The year of 1953 was significant to both the Eastern and the Western blocs of the Cold War. It was marked not only with Dwight Eisenhower’s ascendance to the American presidency, but also with the arrival of a group of new hosts in the Kremlins in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s death. More importantly, the Korean War, which had brought the two blocs into a serious conflict, came to an end.
The end of the Korean War, very much like its beginning, remains a puzzling question to historians. In the 1980s, many scholars in the West credited Eisenhower’s nuclear diplomacy for solving the POW question of the Korean War, the last hurdle to overcome before an armistice agreement could be signed. Yet a debate on this diplomacy’s exact role has continued.[1] In the 1990s some Soviet and Chinese archives became accessible to researchers, and since then this development has directed scholarly attentions to the role of Chinese and Soviet policies in breaking the deadlock of the armistice negotiations. Surely, not all questions have been answered. For instance, did the Soviets force the Chinese to stop fighting? Or, did Mao Zedong’s terms for armistice actually prevail over the Soviets? [2] Relying on newly available evidence from Chinese and Soviet archives, this article examines the policy considerations on the Chinese and the Soviet sides in the process of armistice negotiations, exploring especially the agreements and divergences between the two communist governments.
Sino-Soviet Determination on Fighting to the End
In the second half of 1952, while the two sides of the Korean War reached a balance of power in the battleground, the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom was entering a deadlock. The major obstacle was the POW question, which Mao Zedong had initially expected an easy solution.[3] In the meantime, in concert with his global strategy of confronting the
North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had different ideas. In February 1952, the negotiations at
As revealed in Razuvaev’s report, the Chinese leadership had a concern that “once the Korean War was over, Soviet military supply would be reduced or even terminated.” Besides, a rush to armistice might result in weakening the strength of the Chinese-Korean alliance. Li Kenong, chief Chinese representative at the
In his response to Kim, Mao spared no effort in convincing the Korean leader that it could harm the Chinese-Korean side politically and militarily if the enemy’s deceptive proposal was accepted, especially at a time when the enemy was applying military pressure through indiscriminating bombing. Indeed, the Korean people and the CPV would have to sacrifice more in continuing the war, but they “will also be able to strengthen themselves, inspire the peace-loving people of the world to oppose aggressive wars, and push forward the world’s movement for protecting peace.” In Mao’s opinion, the main force of the
As revealed by recently declassified information, Kim was willing to concede the POW issue and discard the principle of “complete repatriation”. Aside from his concern about casualties of war and economic damages, Kim had another reason. That is, he planned to detain South Korean POWs. According to a report of the Soviet Ambassador, “the Korean comrades believe that a large number of South Korean POWs should be detained and assigned to heavy manual-labor tasks in the north. There is no need to consider their desire of going home.” Consequently, 13,094 southern POWs were detained by the north. 6,430 of these served in the northern army and the rest served in the Interior Ministry and the Railroad Ministry. In addition, 42,262 troops were enlisted from the southern population. [9]
The Chinese-Korean disagreement had to be solved in
In respect to concrete steps to deal with the POW issue, Zhou proposed that in the event that the American side made some concessions, one of the following measures could be adopted. First, if the Americans still insisted on partial repatriation, our side would announce detention of the same percentage of American and South Korean POWs; second, the POW question could be solved through mediation by a neutral country (such as India); third, an armistice agreement could be signed first, leaving the POW question to be settled later. In their ensuing discussions, Stalin appeared to favor the first option while Zhou spent some time on the second. Nevertheless, both agreed that in negotiations “complete repatriation” should be insisted first and no retreat should be made under American intimidation, and that the American side had to make the first move of concession.[10]
Yet the Americans did not show any sign of conceding. Rather, on October 8, they declared an indefinite suspension of the
As a matter of fact, at the time the Chinese leaders focused their attention on a possible expansion of the war, but not on a solution of the POW question. In a report to Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, dated November 24, the Operation Department of the General Staff estimated that although
Having seen the report, Mao was convinced that the enemy would almost certainly parachute five to seven divisions behind the CPV line in the coming spring. He directed the CPV to get into position immediately five armies to deal with the expected offensive.[15] At the same time, the Chinese General Staff received intelligence from the Soviets that the Americans would launch a major offensive in February 1953. Allegedly, the enemy’s goal was to occupy entire
