The year of 1953 was significant to both the Eastern and the Western blocs of the Cold War.  It was marked not only with Dwight Eisenhower’s ascendance to the American presidency, but also with the arrival of a group of new hosts in the Kremlins in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s death.  More importantly, the Korean War, which had brought the two blocs into a serious conflict, came to an end.

       The end of the Korean War, very much like its beginning, remains a puzzling question to historians.  In the 1980s, many scholars in the West credited Eisenhower’s nuclear diplomacy for solving the POW question of the Korean War, the last hurdle to overcome before an armistice agreement could be signed.  Yet a debate on this diplomacy’s exact role has continued.[1]  In the 1990s some Soviet and Chinese archives became accessible to researchers, and since then this development has directed scholarly attentions to the role of Chinese and Soviet policies in breaking the deadlock of the armistice negotiations.  Surely, not all questions have been answered. For instance, did the Soviets force the Chinese to stop fighting? Or, did Mao Zedong’s terms for armistice actually prevail over the Soviets? [2] Relying on newly available evidence from Chinese and Soviet archives, this article examines the policy considerations on the Chinese and the Soviet sides in the process of armistice negotiations, exploring especially the agreements and divergences between the two communist governments.

Sino-Soviet Determination on Fighting to the End     

       In the second half of 1952, while the two sides of the Korean War reached a balance of power in the battleground, the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom was entering a deadlock. The major obstacle was the POW question, which Mao Zedong had initially expected an easy solution.[3] In the meantime, in concert with his global strategy of confronting the United States, Stalin supported Mao to continue the war in Korea and not to make concessions in peace talks. In other words, until the death of Stalin, the two communist governments followed a common strategy in dealing with the Korea question.     

       North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had different ideas. In February 1952, the negotiations at Panmunjom produced a decision that ninety days after the armistice was signed, a political conference would be held to solve questions regarding the Korean state. At the time, Kim wanted to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible. In his message to Moscow, Soviet Ambassador V. N. Razuvaev indicated that Kim was inclined to sign the armistice and to leave all unsettled questions to the political conference.  He reported that “Kim Il Sung does not see any benefit in prolonging the negotiations because the American Air Force is causing horrendous losses to the Korean Democratic People’s Republic.” Kim did not see any reason for arguing over the POW question in the negotiations. Many of the Chinese POWs were Jiang Jieshi’s troops in the past and were politically unreliable in the first place.  So what was the point to argue on their behalf?  Therefore, Kim suggested that the Chinese side make concessions over the POW question in the negotiations. [4]  Kim also told Mao directly that he was unwilling to continue the war. [5]  

       As revealed in Razuvaev’s report, the Chinese leadership had a concern that “once the Korean War was over, Soviet military supply would be reduced or even terminated.” Besides, a rush to armistice might result in weakening the strength of the Chinese-Korean alliance.  Li Kenong, chief Chinese representative at the Panmunjom talks, believed that without mobilizing international public opinion and making preparations for a long-term struggle, the Chinese-Korean side would not be able to force the Americans to make concessions. Mao agreed.  He instructed Li: “You must take a firm and perseverant stand.  Only such a stand can win initiative for you and force the enemy to back down.  To achieve such a goal, you should be prepared to maneuver with the enemy for a few more months.” [6] Kim and his associates hoped initially to conclude an armistice agreement with the Americans no later than May.  They even began to use such a timetable to arrange political and economic work.  When the armistice negotiations stalled due to the POW controversy, “the Korean leaders were enormously disappointed.  Kim Il Sung urged the Chinese comrades to strive for concluding an armistice agreement through making concessions over the POW question.” [7]

       In his response to Kim, Mao spared no effort in convincing the Korean leader that it could harm the Chinese-Korean side politically and militarily if the enemy’s deceptive proposal was accepted, especially at a time when the enemy was applying military pressure through indiscriminating bombing.  Indeed, the Korean people and the CPV would have to sacrifice more in continuing the war, but they “will also be able to strengthen themselves, inspire the peace-loving people of the world to oppose aggressive wars, and push forward the world’s movement for protecting peace.”  In Mao’s opinion, the main force of the United States had been drawn to the East and had suffered greatly.  Such a situation had been advantageous to the construction in the Soviet Union and the national revolutionary movements throughout the world.  Hence a new world war was postponed.  Mao vouched to Kim that China would do its best to help the Korean people to overcome all difficulties, adding that “if our ability is not enough, I will join you in requesting Felipov’s [Stalin’s] assistance.”  Mao also informed Kim that Chinese leaders would let Stalin know about their orientations and get his opinion.  Although agreeable when corresponding with Mao, Kim still insisted to the Soviet Ambassador that an armistice agreement be concluded and an exchange of POWs be made as soon as possible in order to win international support and achieve a positive grip of the situation.[8]

       As revealed by recently declassified information, Kim was willing to concede the POW issue and discard the principle of “complete repatriation”.  Aside from his concern about casualties of war and economic damages, Kim had another reason.  That is, he planned to detain South Korean POWs.  According to a report of the Soviet Ambassador, “the Korean comrades believe that a large number of South Korean POWs should be detained and assigned to heavy manual-labor tasks in the north.  There is no need to consider their desire of going home.”  Consequently, 13,094 southern POWs were detained by the north.  6,430 of these served in the northern army and the rest served in the Interior Ministry and the Railroad Ministry.  In addition, 42,262 troops were enlisted from the southern population. [9]  

       The Chinese-Korean disagreement had to be solved in Moscow.  In August 1952, Zhou Enlai visited in the Soviet Union and held several talks with Stalin.  Later, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai also came and joined the discussions.  The Zhou-Stalin conversations covered China’s economic work, but the focus was a Korean strategy.  Zhou described for Stalin the situation in the battleground.  He asserted that the enemy’s offensive could be beaten, the Chinese-Korean troops were able to hold the current line, and they would also be able to launch counteroffensives.  In Zhou’s word, “we are certain enough that we can endure an even longer war.”  As for the POW question, Stalin pointed out that the Americans would want to solve the issue on their own terms, but that international laws provided for repatriation of all POWs except criminals.  Stalin asked about Mao’s attitude toward the issue.  Would he stand fast or make concessions?  At this point Zhou explained to Stalin the Chinese-Korean disagreement about the advantage or disadvantage of continuing the war and Mao’s insistence on “repatriation of all POWs”.  Stalin said immediately: “Mao Zedong is right.  This war is hurting the United States substantially.  The North Koreans have sacrificed their lives in the war, but they have lost nothing.  The Americans are aware that this war is to their disadvantage, and they want to end it now, especially after they learned that our troops are stationed in China.  What we need now is willpower plus patience.”  Mindful of Mao’s thinking, Stalin also brought up another issue.  He reminded Zhou: “You must be firm in dealing with the Americans.  The Chinese comrades must realize that China would never be able to regain Taiwan if the United States did not lose this war.” 

