Now, a question that needs further exploration is: Does Mao's message via Roshchin, as regarded by Roshchin and Stalin at that time, as well as currently interpreted by Mansourov, indicate that Mao was reluctant to send troops to Korea, or that the CCP leadership had changed its original stand on the Korean issue? This question should be answered in relation to Mao Zedong's considerations before and after October 2, as well as by comparing the contents of the Chinese and Russian versions of the telegram.

        First of all, it should be emphasized that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced to make the decision to send troops to Korea. He fully understood that China's involvement in the Korean War would entail great difficulties. On this point, his views basically coincided with those of his comrades who opposed or had strong reservations about sending troops to Korea. In actuality, the reasons Mao listed in the Russian version, such as America's technological superiority, the danger of an open war with the United States, and the possible negative domestic reactions, were all reflected in the Chinese version, though from a different angle. When Mao mentioned in the Russian version that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution," this does not mean that he had changed his own determination. A careful comparison of the two versions leads to a different conclusion: Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin's request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response, so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication (and bargaining) with Stalin open. This interpretation would explain why the CCP chairman specifically informed Stalin in the Russian version that "A final decision has not been made on this question. This is our preliminary telegram." It also explains why he proposed to send Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin.

        That Mao had not altered his determination to enter the war was most clearly demonstrated by his attitude at the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Although the majority of CCP leaders attending the meeting continued to express strong reservations about entering the Korean War, Mao told them that "all of what you have said is reasonable, but once another nation, one that is our neighbor, is in crisis, we'd feel sad  if we stood idly by."¹⁷ Mao finally convinced his comrades of the need to send troops to Korea at the October 5 meeting. Once the decision was made, the Chinese leaders acted immediately. (It is unclear whether this decision was taken before or after Mao received Stalin's response--which strongly urged Chinese intervention in Korea, even at the risk of World War III--to his earlier telegram indicating doubt about entering the war.) After the October 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to dine with him, and they further discussed some of the details. Mao also instructed Peng and Gao to travel to Shenyang to convey the Politburo's decision to division-level commanders of the Northeast Border Defense Army, preparing to enter operations in Korea by October 15. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which made concrete arrangements about how the troops should prepare to enter operations in Korea.¹⁸

        It should also be noted that there exists no irreconcilable contradiction between the Chinese leaders' previous agreement to send troops to Korea and Mao's expression that China would "refrain from advancing troops" in the Russian version. Scholars who believe that China had completely changed its stand have ignored an important condition, that is, every time the Chinese leaders mentioned that China would send troops to Korea, they made it clear that a crucial precondition for taking action was that the enemy forces crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou Enlai's meeting with K. M. Pannikar, India's ambassador to China, early in the morning of October 3, the Chinese premier particularly emphasized that if the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had crossed the 38th parallel, China would intervene.¹⁹ As of October 2, this precondition had not yet materialized.²⁰

        In addition to the above factors, Mao did not give Stalin a direct and positive response because he sensed the need to put more pressure on Stalin. An important condition for China to enter a war with the United States was that it would receive substantial military support, especially air cover for Chinese ground forces, from the Soviet Union. By analyzing the two versions of Mao's telegram, a common point was that Mao believed that if China was to enter the war, it must win the war, and win it quickly. Only a speedy victory would solve all of China's difficulties and worries. In order to achieve a rapid victory, it was necessary that the Soviet Union, China's main ally, provide the PRC with adequate military assistance, air support in particular. However, Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to Mao, as well as in several other communications with the Chinese leadership before and afterward, failed to clarify this crucial issue. Without reaching clearly-defined and concrete agreements with the Soviets, Mao might have felt that it was better not to give Stalin's request a direct and positive response. This could have been the most important reason underlying Mao's proposal to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet Stalin. And this also could explain why, given that the Chinese leadership had already made the decision to enter the Korean War, Mao told Stalin on October 7 that China "would not be able to send troops [to Korea] at this moment, but would do so after some time."²¹ The key question had now become Soviet air support for Chinese troops that were to fight in Korea.

¹ See my paper, "China Was Forced to Enter the Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Process," prepared for "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," international conference sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996.

² For Kim's letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the original is kept in the Archives of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49.

³ Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 114.

⁴ Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic] (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 539-540.

⁵ Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao makes it clear that the text of the telegram published is incomplete. In the original of the telegram, according to Chen Jian, who based his description on "interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing's military researchers with access to Mao's manuscripts," Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the Chinese large amounts of military equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well as to confirm that the Soviet Union would provide the Chinese with air support when Chinese troops entered operations in Korea. See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 177.

⁶ For examples of such citations, see the editor's note in footnote 30 of Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), at 107.

⁷ Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao Zedong, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 114-115.

⁸ For the article and accompanying documents, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 94-119.

⁹ Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," 107, fn. 30.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ By comparison, early on the morning of 2 October 1950, Mao sent another telegram to Gao Gang and Deng Hua which carries the record of when it was dispatched (2:00 am) and the signature of Yang Shangkun, director of CCP Central Administrative Office, to witness its dispatch. For the text of the telegram, see Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1:538.

¹² See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, 173. My own interviews, as well as those of Xu Yan (a leading Chinese scholar on the history of the Korean War), also confirmed that the 1 October 1950 Central Secretariat meeting did not reach a consensus on sending troops to Korea.

¹³ Telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Deng Hua, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol.1, p.538.

¹⁴ Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan [A Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1993), 400.

¹⁵ Basing his discussion of the meeting on the Chinese version of Mao's 2 October 1950 telegram, Chen Jian, in China's Road to the Korean War (p. 175), asserted that top CCP leaders had reached general consensus on sending troops to Korea at the October 2 meeting, and that Mao proposed before the end of the meeting that he would personally send a telegram to Stalin to inform the Soviet leader of the decision.  This points appears to be in error if the Russian version is correct.

¹⁶ Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs] (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1984), 735.

¹⁷ Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu [The Autobiographical Note of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: People's Press, 1981), 472-74.

¹⁸ Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang [The First Test of Strength] (Beijing: Chinese Television and Broadcasting Press, 1990), 24; Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, 185. For Stalin's reply (n.d., probably October 5 or 6) to Mao's earlier telegram, see Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, 8 [7] October 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116-17.

¹⁹ Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990), 25-27.

²⁰ According to the intelligence reports the Chinese leaders had received by October 2, only South Korean troops had crossed the parallel. As late as October 14, when U.S.-South Korean troops had broken up the North Korean defense line for Pyongyang, Mao, in accordance with the intelligence reports from the Chinese military, still believed that "it seems that the Americans are yet to decide whether or not and when they would attack Pyongyang ... The American troops are now still stationed at the [38th] parallel." Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1: 559-61.

²¹ See Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116.

 translated by CHEN Jian