However, the opening of Russian archives in recent years indicated that Mao, via Soviet ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin, had sent a message to Stalin on 2 October 1950 that drastically differs from the above-cited Chinese version. The Russian version reads as follows:

        I received your telegram of 1 October 1950.  We originally planned to move several volunteer division to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

        However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

        In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.
        In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large.

        Many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

        Of course, not to send our troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

        Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

        Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war. We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

        We await your reply.⁷

        The obvious contradictions between these two versions of Mao Zedong's 2 October 1950 telegram to Stalin have inevitably raised serious questions concerning what really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950. At a seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on 13 December 1995, and in his article in the Winter 1995/1996 issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin,⁸ the Russian scholar Alexandre Y. Mansourov cited the Russian version of Mao's telegram to argue that the Chinese leaders were reluctant to send troops to Korea, and that they might have completely backed away from their original intention to send troops to Korea early in October 1950. Further, Mansourov questioned the authenticity of Mao's telegram published in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. Comparing the styles and contents of the two versions, he pointed out that since the Russian version is a copy of an actual document kept at the Presidential Archive in Moscow, it should be regarded as more reliable than the published Chinese version, which, he argued, could be "unreliable, inaccurate, unsent, or perhaps misdated."⁹ He even stated that one cannot "exclude the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history."¹⁰

        Mansourov's casting of doubt on the authenticity of the Chinese version of Mao's telegram was based on a simple, yet seemingly reasonable, deduction: because the contents of the two versions are drastically different, and because the Russian version appeared authentic, something must have been seriously wrong with the Chinese version.

        The situation, however, is more complicated. After the exposure of the Russian version of the telegram, party archivists in Beijing carefully searched Mao's documents at CCP Central Archives, and confirmed that the original of the Chinese version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message did indeed exist and is kept there (this author was provided access to it). The telegram was in Mao's own handwriting and was longer than the version that was published in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (the published version did not include the sections about China's requests for Soviet ammunition and military equipment). However, the format of this telegram differed from that of many of Mao's other telegrams: while other telegrams usually (but not always) carried Mao's office staff's signature indicating how and when the telegram was dispatched, this telegram does not.¹¹ So, while it is certain that the Chinese version of Mao's telegram is a genuine document, there exist reasonable grounds on which to believe that it might not have been dispatched.

        At the same time, the party archivists in Beijing could not find the Russian version of the 2 October 1950 telegram in Mao's files at CCP Central Archives. This, however, does not mean that the Russian version is not a genuine document. One explanation of its absence in Mao's files might be found in the format of the document: It is not a telegram Mao Zedong directly sent to Stalin, but is a message included in Roshchin's telegram to the Soviet leader. Therefore, it is quite possible that Mao verbally delivered the message to Roshchin and authorized the Soviet ambassador to convey it to Stalin. Because the message may not have been in written form in the first place, it may not be so strange that one cannot locate a copy of it at the CCP Central Archives.

        If the above analysis is correct, one must further ask a question: Why did Mao draft one telegram (the Chinese version) but deliver another message (the Russian version) to Stalin via the Soviet ambassador?

        If we put this issue into the context of the tortuous processes through which the CCP leadership reached the decision to send troops to Korea, we may find that a major reason for Mao not to dispatch the draft telegram to Stalin could lie in the fact that the Chinese leadership had not yet reached a consensus on this issue. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong had been carefully considering the question of sending troops to Korea. After the Inchon landing in mid-September, he seemed to have been determined to do so. However, according to the materials now available, the Chinese leaders did not formally meet to discuss dispatching troops to Korea until after 1 October  1950. The reality was that many Chinese leaders had different views on this issue. We now know that after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram, Mao summoned a Central Secretariat meeting the same night. Attending the meeting were Mao, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Unable to attain a consensus on sending troops to Korea, the group decided to continue to discuss the issue the next day at an enlarged Central Secretariat meeting (attendants would include high-ranking military leaders in Beijing).¹² It was after this meeting that Mao sent an urgent telegram to Gao Gang, instructing him to travel from the Northeast to Beijing immediately. Mao also ordered the Northeast Border Defense Army to prepare to "enter operations [in Korea] at any time."¹³

        According to the materials now available, as well as the recollections of those who had been involved, we are able to draw a general picture about the enlarged Central Secretariat meeting on the afternoon of 2 October. Mao Zedong emphasized at the meeting that it was urgent to send troops to Korea, and the meeting thus decided that Peng Dehuai should be asked to command the troops. Mao also instructed Zhou Enlai to arrange a special plane to pick up Peng in Xi'an (where Peng was then the military and Party head). However, the meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus decided that an enlarged Politburo meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.¹⁴ Evidently, before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been impossible for Mao to give an affirmative response to Stalin's October 1 request.¹⁵ In actuality, even at the October 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which would last until October 5, the opinions of the CCP leaders were still deeply divided, with the majority, at one point, strongly opposing sending troops to Korea. The main tendency of the meeting was that "unless absolutely necessary, it was better not to fight the war."¹⁶
       
         Within this context, it is easier to extrapolate what really happened with the Chinese version of Mao's telegram. It is quite possible that as Mao was willing to send troops to Korea, he personally drafted this telegram after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram. However, because the opinions of the CCP leadership were still divided on the issue, and because the majority of Party leaders either opposed or had strong reservations about entering the war, Mao did not think it proper to dispatch the telegram. In fact, the Russian version of Mao's message mentions that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution." This indicated that the division of opinions among CCP leaders was a reason for Mao to send the message found in Russian archives, but not his personally drafted telegram, to Stalin. Of course, how, exactly, Mao changed his plans regarding the message is a question that might only be illuminated with further research, including the opening of additional archival materials in Moscow and, especially, Beijing.