shift in Stalin’s Korea policy on three different levels.  First, it will examine the historical and political context of Soviet policy toward Korea in the 1950s.  Second, it will provide an in-depth look at Stalin’s immediate incentives to shift his Korea stance.  Finally, it will look at Stalin’s calculations of the means necessary for the success of his new policy.  At each level, issues such as the Sino-Soviet alliance, the growing Sino-American confrontation, the complicated U.S-Soviet relationship, and the postwar Asian context will be considered.

The Political Context in 1950

       The strategic goals of Soviet foreign policy after World War II fell into three major, interrelated major categories: peaceful coexistence, world revolution, and national security. Among the three, priority was given to national security. Stalin alternately exploited peaceful coexistence for propagandistic purposes or engaged in promoting world revolution whenever expedient. Both of these strategic goals, however, were ultimately subordinate to his perception of what would best serve the Soviet Union’s national security interests. 

Because of the innate contradictions among the three goals, Stalin’s foreign policy was continually shifting in the postwar period.  In the first years after the war, Stalin hoped to cooperate with Western allies and desired to consolidate and develop the benefits he gained through the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences.  At the same time, Stalin sought to expand into such regions as Turkey and Iran, which the Yalta Conference did not touch.  But Stalin never let his desire to extend the Soviet sphere of influence overcome his policy of cooperation with the West.  The Soviet Union adopted a policy of retreat and compromise when confronted with a firm position by the United States and Great Britain.  Soviet withdrawal from Iran, Manchuria, and North Korea revealed that Stalin’s expansionist goal was limited.  Whenever possible, he avoided direct conflict with the United States.[7]

The Marshall Plan of June 1947 changed Stalin’s attitude.  In his view, the Plan was designed to create an anti-Soviet bloc in Europe. Stalin vehemently opposed the U.S. attempts to expand Western influence into Eastern Europe and to simultaneously rearm occupied western Germany, Russia’s historical enemy.  The Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan pushed the United States and the Soviet Union deeper into Cold War conflict. After 1947, Stalin’s policy toward the United States and the West became increasingly aggressive.[8]

       U.S.—Soviet conflict first took place in Europe first.  The Berlin Crisis of June 1948—May 1949 , brought the Cold War to center stage in world affairs.  However, the firm stance taken by the U.S. and Western Europe forced the Soviet Union to back down. When Stalin decided to show his determination against the United States on Germany, he did not expect that the United States would be so unyielding because he had underestimated U.S. military and economic strength. Consequently, Stalin decided to abandon direct confrontation with the United States in Europe when he realized that the Soviet Union did not have the means to do so effectivelymount an effective challenge. [9]

       It was in this international context that Stalin turned his major strategic attention to East Asia, where hostilities had been growing in the late 1940s. The victorious Chinese revolution and Beijing’s adoption of a pro-Soviet “leaning-to-one-side” policy greatly increased the tension and uncertainty in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  At the same time, tensions also grew between Soviet-controlled North Korea