In respect to concrete steps to deal with the POW issue, Zhou proposed that in the event that the American side made some concessions, one of the following measures could be adopted.  First, if the Americans still insisted on partial repatriation, our side would announce detention of the same percentage of American and South Korean POWs; second, the POW question could be solved through mediation by a neutral country (such as India); third, an armistice agreement could be signed first, leaving the POW question to be settled later.  In their ensuing discussions, Stalin appeared to favor the first option while Zhou spent some time on the second.  Nevertheless, both agreed that in negotiations “complete repatriation” should be insisted first and no retreat should be made under American intimidation, and that the American side had to make the first move of concession.[10]

       Yet the Americans did not show any sign of conceding.  Rather, on October 8, they declared an indefinite suspension of the Panmunjom talks.  What followed was a discussion of the POW question in the United Nations.  On November 3, Mexico put forward a resolution that before a political solution of the Korean question was found, those POWs who refused repatriation should be allowed to choose a third country to live and have the right to go home later freely and under protection.  The resolution was rejected by the Soviet Union.  The Soviet representative proposed instead that although armistice could be established before the POW question was settled, eventually the question had to be solved on the basis of complete repatriation.  Two weeks later, the Indian delegation produced a resolution for establishing a four-country committee on repatriation.  These countries should be neutrals but not any member of the UN Security Council, and the committee would make necessary arrangements for the POWs’ repatriation.  On November 28, Zhou Enlai issued a statement to endorse the Soviet plan, arguing that the complete-repatriation principle was prescribed by the Geneva Convention and international precedents and therefore must not be violated.  In mid-December, after a revised version of the Indian resolution was approved by the UN Assembly, China expressed its objection on the ground that the resolution only justified forced detention of Chinese POWs.  Accordingly, the Chinese government demanded the resolution’s cancellation.[11]  Since Zhou’s November 28 statement had not mentioned the Indian resolution, speculations in the American and the Indian governments were made that Beijing’s stand differed from Moscow’s and that only under Moscow’s pressure did China reject the UN resolution.[12]  Evidence from the Chinese side makes such speculations groundless.  From the very beginning Mao was opposed to POWs’ repatriation on a voluntary basis.  He regarded the Indian resolution as absurd and did not see any point in reacting to it.[13]

       As a matter of fact, at the time the Chinese leaders focused their attention on a possible expansion of the war, but not on a solution of the POW question.  In a report to Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, dated November 24, the Operation Department of the General Staff estimated that although America’s Korea policy would not change for a while because of its presidential election and Korea’s weather conditions, after next March, when it turned warm, the new president would likely make some military move.  In a report to Mao in early December, Deng Hua, acting commander of the CPV, also suggested that a Republican administration would possibly take a more rigid and radical stand on Korea.  According to Deng’s analysis, these were the reasons: the Wall Street wanted to use Eisenhower to show that more than before the United States was making preparations for war; Secretary of State Dulles would push America’s policy goals in the Far East; American commanders in Korea had already requested more troops and showed interest in landing behind the Chinese-Korean lines.  In his report Deng stated confidently that the CPV was ready to carry out a protracted warfare against the enemy.[14] 

Having seen the report, Mao was convinced that the enemy would almost certainly parachute five to seven divisions behind the CPV line in the coming spring.  He directed the CPV to get into position immediately five armies to deal with the expected offensive.[15]  At the same time, the Chinese General Staff received intelligence from the Soviets that the Americans would launch a major offensive in February 1953.  Allegedly, the enemy’s goal was to occupy entire North Korea up to the Yalu River.  This information further strengthened Chinese leaders’ determination on making war preparations.  On December 9, Mao instructed Deng Hua to speed up the deployment of troops.  In the same day, Peng Dehuai called a meeting to study the prospect of enemy penetration behind the CPV lines and various countermeasures.  Afterwards, he reported to Mao on construction and improvement of railroads in Korea, mobilization of new troops in China, and defense arrangements in China’s Liaodong and Shangdong Peninsulas.  Two days later, Mao approved the plan.  Then, relevant orders were issued by the General Staff to instruct the CPV to ready itself for fending off the enemy’s operations behind its lines.  The Chinese leadership viewed the forthcoming encounter as a key to defeat the enemy, believing that once frustrated in its adventure behind the Chinese lines, America’s final defeat in the war would be sealed.[16]

       Clearly, the Chinese leadership was fully prepared for a long war.  At one of the Government Council’s meetings, Zhou Enlai said: “Although we have stopped the enemy and made it pay a very heavy price, we have not yet beaten it to the extent that it has to seek peace.  This is the reason why the United States is sabotaging the armistice talks.  Therefore, in the coming year we must intensify the struggle of resisting America and assisting Korea, . . . and fight until the enemy has to give up.”  At the time, the Chinese government already lost interest in peace talks.  The size of the Chinese delegation to the armistice negotiations was reduced, and no further consideration was given to a discussion of the POW question with India.[17]  As of the second half of January 1953, the CPV completed a rearrangement of its lineups in the battleground.  In addition, 250,000 new recruits arrived in Korea from China; new fortresses and trenches were completed along the eastern and western coasts of Korea; the railway and highway systems were expanded and improved.  To implement these efforts, Mao sent to Stalin a series of new requests for military supplies in 1953.[18]  

       Stalin understood, just as Mao and Zhou had emphasized repeatedly, that in a sense China was fighting for the sake of the Soviet Union and that of the world revolution.  The Soviet Union therefore had an obligation to meet China’s needs.  Yet Stalin’s evaluation of the situation differed somewhat from China’s.  In a telegram to Mao, Stalin pointed out that America’s offensive plan had been made by the military under the Truman administration and could actually be changed by the incoming Eisenhower administration.  Nevertheless, he still supported Mao in making preparations for the worst scenario.  With regard to a Chinese request for 624 cannons of various types and 2,355,000 rounds of artillery shells, to be delivered between January and April 1953, Stalin considered this as excessive to his country’s ability.  These figures were in addition to the equipments for twenty divisions that Moscow already promised to the Chinese for the year of 1953.  But, in considering the Chinese demands, Stalin was still willing to add 332 cannons and 600,000 rounds of artillery shells to the original list.  He also accepted Mao’s request that these materials be delivered within the first four months of 1953.  Mao further offered that the Chinese navy would join the operations in Korea, but for this purpose he would need from the Soviet Union 18 torpedo boats, 60 coastal artilleries, and 103 airplanes no later than February.  Stalin satisfied this request to a certain degree.[19]  Thus, in terms of the ability of Soviet economy, Stalin did his best to meet the Chinese demands.  He acted so because at the time Soviet and Chinese interests converged fundamentally.  Stalin did not want an enlarged war in Korea that could involve the Soviet Union, nor an armistice agreement at the time.  To him, the best scenario was to trap the United States in Korea for a long time.

