In 1949, Stalin insisted that the unification of the Korean peninsula had to be realized in a peaceful manner.  In early 1950, however, he suddenly approved North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s proposal for invading South Korea.  Until very recently, the only clue to the reason for this major policy shift was found in a telegram Stalin sent’s telegram to Mao Zedong on 14 May 1950.  In it, Stalin simply stated that “in light of the altered international situation, we agree with the proposal of the Koreans to move toward reunification.”[1]  What Stalin meant by the phrase “altered international situation” has remained a mystery.  Scholars have been simply unable to explain this sudden and dramatic transformation in the Soviet Union’s policy toward Korea in 1950.

In the mid-1990s, the Russian government declassified a number of crucial documents on the Korean War.  In addition, many new memoirs and interviews on the subject have been recently published in China.  These new sources have led scholars to thoroughly reconsider many aspects of the Korean War and Soviet foreign policy.[2]   In particular, much discussion has revolved around Stalin’s shifting attitudes toward Korea in 1950. Scholars have debated the possible impact on Stalin of factors such as the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, the development of Soviet nuclear capabilities, the determination that the United States would not intervene in Korea, and the desire to offset the U.S. presence in Japan with the establishment of a Communist state in Korea.[3]

       In their book Uncertain Partners, Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai argue that Stalin’s main goal in Korea was to expand the Soviet Union’s buffer zone.  Korea gave Stalin a springboard from which he could invade Japan in future conflicts.  In addition, they contend that Stalin’s Korea policy was designed to test U.S. will and aggravate the hostility between China and the United States.  Finally, they believe that Stalin wished to divert American military attention away from Europe.[4] John W. Garver places primary emphasis on Stalin’s attitude toward Japan, contending that Stalin hoped to prevent that country from becoming a U.S. military base.[5] A. V. Torkunov, on the other hand, concludes that Stalin felt free to do as he wished in Korea, since the Soviet leaders assumed the United States was only interested in Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kaishek) fate in Taiwan.  In addition, Torkunov argues that Stalin was influenced by Soviet inroads into the U.S. nuclear monopolynuclear progress, and he contends that Stalin viewed this as a shift in the balance of power that could deter U.S. intervention in the Far East.[6]

       This essay will analyze the