Clearly, the Chinese leadership was fully prepared for a long war. At one of the Government Council’s meetings, Zhou Enlai said: “Although we have stopped the enemy and made it pay a very heavy price, we have not yet beaten it to the extent that it has to seek peace. This is the reason why the
Stalin understood, just as Mao and Zhou had emphasized repeatedly, that in a sense
Obviously, in considering war and peace as two options, Mao upheld a strategy that would, as long as permitted by conditions, continue the war until the enemy was forced to make concessions. In pursuing such a strategy, the Chinese leadership was reassured by the large-scale and timely assistance from the
As far as peace talks were concerned, Mao and Zhou endorsed a conclusion reached by a Foreign Ministry group under Qiao Guanhuai in mid-February: “Action is not as advantageous as non-action. The status quo should be prolonged until the
Yet, at the juncture when the Chinese poised to force an American concession with act of war, Stalin died. Immediately
In late 1952, when talking to American reporters, Stalin indicated that the Soviet Union was interested in bringing the Korean War to an end and was willing to cooperate with the
On the last day of February, Stalin summoned Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, and Bulganin to his dacha. After listening to Bulganin’s briefing on the military situation in
The sudden change of the Soviet policy after Stalin’s death happened under a special circumstance. In the last few year of his life, Stalin’s domestic and foreign policies put the Soviet society under tremendous stress. Even those in Stalin’s power circle, such as Molotov and Beria, felt that their positions and life were constantly endangered.[30] Anxieties and discontent were fermenting at the very core of Soviet power, and people were longing for the arrival of the day that they could breath freely again. After Stalin had another stroke on March 1, 1953, the rest of the leadership decided that this time he would not be able to recover. At an urgent meeting, a new leading group was formed. Whereas retaining his position as the first member of the presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin lost all his other titles.[31] This was only the overture of
At the same time, the Chinese also proposed to resume the armistice talks immediately. Previously studies have produced three interpretations. One suggests that Mao and the North Koreans took the initiative because they saw evidence of Eisenhower’s attempt to free himself from Truman’s foreign policy legacy. Another stresses
Surprisingly, after Stalin’s death, it was the well-known conservative and hardliner Molotov who initiated reconsideration of the
On March 8, Zhou Enlai and a Chinese delegation arrived in
At the time, the Chinese were still deliberating what to do with the American overture. On March 19, Mao sent a telegram to Zhou:
We have not yet answered
At the time Zhou was in
In their letter to Mao and Kim, the Soviet leaders stated unequivocally: “The Soviet government has noticed the development of the Korean incident in the past period, and studied comprehensively the issue of the Korean War under the current circumstances. The Soviet government has reached this conclusion: it would be a mistake if the previous policy is not modified in corresponding to the characteristics of current political situation and in consideration of our three peoples’ most fundamental interests. The Soviet, Chinese, and Korean peoples are concerned with consolidating world peace, and they have been constantly searching the way to end the Korean War as soon as possible.” After attacking the aggressive nature of imperialism, the letter nevertheless stressed: “This does not mean that under current circumstances, we should mechanically continue the policy of the past and not try to take the initiative. In other words, we should take advantage of the enemy’s move and find a way to get
The letter also spelled out certain measures and steps that the Soviets deemed necessary: “(1) Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai should give an affirmative answer to General Clark’s call of February 22 for an exchange of wounded and sick POWs. (2) Immediately after the publication of Kim’s and Peng’s response, an authoritative representative of the PRC (comrade Zhou Enlai would be the best selection) should issue a statement in
With regard to the
Meanwhile, the Soviet government issued a directive to its UN delegation, instructing Vyshinskii to support firmly the forthcoming Chinese and Korean statements on Korean armistice. In addition, Vyshinskii was instructed to consult with the Polish delegation for making a change in the latter’s resolution on the Korean question. The change should delete the resolution’s content about repatriation of all POWs, and insert a sentence on immediate resumption of armistice talks and removal of the POW question as an obstacle to termination of the Korean War. The Soviet leaders decided that the letter to Mao would be handed to Zhou Enlai for him to take back to
Clearly, the letter still carried great-power chauvinism bequeathed from the Stalin era. Yet, this would be the last time that the Soviets adopted such a commanding tone in their communications with the Chinese leadership. Soon enough,
