being. But after his meetings with Mao four years later, Stalin realized that returning Lushun to China would mean that Moscow would lose direct control of the only warm water port in the Far East. Soviet strategic interests were again at stake. Control of the strategic regions on the Korean peninsula again returned to his agenda.

Russia had a long tradition of adjusting its Far Eastern policy to suit changing international situations. It is well known that after the humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Tsarist government reevaluated its strategies and tactics in East Asia. Tsarist Russia began to encourage an independence movement in Mongolia and then negotiated a compromise with Japan, in which Russia acknowledged Japan’s special position in Korea in exchange for Japan’s acknowledgement of a Russian “sphere of influence” in Mongolia.[62] In 1950, when Stalin shifted the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy in East Asia from keeping Lushun to pursuing new warm water ports in Korea, he was following the precedent set by previous Russian rulers. 

The Calculations Underlying Stalin’s New Korea Policy

      During the early stages of the Cold War, Stalin adhered to three basic principles in U.S.—Soviet relations.  First, he avoided open confrontation with the United States. Though he believed that conflict between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable, and though he never excluded the possibility of an eventual war, he was cautious, realizing that Soviet military and economic inferiority meant that any open clash with the West would most likely result in Soviet defeat.  The Berlin crisis had highlighted Soviet weaknesses.  Stalin drew lessons from that conflict and decided to provided North Korea with weaponry and military planning secretly, even though he supported Kim Il Sung’s military invasion.  Stalin refused to allow Soviet military personnel to participate in the war directly.  On 20 June 1950, Shtykov sent Moscow an urgent telegram:  “Kim Il Sung has asked me to communicate the following: ships are needed for the attack and landing.  Two ships have arrived, but we have not been able to prepare crews.  He also requests ten Soviet advisers.  I believe this request should be satisfied.”  Stalin replied two days later: “Your proposal is rejected.  It gives grounds for interference.”[63] The Soviet Union became even more cautious after the outbreak of the Korean War.

       Second, Stalin always carefully calculated the probability of U.S. intervention in any given conflict.  He grew anxious about the possible U.S. responses to tensions in Korea in the summer of 1949, and he urged Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Embassy inof Pyongyang to assess the situation. Kim Il Sung believed that the U.S. would not interfere directly, he thought that the United States would do little more than provide Seoul with air force and navy supports or assist military command.[64] Stalin was not so sanguine. But Acheson’s January 1950 speech excluding Korea from America’s western Pacific defensive perimeter seemed to confirm Kim’s assessment, and Stalin therefore agreed to meet Kim in Moscow to discuss his plans to attack the South. According to Mun Il, Kim Il Sung’s interpreter during his visit to Moscow in April 1950, Kim gave Stalin four reasons why the U.S. would not intervene: the North Koreans would launch a decisive surprise attack; the war would be won in three days; there would be an uprising of 200,000 Communist party members in South Korea; and the guerrillas in the southern provinces would support the Korean People’s Army. Thus the United States would not have time to interfere.[65]