place>’s instructions reluctantly,[20] but they did not stop preparing for military action.  When a ferocious fight took place near the 38^th parallel on 14 October 1949, Stalin was furious as Shtykov and other Soviet military advisers had supported this action without reporting it to Moscow. Gromyko severely reprimanded Shtykov: “You were forbidden to recommend to the North Korean government that they take action against the South Koreans without approval of the Center, and you were told that it was necessary for you to present the Center timely reports on all actions and events occurring along the 38th parallel.”[21] At this point, Stalin still preferred to solve the Korea issue through peaceful means. 

Why was Stalin reluctant to take military action in Korea?  Soviet documents have shown that Stalin was primarily concerned about two things:  the possibility of U.S. intervention in Korea, and North Korea’s lack of preparedness for war.[22] However, these concerns were not sufficient to prevent Stalin from permitting the North Korean Communists from starting a revolutionary war.  But Stalin needed the impetus to justify taking action—a  motive that would override the above concerns.

Indeed, when Stalin finally changed his mind and approved Kim Il Sung’s plans in late January 1950, these concerns had not been alleviated.  The preconditions for North Korean action against the South still did not exist:  The North had not established new liberated areas in the South and had not encouraged guerrilla activity there.[23] But careful analysis of the changing international situation in East Asia in late 1949 and early 1950 demonstrates that it was the rise of Communist China and the resulting Sino-Soviet alliance that created a new impetus for Stalin to change his Korea policy.

The Impetus for Shifting Soviet Policy Toward Korea

       Stalin began to adopt a different Korean peninsula policy in the first few months in early 1950. According to Shtykov’s report to Moscow on 19 January 1950, Kim Il Sung raised the unification issue again at a luncheon held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Korea on 17 January.  Kim suggested that the liberation of the South should happen after revolution in China had been accomplished.  In Kim’s own words,

The people of South Korea trust me and rely on our armed might.  Guerrillas cannot solve the problem.  The people of South Korea know that we have a good army.  Lately I have not slept well at night, thinking about how to resolve the question of the unification of the whole country.  If the matter of … the unification of the country is drawn out, then I may lose the trust of the Korean people.

Kim acknowledged that Stalin had given permission for Northern action only if the South instigated hostilities, but he argued that this meant a long delay while waiting for Rhee Syngman to act.  Kim again expressed the wish to visit Stalin and procure permission for action against the South. Kim even assured Shtykov that the Korean People’s Army could take the Ongjin peninsula in three days, and then push to capture Seoul in the several days following. Keeping the Soviet Politburo’s 24 September 1949 resolution in mind, Shtykov did not give Kim an encouraging response.[24]

In a surprise move, Stalin himself changed his mind after hearing Kim’s report. He cabled Kim personally on 30 January:

I received your report. I understand the dissatisfaction of Comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that an effort as important as the one he wishes to undertake in South Korea needs careful preparation.  The matter must be organized so that it will not be such a great risk.  If he wants to discuss this matter with me, then I will always be ready to receive him and discuss it with him.  Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter.<A title="" style="mso-endnote-id: edn25" href="#_edn25" name="_edn