Zhou Enlai returned to
After meeting with Soviet leaders, Zhou immediately sent a telegram to Mao to report what had just transpired. Mao’s response came the next day and was receptive to the Soviet proposal. Mao pointed out that the Soviet plan was actually similar to one of the three Chinese plans delivered to Stalin in September of 1952. The Chinese plan had not been raised at the
The above description of events is based on information from Chinese documents. It is rather different from an impression derived from Soviet archives. In 1966, in considering the historical background of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Foreign Ministry submitted to Brezhnev a report on the Korean War. According to this report, during his conversation with Soviet leaders depicted above, “Zhou Enlai, using the name of the Chinese government, requested urgently Soviet assistance in speeding up the armistice negotiations and concluding an agreement. This Chinese stand was consistent with ours. To guarantee effective policy implementation under a very complex situation, in March 1953
The recent actions by the other side at
Mao’s telegram also indicated that a response to
In the meantime, the Soviet government already made a public gesture of reconciliation toward the West. On March 21, in
Indeed, although Chinese leaders made preparations for different contingencies regarding the armistice negotiations, at the time they accepted only reluctantly the Soviet proposal that
Mao Zedong’s Effort to Strike the Best Deal
Among Stalin’s successors, no one could match Mao Zedong in terms of ability, experience, and theoretical sophistication. Since both the Chinese and the Soviet systems were disposed to uphold an individual leader’s role, the death of Stalin obviously had a significant impact on the two countries’ bilateral relationship. The impact was first reflected in the question of armistice in
In a statement dated April 1, Molotov stressed that the new policy meant not only an exchange of wounded and sick POWs but also resumption of negotiations for a general solution of the POW question and conclusion of an armistice agreement.[50] Yet to Chinese leaders, the highest priority remained military attack on the UN forces in the battleground. On April 3, at a Government Council meeting Zhou Enlai delivered a report on Korean negotiations. He said that although resumption of negotiations had bee decided and resultantly the possibility of ending the war had greatly increased, the possibility of war’s continuation however did not disappear. “These words still hold true: struggle for peace but fear no war.” In a telegram to Qiao Guanhuai, which Zhou drafted on Mao’s behalf and was also conveyed to Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, it was clearly spelled out that at the liaison meeting scheduled for April 6, the Chinese-Korean side would only talk about exchanging wounded and sick POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention, but not any new proposal or a timetable for resuming the formal negotiations. Another telegram, dated April 8, instructed Chinese representatives to issue a statement upon the conclusion of an agreement on exchange of wounded and sick POWs. It should declare
As of April 1953, the CPV nearly completed its preparations for countering the enemy’s landing operations. It now included nineteen armies of 1.35 million troops (the Korean People’s Army had six army corps of 0.45 million troops). With significantly enhanced firepower, fortified position, replenished material supplies, the CPV had no more logistical worries and achieved a greater degree of strategic maneuverability. Between January and April, the CPV and the KPA conducted more than 770 operations and destroyed more than 50,000 of the enemy’s troops. During the first season, the CPV Air Force flew 4,093 sorties in 399 groups, and downed 50 and damaged 16 of American airplanes. These factors tremendously boosted the CPV troops’ morale and they were eager to fight.[52]
In the end of March, Wang Jianan, commander of the Ninth Corps of the CPV, cabled the CPV headquarters and the Central Military Commission of the CCP, recommending that a tactical counteroffensive be launched in the first half of May. The rationale was that with careful preparations, a CPV army could surely overrun the position of an enemy battalion, and that if all CPV frontal armies operated in such a way simultaneously, the effect would amount to an annihilating strike and could wreak havoc on the enemy. On April 1, CPV deputy commander Yang Dezhi replied to Wang and praised his thinking. Two days later, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Yang and Wang on behalf of the Central Military Commission. The telegram approved the plan, and it pointed out that small-scale offensives could both train CPV troops and facilitate the armistice negotiations. The timetable could even be moved forward if Yang decided the conditions were favorable. Later, Mao further instructed commanders in
Indeed, although the
The negotiations would not resume until June 4, and armistice was concluded on June 8. The reason for this turn of events, according to studies in the West, was
