Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War:Soviet Strategic Goals in the Far East in Early 1950
r and Outer Mongolia could be merged into one autonomous
province of China.
When Mikoyan rejected this proposal, Mao did not press the matter.
During Mao’s visit to
Moscow from December 1949 to February 1950
(which Zhou Enlai joined in January 1950), the status quo of
Outer Mongolia was recognized in a joint statement.
[37]
The CCP paid a special attention to the question of Xinjiang. Mao informed Mikoyan of the importance of Xinjiang and reminded him that the independence movement in Yili was supported by the Soviet Union. This movement possessed Soviet antiaircraft guns, tanks, and planes. Mikoyan assured Mao that the Soviet Union did not support the independence movement of minorities in Xinjiang and that it had no territorial designs on that region. CCP leaders were not convinced and pressed the matter again in the summer of 1949, when Liu Shaoqi, the second most important CCP leader, visited Moscow.[38] In the end, Soviet policy toward Xinjiang satisfied and even surprised the CCP. Stalin not only suggested to Liu that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army accelerate its liberation of Xinjiang, but he also promised to offer material assistance for this purpose.[39] It is possible that Stalin’s concession was aimed at winning a favorable bargaining position on the question of Manchuria.
The real conflict between the Soviet Union and China occurred over Manchuria. The fate of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed in 1945 depended largely on Soviet privileges in this northeastern part of China. Mao, as the founder of the new Communist Chinese state, wanted to abolish unequal treaties in order to preserve China’s national sovereignty. Stalin, on the other hand, did his best to maintain key Soviet positions in East Asia, including Manchuria. Considering the sensitivity of the matter, both sides proceeded cautiously on the question of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. Mikoyan sent a report to the Soviet Politburo admitting that the treaty was not equal and agreeing to abolish it after signing a peace treaty with Japan. The Soviet Union would withdraw its army from Lushun if the CCP thought it necessary. The Soviet Union also agreed to negotiate on the questions surrounding the China Eastern Railroad. Mao told Mikoyan that he would establish a special committee to formulate a proposal. Both sides approached these questions without undue agitation. Mikoyan felt that Mao “had his own considerations, but he did not speak out.”[40]
Liu Shaoqi raised the issue of the Sino-Soviet Treaty again when he visited Moscow in July 1949. Liu, on behalf of the CCP, proposed three alternatives: the Chinese Communist state could declare the original treaty still in effect, it could negotiate a new Sino-Soviet treaty, or it could maintain the status quo and revise the treaty at a suitable time in the future. Stalin was not pleased by Liu’s proposal. He explained the conditions under which the treaty was signed, and he listed the reasons why the Soviet Union had stationed its troops in Port Lushun. Then he made it clear that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Lushun immediately, if China so desired. Finally, Stalin stated that the three choices put forward by Liu should wait until Mao himself visited Moscow.[41] It was clear that Stalin did not want to revise the original treaty. As scholars have suggested, the proposed withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lushun was more a threat than a conciliatory gesture.