[66] Wang Yazhi, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng zhongde Peng Dehuai and Nie Rongzhen” (Peng Dehuai and Nie Rongzhen in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), junshi shilin (Military History), 1994, No. 1, p. 9.

[67] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, pp. 552-553.

[68] Wang Yazhi, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng zhongde Peng Dehuai he Nie Rongzhen” (Peng Dehuai and Nie rongzhen in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), Junshi Shilin (Military History), 1994, No. 1, pp. 8-9.

[69] Chen Jian, “China’s road to the Korean War,” pp. 201-202. Wang Yan, etc., Peng Dehuai zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), Beijing, 1993, pp. 405-406.

[70] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, pp. 556, 558-560.

[71] Wang Yan, etc., Peng Dehuai zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), Beijing, 1993, p. 406. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, p. 564.

[72] Wang Yan, ect., Peng Dehuai zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), Beijing, 1993, p. 406-407.

[73] APRF, f.45, op.1, d.335, ll.1-2.

[74] Li Haiwen, “Zhonggong zhongyang jiujing heshi jueding zhiyuanjun chuguo zuozhan?” (When did the CPC Central Committee decide to send the volunteers to fight abroad?), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), No. 5, 1993, p. 88. Xiong huayuan, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng qianxi Zhou Enlai mimi fangsu” (Zhou Enlai’s secret visit of the Soviet Union shortly before the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea broke out), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 3, p. 86. Cf. Rosh Chin’s telegram to Stalin on Oct. 14, 1950, APRF, f.45, op.1, d.335, ll.1-2.

[75] Li Haiwen ed., Zai lishi juren shenbian – Shi Zhe huiyilu (With the historical giant – memoirs of Shi Zhe), Beijing, 1991, p. 502. Xiong Huayuan, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng qianxi Zhou Enlai mimi fangsu” (Zhou Enlai’s secret visit of the Soviet Union shortly before the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea broke out), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 3, pp. 86-87.

[76] Xiong Huayuan, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng qianxi Zhou Enlai mimi fangsu” (Zhou Enlai’s secret visit of the Soviet Union shortly before the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea broke out), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 3, p. 85.

[77] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, p. 567. According to another book, the telegram said, “As for the time for dispatching the troops, it is appropriate to determine it after Zhou［Enlai］comes back to Beijing and makes a report to the Central Committee on October 18.” Wang Yan, etc., Peng Dehuai zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), Beijing, 1993, p. 407.

[78] Wang Yan, etc., Peng Dehuai zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), Beijing, 1993, p. 407. Xiong Huayuan, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng qianxi Zhou Enlai mimi fangsu” (Zhou Enlai’s secret visit of the Soviet Union shortly before the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea broke out), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 3, p. 87.

[79] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s works since the founding of the People’s Republic), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1988, p. 568. It is generally held that China dispatched its troops on October 19. But according to the recall of Wu Ruilin, former commander of the 42^nd Army who was the first to enter Korea to fight, his troops entered Korea by two groups through the Ju’an ferry on October 17 and 19 respectively. See Dong Yurong, “Zhiyuanjun sishi’er jun fuchao qianhou” (The process of the 42^nd Army’s entering Korea), Junshi shilin (Military History), 1994, No. 5, p. 10.

[80] In his memoirs, Hu Qiaomu said that as he had attended all the relevant meetings of the Central Committee, he could prove that China did not “encourage Korea to wage the war” and that China “ had to send its troops to Korea and was very reluctant to do that.” See Hu Qiaomu huyi Mao Zedong (Hu Qiaomu’s recall of Mao Zedong), Beijing, 1994, p. 87. According to the recall of Du Ping, former Political Commissar of the Volunteers, only half of the operational troops had a positive attitude toward sending troops to Korea.  It was two days before the troops were dispatched that several officers in charge of the 13^th Corps sent a joint telegram to Peng Dehuai, suggesting that “if we are sure to get the new equipment in two or three months (especially if the Soviet air force can go into action), then we should proceed according to the original plan. Otherwise, it is worth considering to postpone the sending of troops.” It was “under these circumstances in which the volunteers had come to the end of their patience and could not afford waiting any longer” that they set out. Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu (At the headquarters of the volunteers), Beijing, 1989, pp. 23, 41.

[81] Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong (Hu Qiaomu’s recall of Mao Zedong), Beijing, 1994, p. 87.

[82] Cited from the notes that author made when he visited Chai Chengwen in July 1995.

[83] Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Mao Zedong’s works on foreign affairs), Beijing, 1994, pp. 252, 326.

[84] Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi” (xu yi) (Recall of several major policy decisions in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea) (Sequel 1), Dang de wenxian (Party Literature), 1994, No. 1, p. 25.