jingong Taiwan de jihua” (Kim Il-sung held back Mao Zedong’s plan for attacking Taiwan), pp. 87-88.

[15] Kapicha, a diplomat of the former Soviet Union, and Yu, Song-chol, former Vice-Minister of Combat of the People’s Army, maintained that it was impossible for Kim Il-sung to visit Beijing because he and China were not on good terms at the time. Goncharov, “Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, p.330.

[16] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s decision to enter the Korean War: History revisited,” China Quarterly, No.121 (March 1990), p.100. Goncharov, “Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, p.330.

[17] Cf. Shi Zhe, “Kangmei yuanchao shiqi de mimi waijiao” (Secret diplomacy in the period of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Fazhi wencui bao (Legal Articles News), January 5, 1995, p. 6. Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet role in the early phase of the Korean War: New documentary evidence,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol.2, No.4 (Winter 1993), p. 442. Goncharov, “ Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, p.330. Ching Shih, “Kim Il-sung zuzhi le Mao Zedong jingong Taiwan de jihua” (Kim Il-sung held back Mao Zedong’s plan for attacking Taiwan), Mingpao Monthly, July, 1994, pp. 88-89. According to another material, Kim Il-sung arrived in Beijing on May 12. Ching Yuen, “Hanzhan mimi dang’an de gongkai” (The secret archives on the Korean War revealed), Mingpao Monthly, September 1994, p. 68.

[18] Ching Shih, “Kim Il-sung zuzhi le Mao Zedong jingong Taiwan de jihua” (Kim Il-sung held back Mao Zedong’s plan for attacking Taiwan), Mingpao Monthly, July, 1994, p. 88. Ching Yuen, “Hanzhan mimi dang’an de gongkai” (The secret archives on the Korean War revealed), Mingpao Monthly, September 1994, p. 68. Goncharov quoted a high-level diplomat of the former Soviet Union who knew the archival material to prove this was true, that is, when Kim Il-sung told Mao Zedong that Stalin had reestimated the possibility for North Korea to launch a successful surprise attack on the south, Mao was very skeptical about it. Goncharov, “Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, p.146. It seems to the author that Mao Zedong talked with Yi Chu-yong, Korean ambassador to China, but not Lee Sang-jo.

[19] Dmitrii Volkogonov, “Sleduyet li etogo boyat’sia?” (Should we fear this?) Ogonyok (Small Flame), No.26 (June 1993), p. 29. Filippov was an assumed name of Stalin.

[20] Ching Shih, “Kim Il-sung zuizhi le Mao Zedong jingong Taiwan de jihua” (Kim Il-sung held back Mao Zedong’s plan for attacking Taiwan), Mingpao Monthly, July, 1994, p. 88.

[21] Ching Shih, “Kim Il-sung zuizhi le Mao Zedong jingong Taiwan de jihua” (Kim Il-sung held back Mao Zedong’s plan for attacking Taiwan), Mingpao Monthly, July, 1994, p.81. Ching Yuen, “Hanzhan mimi dang’an de gongkai” (The secret archives on the Korean War revealed), Mingpao Monthly, September 1994, p.68.

[22] In citing the recalls of Shi Zhe and Lei Yingfu, Goncharov also pointed out, when Mao Zedong asked Kim Il-sung if the United States intervened, whether Korea was willing to allow China to send its troops to the Sino-Korea border, Kim Il-sung replied that he would win within one month before the Americans could deploy its troops. He rejected China ’s offer to send its troops to the border and believed that it was enough to have the assistance of the Soviet Union at the time. See Goncharov, “Uncertain partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.” Stanford, 1993, p. 146.

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