These developments, however, cannot support the interpretation mentioned above. The question is whether or not the Americans intended to send a clear message of nuclear threat to
Even if the possibility of the Chinese government’s receiving of an American warning is accepted, as the development of event shows, the Chinese did not pay much attention to such a warning. After the Americans put forward their proposal on May 25, the CPV began the second and more extensive phase of the summer campaign. A readjustment was indeed made about the targets to be attacked. On June 1, the CPV headquarters ordered its troops that in view of the situation at
As a matter of fact, it was the American side that made the decisive concessions. These led to the conclusion of the armistice agreement on June 8. The American proposal of May 25 already accepted the Chinese stand in principle. As stated by Bohlen in his meeting with Molotov: “In comparison with the Korean-Chinese plan of May 7, the United Nation’s has clearly made significant concessions. First, the UN representatives gave up their earlier position on releasing those POWs who would have declined repatriation upon the effective date of the armistice agreement. The new UN proposal stipulates that both the Korean and the Chinese POWs should be handed to the commission of neutral states. Secondly, according to the new UN proposal, the Korean and Chinese sides will have three months to make explanations among the POWs. The time limit set in the old UN plan was two months and the other side wanted four months.” In addition, “the new UN plan accepted the other side’s proposal about transferring the POW question to a political commission. As a supplementary measure, the UN representatives now agree that decisions in the commission of neutral states will be made by a majority vote. Therefore, the UN representatives have given up their original position on this matter, which supported a unanimous decision by the five member states of the neutral commission.”[58] The Chinese side of information also shows that the Chinese accepted the American proposal because it was deemed “in agreement with the basic orientations of our May 7 plan.”[59]
At least in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the Chinese-Korean side had the upper hand both in battleground and in negotiations. On June 5, Zhou Enlai summarized the situation in these words:
Right after he took the presidency, Eisenhower fired empty cannons to scare people. He talked about five policy measures: first, an offensive against our flank, second, bombardment of the Northeast [of
The connotation of statements like this was that if possible,
At the time, the two sides already reached an agreement on armistice and the only thing left to do was to sign the document. A new campaign at this juncture would certainly cause problems with the Soviets. Therefore, this time the Chinese leadership felt necessary to inform
Although Chinese leaders had no intention to wait for
On the midnight of July 8, Zhou Enlai met with the Indian Ambassador to
Three days after the negotiations resumed, the CPV launched the third phase of its offensive, or the Kumsong campaign. The campaign lasted from July 13 to 27 and ended on the same day when the armistice agreement was signed. In this effort the Chinese-Korean forces killed, wounded, and captured 78,000 enemy troops and gained 192.6 square kilometers of territories.[68] Mao was thrilled with the results. He was still excited when recalling the experience late in the year: “In this summer, within an hour we were able to break the enemy’s frontline twenty-one kilometers wide, fire intensively several hundred thousand rounds of cannon shells, and penetrate as deep as eighteen kilometers into the enemy line. If we continue to fight like this and repeat a second, third, and fourth time, the entire enemy line will be broken.”[69] Such a conviction was behind a somewhat regretful remark that Mao made to the Soviet Ambassador two days after the armistice was concluded: “From a purely military point of view, if we use one more year to continue the strike against the Americans, we could probably achieve a more favorable border along the
In the last stage of the armistice negotiations, the Chinese efforts were quite successful. Mao had good reasons to feel proud and excited, whereas these made leaders in
* A Chinese version of this article was published in Shijieshi (World history), no. 2 of 2001.
[1] For a detailed discussion of the debate, see R. Foot,Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,Diplomatic History, volume 15 (1991), no. 4.
[2] At an international conference on “Cold War in Asia”,
[3] Until November 14, 1951, in his letter to Stalin, Mao still believed that an agreement on the POW issue could be easily achieved. See АПРФ(Presidential Archives of the Russian Federation),ф.45,оп.1,д.342,л.16-19.
[4] Razuvaev’s work report for the first season of 1952, АВПРФ(Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation),ф.0102,оп.8,п.35,д.10,лл.157-158, cited in А.Волохова, Переговоры о перемирии в Корее, 1951-1953гг.,Проблемы Дальнег Востока,2000,№2,с.104.
[5] Mao Zedong to Felipov (Stalin), February 8, 1952, АПРФ,ф.45,оп.1,д.342,лл.81-83.
[6] Razuvaev’s work report for the first season of 1952,АВПРФ,ф.0102,оп.8,п.35,д.10,лл.157-158, cited in Волохова,с. 104.
[7] Razuvaev’s work report for the second season of 1952,АВПРФ,ф.0102,оп.8,п.36,д.11,л.19, cited in Волохова, с. 104.
