[23] Li Haiwen, “zhonggong zhongyang jiujing heshi jueding zhiyuanjun chuguo zuozhan?” (When did the CPC Central Committee decide to send the volunteers to fight abroad?), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), No. 5, 1993, p. 85.

[24] The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not determine on the personnel for China’s embassy in Korea until early July 1950. Chai Chengwen, political counselor and charged affairs and interim at China’s embassy in Pyhongyang, and his part did not leave China for Korea until July 8. Cf. Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, “Panmunjom tanpan” (Talks at Panmunjom), Beijing, 1989, pp. 24, 36-40.

[25] In the spring of 1950, the Central Military Commission decided to allocate half of the US $ 300 million provided by the Soviet Union to the navy for purchasing equipment. In April of the same year, Zhou Enlai telegrammed Bulganin, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, saying that China urgently needed ships, planes and shore artillery and asked the Soviet Union to provide them to China in the summer of 1950 or before the spring of 1951 at the latest. Two days before the outbreak of the Korean War, in accordance with the report of the Third Field Army, the Central Military Commission decided to revise the campaign plan again and increase the troops for attacking Taiwan to more than 16 armies. See Zhou Jun, “Xin Zhongguo chuqi renmin jiefangjun weineng suixing Taiwan zhanyi jihua yuanyin chutan” (Tentative exploration of the reasons why the People’s Liberation Army could not carry out the campaign plan for attacking Taiwan soon after the New China was founded), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Research on the history of the Chinese Communist Party), No. 1, 1991, pp. 67-70.

[26] At the time in the three northeastern provinces there was only the 42^nd Army, which would be demobilized entirely and was reclaiming land and farming in Heilongjiang Province, the five independent divisions and a public security division in charge of local garrison with less than 200,000 troops, accounting only for one twenty-seventh of the regular troops of China at the time. See Xu Yan, diyici jiaoliang – kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng de lishi huiyi yu fansi (The first trial of strength – historical review and rethinking on the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Beijing, 1990, p. 16.

[27] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1998, pp. 391, 416.

[28] Zhou Jun, “Xin Zhonggguo chuqi renmin jiefangjun weineng suixing Taiwan zhanyi jihua yuanyin chutan” (Tentative exploration of the reasons why the People’s Liberation Army could not carry out the campaign plan for attacking Taiwan soon after the New China was founded), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Research on the history of the Chinese Communist Party), No. 1, 1991, p. 72.

[29] Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi” (Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1993, No. 6, p. 76.

[30] John Toland, In Mortal Combat, New York, 1991.

[31] Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi” (Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1993, No. 6, p. 76.

[32] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, p. 428.

[33] Li Haiwen, “Zhonggong zhongyang jiujing heshi jueding zhiyuanjun chuguo zuozhan?” (When did the CPC Central Committee decide to send the volunteers to fight abroad?), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), No. 5, 1993, p. 86. Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jiege zhongda juece de huiyi” (Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1993, No. 6, pp. 77-78. Later, because changes took place in the situation, the command institution of the Northeast China Border Defense Army was not established and the troops in the army were directly renamed the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

[34] Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huiyi (Review of certain major policy decisions and events), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1991, p. 43.

[35] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, p. 454, 469.

[36] Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi”(Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1993, No. 6, p. 80. Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi” (xu yi ) (Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea) (Sequal 1), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 1, p. 24. According to another material, before this Mao Zedong had already said that he was worried that the United States would go by sea to the rear areas of the People’s Army and land. He had also asked Lee Sang-jo to tell Kim Il-sung immediately to formulate measures for preventing U.S. troops from landing. See Sun Baosheng, “Mao Zedong ceng yuyan meijun Keneng zai Inchon denglu” (Mao Zedong predicted that U.S. troops might land in Inchon), Junshi shilin (Military History), 1990, No. 5, p. 13.

[37] Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi” (xu yi) (Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea) (Sequel 1), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 1, pp. 24-25.

[38] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1998, p. 485.

[39] Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang – kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng de lishi huiyi yu fansi (The first trial of strength – historical review and rethinking on the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Beijing, 1990, p. 86.