       Obviously, in considering war and peace as two options, Mao upheld a strategy that would, as long as permitted by conditions, continue the war until the enemy was forced to make concessions.  In pursuing such a strategy, the Chinese leadership was reassured by the large-scale and timely assistance from the Soviet Union.  In early 1953, in terms of military power, China was at its peak since the beginning of the war.[20]  While North Korean leaders became tired of war and eagerly wanted to take a break, the CPV was “determined, confident, and spirited” in making preparations for winning a crucial campaign that might lead to a decisive victory.[21]  It was under such a circumstance, Mao firmly reacted to the new American administration’s policies of “unleashing Jiang (Jieshi)” and threatening China with a new blockade.  On February 7, Mao stated defiantly that China was prepared to continue the war, and China would “fight to the time when American imperialism is willing to stop and when the Chinese and Korean peoples gain complete victory.”[22]      

       As far as peace talks were concerned, Mao and Zhou endorsed a conclusion reached by a Foreign Ministry group under Qiao Guanhuai in mid-February: “Action is not as advantageous as non-action.  The status quo should be prolonged until the United States becomes willing to make concessions and to take a first step.”  Mao also anticipated that the Americans might again approach the Soviets and ask them to act as the intermediary.  On February 22, in a letter General Clark suggested that wounded and sick POWs be exchanged first.[23]  CPV representative Ding Guoyu asked Beijing for instructions on how to react.  Mao decided to wait for a while because at the moment it was difficult to ascertain whether the American move was a gesture of concession or a trick played at the eve of a forthcoming UN Assembly meeting.  Moreover, the situation in the battleground was favorable to the Chinese-Korean side and would probably be able to force the Americans to make some general concessions over the POW question.[24]

       Yet, at the juncture when the Chinese poised to force an American concession with act of war, Stalin died.  Immediately Moscow’s Korea policy changed.

Moscow Decides to Back Off

       In late 1952, when talking to American reporters, Stalin indicated that the Soviet Union was interested in bringing the Korean War to an end and was willing to cooperate with the United States in achieving this goal.[25]  This should probably not be interpreted as evidence that at the time Stalin wanted to facilitate armistice in Korea.  Although Stalin’s attitude may have reflected Moscow’s reluctance to see the war to expand, he remained a staunch supporter to Mao Zedong’s hard-line policy.  Stalin was not overly concerned about any new action on the American part.  His intelligence information indicated that American military leaders did not believe in using the nuclear weapon in Korea.  Actually, they feared that if the United States failed to achieve an absolute superiority in Korea after using the nuclear weapon, not only would American prestige be damaged but also the deterrence effect of America’s nuclear stockpile be lost.[26]  In mid-February, 1953, in a conversation Staling explicitly told Indian Ambassador Krishna Menon that he was not at all interested in India’s mediating effort in Korea.  Menon saw an ominous sign himself: during the conversation Stalin drew a pack of wolves in a piece of paper and said repeatedly that farmers must kill these wolves.[27]

       On the last day of February, Stalin summoned Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, and Bulganin to his dacha.  After listening to Bulganin’s briefing on the military situation in Korea, Stalin was convinced that the deadlock in Korea could not be broken.  It was decided that the next day Molotov should propose to the Chinese and Koreans that, although military actions would have to stop eventually, they must “fight to the end” in negotiations.[28]  A few days later, when making a speech at the United Nations, Vyshinskii reiterated the Soviet proposal of December 2, 1952 on steps leading to a ceasefire in Korea, including the principle of repatriating all POWs.[29]  Evidently, Stalin did not alter his basic attitude and policy toward Korea to the end of his life.

       The sudden change of the Soviet policy after Stalin’s death happened under a special circumstance.  In the last few year of his life, Stalin’s domestic and foreign policies put the Soviet society under tremendous stress.  Even those in Stalin’s power circle, such as Molotov and Beria, felt that their positions and life were constantly endangered.[30]  Anxieties and discontent were fermenting at the very core of Soviet power, and people were longing for the arrival of the day that they could breath freely again.  After Stalin had another stroke on March 1, 1953, the rest of the leadership decided that this time he would not be able to recover.  At an urgent meeting, a new leading group was formed.  Whereas retaining his position as the first member of the presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin lost all his other titles.[31]  This was only the overture of Moscow’s new orientation.  No matter what motivated them, the new leaders in the Kremlin vied with one another in pushing a wholesale reorientation of Soviet domestic and foreign policies.  Among the changed policies, first and foremost, and also most eye-catching, was the about-face in respect to the issue of ending the Korea War.

       At the same time, the Chinese also proposed to resume the armistice talks immediately.  Previously studies have produced three interpretations.  One suggests that Mao and the North Koreans took the initiative because they saw evidence of Eisenhower’s attempt to free himself from Truman’s foreign policy legacy.  Another stresses Moscow’s post-Stalin power struggle, believing that the Chinese policy was connected to the Soviets’ domestic preoccupation.  Still another asserts that Washington’s nuclear diplomacy forced China to seek armistice.[32]  All these theories are now invalidated by newly declassified archives.  New evidence indicates that Moscow’s reorientation and Beijing’s acceptance of the new Soviet policy were the key developments that broke the stalemate in Korea.

       Surprisingly, after Stalin’s death, it was the well-known conservative and hardliner Molotov who initiated reconsideration of the Korea question.  According to Molotov’s recollections, after he regained his position in the Foreign Ministry, the first thing he did was to draft a proposal for ending the Korean conflict.  His reason was that “events have evolved to such a point that we no longer need this war forced upon us by the Koreans.”  Meanwhile, Beria also showed a positive attitude toward the Korean question.[33]  Differing from Stalin’s optimistic estimate, new Soviet leaders’ reading of intelligence information led them to consider the “worst scenario” in relation to possible American actions in the Cold War.[34]  This shifting of judgment was made by Soviet leaders without consulting their allies.

