railroad was to replace the China Eastern Railway.[58] If the North Koreans lost, China would be forced to ask the Soviet Union to retain its troops in Port Lushun and Dalian. In either case, Stalin would be the victor.

       Stalin had long understood the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula for Soviet security interests. The department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry responsible for the Far East sent a report to the negotiators of the Potsdam Conference on 29 June 1945, pointing out the significance of the Korea issue.  The report declared that the Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 1905), as a Russian war against Japanese expansion onto the Asian continent, was “a historically justified act.”  It further argued that “Japan must be forever excluded from Korea, since a Korea under Japanese rule would be a threat to the eastern territories of the USSR.” The report concluded:

Korean independence must be effective enough to prevent Korea from being turned into a staging ground for future aggression against the USSR, not only from Japan, but also from any other power which would attempt to put pressure on the USSR from the East.  The surest guarantee of the independence of Korea and the security of the USSR in the Far East would be the establishment of friendly and close relations between the USSR and Korea.[59]

In essence, the Soviet leaders fully understood that they had to try to prevent Korea from becoming a springboard for military action on the Asian continent.

       During the late 1940s, the Soviet Union placed special weight on several strategic areas in the southern part of the Korean peninsula and linked these areas with Port Lushun in China.  A newly declassified document from Russian archives reveals that in September 1945, the Soviet Union asked that “the island Kvel’part [Chejudo] be placed in the Chinese occupation zone,” arguing that this would  “motivate Chinese interest in strengthening the strategic position of the Soviet-Chinese military-naval base at Port Arthur.”  The report further added that, upon the conclusion of the occupation regime (presumably after two years), “Korea must become a trust territory of the four powers, with apportionment of three strategic regions: Pusan, (Tsinkai), Kvel’part Island (Saisiu), and Chemul’po (Dzinsen) [Inchon], which must be controlled by the Soviet military command.” The report concluded that by

insisting on the appointment for the USSR of the Strategic regions in Korea, we can exert pressure on the American positions, using their wish to acquire strategic regions in the Pacific Ocean.  In case the proposal of granting the Soviet Union these strategic regions in Korea is met with opposition, it is possible to propose joint Soviet-Chinese control over the strategic regions.[60]

Another report in September 1945 added that:

In the agreement that determines the conditions of the four-power trusteeship over Korea, the apportionment of the following strategic regions must be provided for, in accordance with article 82 of the U.N. Charter: Pusan and Tsinkai, Kvel’part Island, Dzinsen (Chemul’po). These regions, of essential importance for securing dependable sea communications and approaches to the Soviet military-naval base at Port Arthur, which is in joint use with the Chinese Republic, must be subject to special military control, carried out by the Government of USSR, in correspondence with the provisions of the UN Charter.[61]

       SAfter signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in August 1945 and the Soviet-American agreement to divide Korea along the 38th parallel convinced , Stalin felt that Soviet strategic aims were satisfied for the time