[8] Mao to Felipov, July 18, 1952; Razuvaev to Vasilevskii, July17, 1952, АПРФ,ф.45,оп.1,д.343,лл.72-75, 65-68.
[9] After the Korean armistice came into effect, Kim Il Sung visited
[10] Minutes of Stalin-Zhou Enlai converstions, August 20, and September 19, 1952,АПРФ,ф.45,оп.1,д.329,лл.54-72,91-101. For two different views, see Haruki Wada, “Stalin and the Japanese Communist Party, 1945-1953: In the Light of New Russian Archival Documents”, paper presented at the international conference on “Cold War in Asia”, Hong Kong, January 1996, and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.147-148.
[11] Peter Calvocoressi, ed., Guoji Shiwu Gailan, 1952 (Survey of international affairs, 1952), Wu Shimin et al., trans. (Shanghai: Shanghai Yiwen Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 440-442, 445-446;Office of Documentary Research of the CCP Central Committee, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949-1976 (Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s life, 1949-1976), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1997), vol. 1, p. 270, 273.
[12] Excerpts from the telegrams of the US Department of State, December 1 and 16, 1952, cited in Hua Qingzhao, Cong Ya’erta dao Banmendian—Meiguo yu Zhong, Su, Ying, 1945-1953 (From Yalta to Banmunjom: The United States and China, the Soviet Union, and the Great Britain, 1945-1953) (Beijing: Zhougguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1992), p. 230.
[13] Office of Documentary Research of the CCP Central Committee, Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the foundation of the state) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1989), vol. 3, p. 547 and 624.
[14]Department of History Studies of the
[15] Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, vol. 3, pp. 638-639, 632, 640-641.
[16] Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji (Military writings of Mao Zedong), (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe and Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1993), vol. 6, pp. 331-332.
[17]Office of Documentary Research of the CCP Central Committee and the Academy of Military Science of the People’s Liberation Army, Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan (Selected military writing of Zhou Enlai), (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), vol. 4, p. 305; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, pp. 272-273, 279; Wang Yan et al., eds., Peng Dehuai Nianpu (Chronicle of Peng Dehuai’s life), (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), p. 538; Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, vol. 4, p. 31.
[18] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi (History of the war resisting America and assisting Korea), vol. 3, p. 359; Mao to Stalin, December 17, 1952, АПРФ,ф.45,оп.1,д.343,лл.105-114.
[19] Stalin to Mao, December 27, 1952, report to Stalin from Vasilevskii and Sokolovsky, January 12, 1953, Stalin to Mao, January 15, 1953, АПРФ,ф.45,оп.1,д.343,лл.115-116,133-135,13; Mao to Stalin, January 7, 1953, Stalin to Mao, January 27, 1953, АПРФ,ф.45,оп.1,д.343,лл.125-128, 139.
[20]
[21] Suzdalev’s work report for the first season of 1953,АВПРФ, ф.Референтура по Корее,оп.9,п.46,д.14,лл.40-69, cited in А.Вольхова,Некоторые архивные материалы о корейской войне,1950-1953,Проблемы Дальнего Востока,1999,№4,с.129;
[22] Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji, vol. 6, p. 341.
[23] Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian Tanpan (
[24]
[25] Renmin Ribao (People’s daily), December 26, 1952.
[26] Intelligence Commission’s memo for Stalin, “Some issues regarding the foreign policy of the new American administration”, January 31, 1953, АВПРФ,ф.0595,оп.6,п.13,д.769,л.223, cited in V. Zubok and C.Pleshakov,Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushev (Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1996),p.76.
[27] Mastny, p. 166.
[28] Dmitri Volkogonov, Shenli yu Beiju—Sidalin de Zhengzhi Xiaoxiang (Triumph and tragedy: a political portrait of Stalin), Zhang Zuwu et al., trans. (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1990), p. 632.
[29] Renmin Ribao, March 5, 1953.
[30] Works by Russian scholars have revealed many new archival materials in this regard. See Л.Безыменский,Завещание Сталина? Новое время,1998, №14;Е.Зубкова,Кадровая политика и чистки в КПСС(1949-1953),Свободная Мысль,1999,№3,№4,№6;Ж.А.Медведев,Секретный наследник Сталина,Вопросы Истории,1999,№7.