       On March 8, Zhou Enlai and a Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow to pay condolence about Stalin’s death.  In the delegation’s pre-prepared “outline agenda”, the Chinese leadership listed the war in Korea for a possible discussion with the Soviets.  There is however no evidence showing that at this point the Chinese side intended to resume the armistice negotiations.  On the 11^th, after attending Stalin’s funeral, Zhou talked with the Soviets on some general issues.  The conversation did not include any in-depth exchange about Korea between the two sides.[35]  Nevertheless, on the same day, in a public speech Malenkov said that “there is nothing that cannot be solved peacefully.”[36]  The next day, the signal became even clearer when Malenkov again told the participants in a meeting of the Supreme Soviet: “At present, all controversies and unsettled questions should be able to be solved peacefully on the basis of common consultations among countries concerned.  This should be the case for our relations with all states, including the United States.  Countries interested in preserving peace can rest assured, at present and in the future, about the firm peace policy of the Soviet Union.”[37]  A few days later, Molotov sent to Malenkov and Beria his plan for a new policy in the Korean War.[38]

       At the time, the Chinese were still deliberating what to do with the American overture.  On March 19, Mao sent a telegram to Zhou:

We have not yet answered Clark’s February 22 proposal about an exchange of wounded and sick POWs between the two sides.  Based on your suggestion, Qiao Guanhuai has drafted a rebuttal statement.  But I tabled it for the moment and will wait until your return.  The American overture could be Dulles’ trial balloon after he became the Secretary of the State.  We have two options.  One is refutation, and the other is to express willingness to discuss the issue.  Next we will need to decide a final policy, depending on the development of events.  In your conversations with Soviet comrades, you may raise the issue and ask for their opinions.”[39]

At the time Zhou was in Czechoslovakia to attend another funeral.  On this day, without consulting the Chinese, the Soviet leadership already decided its new policy toward armistice in Korea, which was soon conveyed to the Chinese and Koreans in a letter by the Soviet Council of Ministers.

       In their letter to Mao and Kim, the Soviet leaders stated unequivocally: “The Soviet government has noticed the development of the Korean incident in the past period, and studied comprehensively the issue of the Korean War under the current circumstances.  The Soviet government has reached this conclusion: it would be a mistake if the previous policy is not modified in corresponding to the characteristics of current political situation and in consideration of our three peoples’ most fundamental interests.  The Soviet, Chinese, and Korean peoples are concerned with consolidating world peace, and they have been constantly searching the way to end the Korean War as soon as possible.”  After attacking the aggressive nature of imperialism, the letter nevertheless stressed: “This does not mean that under current circumstances, we should mechanically continue the policy of the past and not try to take the initiative.  In other words, we should take advantage of the enemy’s move and find a way to get China and Korea out of the war.  This will serve not only the fundamental interests of the Chinese and the Korea peoples, but also the interests of all other peace loving peoples.”

       The letter also spelled out certain measures and steps that the Soviets deemed necessary: “(1) Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai should give an affirmative answer to General Clark’s call of February 22 for an exchange of wounded and sick POWs. (2) Immediately after the publication of Kim’s and Peng’s response, an authoritative representative of the PRC (comrade Zhou Enlai would be the best selection) should issue a statement in Beijing.  Aside from repeating a positive attitude toward exchange of wounded and sick POWs, the statement should points out that the time has arrived for taking actions to solve the POW question as a whole in order to guarantee armistice in Korea and to conclude a peace treaty.  (3) Simultaneously, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic should issue a political statement in Pyongyang, confirming the correctness of the statement by the PRC representative and expressing full support.  (4) We consider it proper that in the wake of the Beijing and Pyongyang statements, the Soviet Foreign Ministry will publicly support the stand taken by Beijing and Pyongyang.  (5) In coordination with the four steps described above, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations will take all necessary steps in New York to support and facilitate the implementation of the new policy.”

       With regard to the Clark overture, the Soviets elaborated that the Chinese and Korean response “should point out that the exchange of wounded and sick POWs is a crucial step toward a solution of the whole POW question and therefore toward a settlement of the armistice and peace treaty questions.”  Logically, the Chinese-Korean side should propose to resume the talks between the two sides’ principal representatives at Panmunjom.  Mindful of India’s UN resolution, the Soviets advised the Chinese and the Koreans that their negotiation representatives propose immediate repatriation of all POWs who wished to return home, leaving the other POWs to neutral countries’ arrangements.  In conclusion, the Soviet document stated: “Of course we cannot foresee all steps and measures that the Soviet, Chinese, and Korean governments will have to take in the future.  Nevertheless, as long as our three governments, as we heartily hope, can reach a consensus on the general line of action, we may consult one another and make decisions on other issues as events evolve.”

       Meanwhile, the Soviet government issued a directive to its UN delegation, instructing Vyshinskii to support firmly the forthcoming Chinese and Korean statements on Korean armistice.  In addition, Vyshinskii was instructed to consult with the Polish delegation for making a change in the latter’s resolution on the Korean question.  The change should delete the resolution’s content about repatriation of all POWs, and insert a sentence on immediate resumption of armistice talks and removal of the POW question as an obstacle to termination of the Korean War.  The Soviet leaders decided that the letter to Mao would be handed to Zhou Enlai for him to take back to Beijing.[40]

       Clearly, the letter still carried great-power chauvinism bequeathed from the Stalin era.  Yet, this would be the last time that the Soviets adopted such a commanding tone in their communications with the Chinese leadership.  Soon enough, Moscow sensed the independent spirit of the Chinese and also a pressure from Beijing.

Zhou Enlai returned to Moscow on March 21.  In the evening, Soviet leaders discussed with him the Korean question and gave him the letter to Mao.  Zhou explained the Chinese position, which was to take advantage of America’s unilateral and unreasonable suspension of the armistice talks and not to resume the talks for a while.  Zhou said: “To us, the struggle for the POWs’ repatriation is a just cause.  We did not make troubles and it is the enemy that intentionally created difficulties for us.”  Zhou also contended that postponement of armistice could strengthen China’s national defense and the international peace movement, weaken America’s military power and financial resources, and increase the internal contradictions within the Western bloc.  The Soviets encountered Zhou’s argument in suggesting that the policy of procrastination, if continued, would hurt Soviet, Chinese, and Korean interests, and that this was the right time to solve the armistice question.  In the Soviets’ opinion, as long as the Korean War continued, the United States could expand its military for the sake of war, postpone the arrival of its economic crisis, and force other countries to serve its own aggressive policy.  When Zhou asked whether or not the Americans would continue their policy of procrastination, the Soviets admitted that such a possibility existed and only the Americans could decide what they wanted to do.  But, they argued, “If our side refuses to make any concession, it will be more likely for the Americans to prolong the war.  If we yield a step, the Americans will run into greater difficulty in carrying out the policy of procrastination and may possibly be forced to seek a compromise.”  Hence it would be politically advantageous to concede at this time.  Zhou then asked that whether or not the wording in the letter, “immediately take all possible means”, meant the opportunity availed by the forthcoming session of the United Nations.  Soviet leaders confirmed the interpretation, and they urged Zhou to go back and solve the issue between two to five days in order to seize the window of opportunity.  In the end, Zhou stated that such a concession would mean a huge change and a new orientation.  He reminded the Soviets that China had lately worked very hard for the original policy, and that in a recent speech Mao personally stressed the significance of China’s just struggle for the POWs’ repatriation.  Therefore, he could not give the Soviet leaders an answer without first reporting to Mao and the CCP Central Committee.[41]

After meeting with Soviet leaders, Zhou immediately sent a telegram to Mao to report what had just transpired.  Mao’s response came the next day and was receptive to the Soviet proposal.  Mao pointed out that the Soviet plan was actually similar to one of the three Chinese plans delivered to Stalin in September of 1952.  The Chinese plan had not been raised at the Panmunjom talks only because of the Americans’ peremptory attitude.  Mao however did not mention a discrepancy between the Chinese and the Soviet proposals.  The Chinese plan differentiated those POWs whose status was settled by agreements and those whose was not.  To be consistent with the Chinese objection to a “voluntary repatriation” proposition, Mao wanted to avoid the Soviet wording regarding the POWs’ own will about repatriation.[42]   

The above description of events is based on information from Chinese documents.  It is rather different from an impression derived from Soviet archives.  In 1966, in considering the historical background of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Foreign Ministry submitted to Brezhnev a report on the Korean War.  According to this report, during his conversation with Soviet leaders depicted above, “Zhou Enlai, using the name of the Chinese government, requested urgently Soviet assistance in speeding up the armistice negotiations and concluding an agreement.  This Chinese stand was consistent with ours.  To guarantee effective policy implementation under a very complex situation, in March 1953 Moscow sent a special envoy to Pyongyang with a plan for facilitating the peace talks.  At the time, the Koreans also indicated that they wanted to bring military actions to an end with the fastest possible speed.”[43]  This Soviet document has caused some confusion among researchers.[44]  But, obviously, out of certain political considerations, the Soviet Foreign Ministry provided Brezhnev with a piece of false information.

China’s policy readjustment began even before Zhou Enlai returned from Moscow.  In the light of the new Soviet orientation, on March 23 Mao sent the following telegram to Ding Guoyu:

The recent actions by the other side at Panmunjom are clearly of provocation and intimidation by nature.  Therefore we must be highly vigilant and make necessary preparations for bad things to happen.  On the other hand, the other side took these actions with an obvious intention of forcing us to discuss the main issue of armistice.  This actually shows that they are anxious.  Since he took power, Eisenhower has taken a series of measures in Asia.  He wants to free himself from the restraints created by Truman and regain policy initiative.  The American proposition about exchange of wounded and sick POWs could be a tentative step on their port for changing directions at Panmunjom.  When analyzing the concrete steps of the other side, we should pay attention to these two aspects.  As for the possibility that the other side reject our communications, or even refuse to call the meetings of liaison officers, you should deal with the situation on its merits and make reasonable arguments within and without the formal meetings.  You may strongly repudiate the other side but should not force them to choose between a compromise and final collapse of the negotiations.  The other side will probably not resort to such a tactic either.  In the past, our policy toward American violation of agreements was to encounter one violation with one of our own steps regardless of the seriousness of the issues involved.  This orientation has had some negative consequences to us.  In the week to come, if there is no major incident, you should not make any protest to the other side.[45]

Mao’s telegram also indicated that a response to Clark was being drafted.  Three days later, having reported to Mao his discussions with Soviet leaders, Zhou worked with Mao in deciding the steps for the Chinese government to take.[46] 

       In the meantime, the Soviet government already made a public gesture of reconciliation toward the West.  On March 21, in Moscow’s radio broadcasting it was reported that the Soviet government was willing to help achieve the release of nine British diplomats and missionaries detained by North Korea after the breakout of the war.  A few days later, Molotov cabled Kim Il Sung and asked the Korean authorities to consider releasing fourteen detained French nationals.  Molotov reasoned that under the current circumstance, it would be politically appropriate to respond positively to the French government’s request.[47]

       Moscow’s new orientation was exactly what Korea needed.  Reportedly, after learning about Moscow’s reorientation, Kim was “very happy and cheered excitedly”.[48]  As reported by a special Soviet envoy to Pyongyang, Kim told him repeatedly that he agreed completely with the Soviet proposal on the Korean situation, and hoped to see the implementation of the proposal as soon as possible.  Kim believed that “continuation of the current situation would be to the great disadvantage of Korea, China, and the entire democratic camp,” and that “the Soviet government’s proposition is the wisest and most correct policy.”  He also complained that “every day Korea endured tremendous losses in both the frontline and the rear areas (nearly 300-400 death per day), and it would be unwise to continue arguing with the Americans over how many of the controversial POWs should be repatriated.”[49] The last comment was obviously a complaint against the Chinese.

       Indeed, although Chinese leaders made preparations for different contingencies regarding the armistice negotiations, at the time they accepted only reluctantly the Soviet proposal that China make the first move of reconciliation toward the Americans.  In pursuance of Moscow’s proposed steps, Beijing notified Kim Il Sung that the negotiations would be resumed.  Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhuai departed for Kaesong.  On March 28 an answer to Clark was delivered.  And, two days later, Zhou Enlai issued a “Statement on the Question of Armistice Negotiations in Korea”.  But Mao Zedong had his own ideas, and he still wanted to strike the best deal possible for China if permitted by conditions.

Mao Zedong’s Effort to Strike the Best Deal

       Among Stalin’s successors, no one could match Mao Zedong in terms of ability, experience, and theoretical sophistication.  Since both the Chinese and the Soviet systems were disposed to uphold an individual leader’s role, the death of Stalin obviously had a significant impact on the two countries’ bilateral relationship.  The impact was first reflected in the question of armistice in Korea.  As shown by declassified Chinese and Soviet archival materials, when Stalin was still alive, Mao sent reports to and requested advice from Moscow about almost every single issue related to the Korean War, though most of the telegrams were drafted by Zhou Enlai.  After Stalin’s death and the issuance of Moscow’s new orientation, the Moscow factor in Mao’s handling of the Korean armistice question changed.  Now, he rarely asked Soviet leaders’ opinion and no longer communicated with them in person.  As far as the general policy for achieving armistice was concerned, Mao respected Moscow’s opinion and agreed to make the first reconciliatory gesture.  But in concrete negotiations and measures to end the war, China followed completely its own course of action, one of fighting and talking simultaneously.  In this regard, it was the Soviet leadership that followed Mao’s decision.  

       In a statement dated April 1, Molotov stressed that the new policy meant not only an exchange of wounded and sick POWs but also resumption of negotiations for a general solution of the POW question and conclusion of an armistice agreement.[50]  Yet to Chinese leaders, the highest priority remained military attack on the UN forces in the battleground.  On April 3, at a Government Council meeting Zhou Enlai delivered a report on Korean negotiations.  He said that although resumption of negotiations had bee decided and resultantly the possibility of ending the war had greatly increased, the possibility of war’s continuation however did not disappear.  “These words still hold true: struggle for peace but fear no war.”  In a telegram to Qiao Guanhuai, which Zhou drafted on Mao’s behalf and was also conveyed to Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, it was clearly spelled out that at the liaison meeting scheduled for April 6, the Chinese-Korean side would only talk about exchanging wounded and sick POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention, but not any new proposal or a timetable for resuming the formal negotiations.  Another telegram, dated April 8, instructed Chinese representatives to issue a statement upon the conclusion of an agreement on exchange of wounded and sick POWs.  It should declare China’s right to demand transfer of Chinese POWs detained by the enemy to a neutral state.[51]  The reason behind such a ploy was simple: at the time China was making preparations for a new offensive.

       As of April 1953, the CPV nearly completed its preparations for countering the enemy’s landing operations.  It now included nineteen armies of 1.35 million troops (the Korean People’s Army had six army corps of 0.45 million troops).  With significantly enhanced firepower, fortified position, replenished material supplies, the CPV had no more logistical worries and achieved a greater degree of strategic maneuverability.  Between January and April, the CPV and the KPA conducted more than 770 operations and destroyed more than 50,000 of the enemy’s troops.  During the first season, the CPV Air Force flew 4,093 sorties in 399 groups, and downed 50 and damaged 16 of American airplanes.  These factors tremendously boosted the CPV troops’ morale and they were eager to fight.[52]  

       In the end of March, Wang Jianan, commander of the Ninth Corps of the CPV, cabled the CPV headquarters and the Central Military Commission of the CCP, recommending that a tactical counteroffensive be launched in the first half of May.  The rationale was that with careful preparations, a CPV army could surely overrun the position of an enemy battalion, and that if all CPV frontal armies operated in such a way simultaneously, the effect would amount to an annihilating strike and could wreak havoc on the enemy.  On April 1, CPV deputy commander Yang Dezhi replied to Wang and praised his thinking.  Two days later, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Yang and Wang on behalf of the Central Military Commission.  The telegram approved the plan, and it pointed out that small-scale offensives could both train CPV troops and facilitate the armistice negotiations.  The timetable could even be moved forward if Yang decided the conditions were favorable.  Later, Mao further instructed commanders in Korea that the policy was to strive for peace but to prepare for war’s continuation.  Especially, the CPV troops had to be prepared for a prolonged war and focus their attention on fighting; negotiations were not the troops’ concern and they must implement the original plan without any relaxation.  In late April, Deng Hua reported from Korea that even if the war could stop this time, it would still take a considerable time to realize ceasefire.  In his estimate, the enemy would likely use military pressure to blackmail the Chinese-Korean side.  Therefore, the CPV must adopt a tit-for-tat orientation and use active operations to support negotiations.  He indicated that the time for counteroffensive was set for the period from early June to the first half of July, and that all preparations would be completed before the end of May.  On April 23, Mao put a remark on Deng’s cable: “This document seems approvable.  Tell them to get ready to attack.  If an early armistice is achieved, or for the sake of negotiations military operations are suspended, an appropriate decision can be made some time in May.”[53]

       Indeed, although the Panmunjom talks resumed on April 26, it did not proceed smoothly.  Issues such as disposition of POWs who declined repatriation and time limits for the work of a neutral repatriation commission were discussed.  The Chinese side suggested different plans on these matters and actively sought solutions with the Americans through the Indian government.  Meanwhile, the preparations for a new offensive were being completed.  On April 30, Peng Dehuai ordered the CPV troops to intensify their attacks and try to destroy one or two enemy companies in every operation.  The purpose was to train newly arrived troops as well as to facilitate armistice negotiations.  It was also made clear that if the negotiations continued to run into troubles, the planned new campaign would be launched in June.  On May 11, Deng Huai further informed the troops that it was unlikely to conclude armistice before June, and therefore the campaign would begin on June 1.  Yet, two days later, the CPV started the summer campaign ahead of the schedule.  The immediate reason was an American counterproposal that all those Korean POWs not for direct repatriation should be released on the spot.  This was unacceptable to the Chinese side, and the talks were again interrupted.  On May 16, in a directive the CCP Central Military Commission asserted that “the armistice negations are still stalling, and it is hard to predict when armistice can be achieved.  Therefore, our operational orientation in Korea remains the same: ‘make progress steadily and strike sure blows in a prolonged war’.”[54]  No evidence suggests that from this point to early June, Chinese leaders ever consulted with the Soviets about military operations and negotiation plans.  

       The negotiations would not resume until June 4, and armistice was concluded on June 8.  The reason for this turn of events, according to studies in the West, was Washington’s threat to enlarge the war and to use tactical nuclear weapons.  This interpretation is based on the fact that in early 1953 scientists in the nuclear lab of New Mexico succeeded in producing tactical nuclear weapons, and this led the American military to reconsider the policy of not using nuclear weapons in the Far East.  As the armistice talks again ran into a deadlock, on May 20 the United States National Security Council approved a suggestion made by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs.  Accordingly, Clark was instructed to prepare a plan for launching offensives and using tactical nuclear weapons in the event that the negotiations collapsed.  Between May 21 and 22 Dulles visited India.  He asked Nehru to convey a warning to China that if the armistice negotiations failed, the United States would likely take stronger military actions.  On May 25, American Ambassador Charles Bohlen also exerted some pressure when meeting with Molotov.[55]

       These developments, however, cannot support the interpretation mentioned above.  The question is whether or not the Americans intended to send a clear message of nuclear threat to China, or whether or not the Chinese ever received such a message.  Neither Dulles nor Bohlen explicitly indicated that the United States would use nuclear weapons.  Thus, naturally, Nehru and Molotov, the intended intermediaries, could not possibly send such messages to China.  Until now no documented evidence has surfaced to indicate that in this period Moscow contacted Beijing in respect to Korea, not to mention its applying pressure on the Chinese leadership.  As for the American side of information, neither directives from Washington nor reports by negotiation representatives at Panmunjom indicate that the American side ever made any direct warning to the Chinese side.  The strongest American representation was no more than a statement that the United States would not endorse an endless and fruitless negotiation.[56]

       Even if the possibility of the Chinese government’s receiving of an American warning is accepted, as the development of event shows, the Chinese did not pay much attention to such a warning.  After the Americans put forward their proposal on May 25, the CPV began the second and more extensive phase of the summer campaign.  A readjustment was indeed made about the targets to be attacked.  On June 1, the CPV headquarters ordered its troops that in view of the situation at Panmunjom, “currently the main target of counterattack should be [Syngman] Rhee’s puppet troops.”  The troops were commanded to launch determined strikes against Rhee’s forces and eliminate as many of them as possible.  In the meantime, British and other countries’ forces should be spared.  As for American units, the attack should be aimed at those whose sizes were smaller than a company.  Yet the original campaign preparations against the American forces should still be implemented just in case that such an offensive became necessary.  In addition, the CPV troops were ordered to beat back all enemy’s offensives, no matter these were launched by which country’s forces.  The CPV offensive did not stop until June 16.  In the end it enlarged the CPV position by 58 square kilometers and killed, wounded, and captured about 41,000 enemy troops.[57]    

       As a matter of fact, it was the American side that made the decisive concessions.  These led to the conclusion of the armistice agreement on June 8.  The American proposal of May 25 already accepted the Chinese stand in principle.  As stated by Bohlen in his meeting with Molotov: “In comparison with the Korean-Chinese plan of May 7, the United Nation’s has clearly made significant concessions.  First, the UN representatives gave up their earlier position on releasing those POWs who would have declined repatriation upon the effective date of the armistice agreement.  The new UN proposal stipulates that both the Korean and the Chinese POWs should be handed to the commission of neutral states.  Secondly, according to the new UN proposal, the Korean and Chinese sides will have three months to make explanations among the POWs.  The time limit set in the old UN plan was two months and the other side wanted four months.”  In addition, “the new UN plan accepted the other side’s proposal about transferring the POW question to a political commission.  As a supplementary measure, the UN representatives now agree that decisions in the commission of neutral states will be made by a majority vote.  Therefore, the UN representatives have given up their original position on this matter, which supported a unanimous decision by the five member states of the neutral commission.”[58]  The Chinese side of information also shows that the Chinese accepted the American proposal because it was deemed “in agreement with the basic orientations of our May 7 plan.”[59]

       At least in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the Chinese-Korean side had the upper hand both in battleground and in negotiations.  On June 5, Zhou Enlai summarized the situation in these words:

Right after he took the presidency, Eisenhower fired empty cannons to scare people.  He talked about five policy measures: first, an offensive against our flank, second, bombardment of the Northeast [of China], third, harassment along our coasts, fourth, nuclear intimidation, and five, invasion of China mainland.  We have frustrated all five. . . .  We made preparations for the first three and the last two could not be accepted by America’s allies lest these cause a world war.”[60]

The connotation of statements like this was that if possible, China would strive to get a better deal in armistice.  On June 17, Syngman Rhee took steps to “release the POWs”, and this created an opportunity for the Chinese side to enlarge its gains.  On the one hand, the Chinese sent a strongly worded letter to Clark regarding the new development.  On the other, they suspended the negotiations and were ready to resort to military actions again.  Peng Dehuai was scheduled to leave for Korea to sign the armistice agreement on June 19, but he wanted to strike South Korea one more time.  On June 20, he cabled Mao and suggested to postpone the signing of armistice to the end of the month in order to destroy another 15,000 of Rhee’s troops.  Mao endorsed the plan and replied to Peng the next day: “The signing of armistice must be postponed, and the timing will have to be determined by the development of events.  It is absolutely necessary to destroy another ten thousand puppet troops.”  On June 25, the CPV troops at the frontline received an order that they speed up operation preparations and be ready to hit hard on South Korean forces.  The CPV’s 20^th Corps was set to use two or three armies to penetrate the enemy lines after accomplishing the initial tasks.  As Li Kenong stated in a telegram to Mao, “Armistice in Korea is certain.  Although currently the negotiations will be prolonged a bit, the actual preparatory work for armistice should not be stopped.  We must take advantage of the favorable situation and work for a relatively stable armistice.”[61]  This political consideration decided the actions that the Chinese would take in the weeks to come.  On June 29, Clark sent a letter to the Chinese side, admitting that the “release of POWs” was a serious incident.  He promised that the UN forces would do their best to recall those released POWs.  In the meantime, he suggested that the two sides resume negotiations in order to set a date for the armistice to become effective.  The letter however did not stop China to prepare a new offensive according to its plan.  On July 6, the CPV’s 20^th Corps decided to attack on the night of July 13, which would start a campaign lasting from five to ten days.  In the next day the CCP Central Military Commission approved the plan.[62]

       At the time, the two sides already reached an agreement on armistice and the only thing left to do was to sign the document.  A new campaign at this juncture would certainly cause problems with the Soviets.  Therefore, this time the Chinese leadership felt necessary to inform Moscow in advance of its political considerations and planned measures.  According to a report by the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, Chinese deputy foreign minister Wu Xiuquan visited the embassy at 3:30 on the morning of July 3.  Under Zhou Enlai’s instruction, he handed to the Soviets China’s reply to the Clark letter of June 29 and a report by the Chinese government on “The Current Situation in the Armistice Negotiations and Measures to Deal with the Clark Letter.”  In the opinion of the Chinese government, the first purpose of the Clark letter was to let Syngman Rhee know that the Americans would sign the armistice agreement regardless of his attitude.  Secondly, the Americans wanted to tighten their control of Rhee through the signing of the armistice agreement and to solve the difficulties caused by Rhee’s releasing of POWs.  And, thirdly, the letter wanted to demonstrate to the world that the United States was willing to end the war.  Therefore, although the Americans and Rhee had serious disagreements over the armistice question, armistice in Korea was still achievable.  The Chinese report listed five steps for dealing with the situation.  (1) A reply to the Clark letter would be made on July 5 and China would agree to resume the negotiations.  (2) An offensive against Rhee’s army would be launched before the armistice was signed, the frontline be pushed southward, and a suggestion for revising the South-North border be made based on the result of the offensive.  If the other side refused to concede, the agreed division established on June 17, 1953, would be maintained.  (3) The meeting between the two sides would be resumed after July 5, and relevant questions regarding the implementation of the armistice agreement would be brought up.  (4) When the meeting began, staff members and interpreters would make preparations for signing the armistice agreement and prepare the venue for the signing ceremony.  (5) If everything developed according to plan, the signing ceremony would be held around July 15.  To reassure the Soviets, Wu Xiuquan also conveyed an oral message that Rhee was bluffing in threatening to continue the war alone in case of an American refusal to accept his conditions about a mutual defense treaty.  According to the Chinese analysis, the United States could increase assistance to Rhee only to a certain degree, for Washington was concerned that a large-scale aid might encourage Rhee to take risky actions and to entangle the United States in troubles.  Washington did not want to become entangled in large-scale military adventures in the Far East.  Consequently, Syngman Rhee might start some minor provocations but could not take any major action.[63]

       Although Chinese leaders had no intention to wait for Moscow’s opinion, Wu nevertheless told the Soviet Embassy that Soviet leaders’ feedback was expected.  The feedback came back quickly.  On the next day, the Central Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party reached a decision to endorse both the Chinese analysis and planned measures with regard to the armistice negotiations in Korea.[64]  Yet, in his ensuing telegram to Chinese leaders, Molotov did not even mention military actions.  Instead, he offered a different set of views on the conditions and intentions on the American side.  According to the telegram, the recent behavior of the Rhee regime, which was intended to complicate the negotiations and prolong the war, did not at all reflect its own policy.  The regime just carried out the “established tasks of America’s ruling clique”.  In the Soviets’ opinion, unlike Beijing’s analysis, the United States was not anxious to sign the armistice agreement.  Rather, Washington’s intention was to “maintain the unstable political situation of a demi-war and delay the signing of the armistice agreement with all possible means”.  Moscow did not believe that the Americans would be able to delay the armistice agreement for ever, but cautioned Beijing that Washington could likely use the Rhee regime to make all kinds of noises to disturb the armistice process.  This line of reasoning implied an unstated concern on Moscow’s part about the negative consequences of China’s planned military actions.[65]  Having received the Molotov message, the Chinese leadership did not make any further explanations to the Soviets and continued military preparations.  The disagreement between the two sides was obvious: whereas Moscow emphasized the need to make political concessions for a speedy armistice, Beijing insisted on gaining the best deal by way of military leverage.  Events again proved that Mao got the upper hand and indeed obtained more favorable armistice conditions for China. 

       On the midnight of July 8, Zhou Enlai met with the Indian Ambassador to China and told him that the Clark letter did not make a complete and unequivocal pledge.  China was willing to resume the talks only if there was a guarantee for full implementation of the words and spirit of the armistice agreement.  The first question that needed clarification was whether or not the so-called UN forces, on behalf of which the American representative would sign the armistice agreement, included Syngman Rhee’s puppet troops.  The Americans must now answer this question clearly.  Otherwise, armistice could not be achieved or would be undermined after the agreement was signed.[66]  On the same day Mao instructed the CPV delegation at Panmunjom not to raise the issue of revising the demarcation line when the talks were resumed.  The issue should be postponed to July 18 when the situation in the battleground became clearer.  Then the CPV should spare no effort in getting a positive answer from the other side regarding concrete issues in implementing the armistice agreement.  Hence, the date to sign the armistice agreement had to be later than July 20.  In seeing the signing of the armistice agreement as a means of continuing the strike against the enemy, Mao pointed out: “Our orientation remains to seize the initiative and to strive for armistice.  If the armistice agreement can be signed, then we will be able to use the conclusion of armistice to undermine the camp of the UN forces and demoralize American and Rhee’s troops.  But if it cannot be signed, we will still have the initiative and we may continue to strike the enemy politically and militarily.”[67]

       Three days after the negotiations resumed, the CPV launched the third phase of its offensive, or the Kumsong campaign.  The campaign lasted from July 13 to 27 and ended on the same day when the armistice agreement was signed.  In this effort the Chinese-Korean forces killed, wounded, and captured 78,000 enemy troops and gained 192.6 square kilometers of territories.[68]  Mao was thrilled with the results.  He was still excited when recalling the experience late in the year: “In this summer, within an hour we were able to break the enemy’s frontline twenty-one kilometers wide, fire intensively several hundred thousand rounds of cannon shells, and penetrate as deep as eighteen kilometers into the enemy line.  If we continue to fight like this and repeat a second, third, and fourth time, the entire enemy line will be broken.”[69]  Such a conviction was behind a somewhat regretful remark that Mao made to the Soviet Ambassador two days after the armistice was concluded: “From a purely military point of view, if we use one more year to continue the strike against the Americans, we could probably achieve a more favorable border along the Han River.”[70]

       In the last stage of the armistice negotiations, the Chinese efforts were quite successful.  Mao had good reasons to feel proud and excited, whereas these made leaders in Moscow nervous.  But, Mao was unaware of a fact revealed only recently by a Western scholar.  Because the Chinese army repeatedly launched attacks during the negotiations, at a National Security Council meeting on July 23, Eisenhower suggested that armistice might be a dangerous device of deception on the Chinese part.  Therefore he ordered Clark to maintain a powerful military posture even after the signing of the armistice agreement.  The NSC also agreed unanimously that if the armistice agreement was sabotaged, “we must use the atomic bomb to deal with the Chinese Communists.”  Indeed there is no conclusive evidence that Eisenhower’s nuclear threat was ever conveyed to the Chinese and Soviet leaders.  His statement at the July 23 NSC meeting also indicates that he himself did not believe a fear of nuclear attack had persuaded the communists to sign the armistice agreement.  Yet all evidence can show that the Americans’ patience was running very thin, and that a continuation of the war would almost certainly have meant an escalation.[71]  This analysis deserves serious attention.  Moscow’s concern was not groundless: the suspicious and vengeful mindset of American leaders planted the seeds of a long and unsettled question of Korean unification.