[31]Ж.А. Медведев, Загадка смерти Сталина,Вопросы Истории,2000,№1; meeting minutes of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Soviet Council of Ministers, and Joint Conference of the Soviet Supreme Soviet Presidium, March 5, 1953, АПРФ,ф.2,оп.2,д.196,лл.1-7, cited in Источник,1994,№1,с.107-111.
[32]Han Nianlong ed al., Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao (Diplomacy of contemporary China), (Beijing: zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1988), p. 49; John King Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., Jianqiao Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shi, 1949-1965 (Cambridge history of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1965), Wang Jianlang, et al., trans. (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1990), pp. 299-300; Conrad Crane, “To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military Plans to Use Atomic Weapons During the Korean War,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000), pp.84-85.
[33] Felix Chuev, Tong Molotof de 140 ci Tanhua (140 conversations with Molotov), Wang Zhinan et al., trans. (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1992), p. 126; F. Orlandi, “The Alliance”.
[34] Zubok and Pleshakov, p. 154.
[35] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, pp. 288-289.
[36] Zubok and Pleshakov, p. 154.
[37] John Toland, Manchang de Zhandou—Meiguoren Yanzhong de Chaoxian Zhanzheng (A prolonged struggle: The Korean War as seen by the Amerians), Meng Qinglong trans. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1993), p. 618.
[38] Molotov to Malenkov and Beria, March 18, 1953, cited in Zubok and Pleshakov, p. 155.
[39] Mao to Zhou Enlai, March 19, 1953, cited in Pang Xianzhi and Li Jie, Mao Zedong yu Kang Mei Yuan Chao (Mao Zedong and the resistance against America and assistance to Korea), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 117-118.
[40] Resolution by the Soviet Council of Ministers, March 19, 1953, АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.60-71.
[41] Minutes of a conversation between Zhou Enlai and Soviet leaders, March 21, 1953, cited in Xiong Huayuan, “Resumption of the Armistice Negotiations in Korea,” a paper presented at a conference, “The Question of Division or Unification in the Korean Peninsular,” Dandong, October 2000.
[42]Zhou Enlai to Mao, March 21, 1953, cited in Pang Xianzhi and Li Jie, pp. 118-119, and Xiong Huayuan, “Resumption of the Armistice Negotiations in Korea”; Mao to Zhou, March 22, 1953, cited in Pang Xianzhi and Li Jie, p. 119. Actually, the Chinese plans were handed to Stalin by Zhou in August 1952.
[43] Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Report on the Background of the Korea War,” August 9, 1966, ЦХСД(Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents),ф.5,оп.58,д.266Ⅰ,лл.122-131,cited in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue3, Fall 1993, p.17.
[44] K. Weathersby, “Stalin and a Negotiated Settlement in
[45] Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, vol. 4, pp. 148-149.
[46] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, p. 291.
[47] Toland, p. 618; Molotov to Razuvaev,March 25, 1953,АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.94-95.
[48] Н.Базанова,Самая загадочая война ХХ столетмя,Новое Время,1996,№6,с.31.
[49] Kuznetsov and Fedorenko to Molotov,March 29, 1953,АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.97-99.
[50] Renmin Ribao, April 2, 1953.
[51] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, pp. 292-294.
[52] Department of Historical Studies of the Academy of Military Science, Zhongguo Renmin Zhiyuanjun Kan Mei Yuan Chao Zhanshi (History of the CPV operations in the war of resisting America and assisting Korea), (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1990), p. 195; Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzeng Shi, vol. 3, p. 372, 369, 393.
[53] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzeng Shi, vol. 3, p.393; Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 547;Xu Yan, Diyici Jiaoliang—Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzeng de Lishi Huigu yu Fansi (The first encounter: a historical review and reflection on the war of resisting America and assisting Korea), (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1990), p. 144; Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji, vol. 6, pp. 347-348.
[54] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi, vol. 3, p. 395, pp. 399-401.
[55] Crane,pp. 82-83;Manchang de Zhandou (A long struggle), pp. 626-627;Joseph Gordon, Chaoxian Zhanzheng—Wei Toulu de Neiqing (Korean War: untold inner stories), Yu Bin et al., trans. (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1990), pp. 730-731; Stephen Ambrose, Aisenhaoweier Zhuan, 1952-1969 (Biography of Eisenhower, 1952-1969), Xu Wenquan et al., trans. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1988), p. 92; Charles Bohlen, Lishi de Jianzheng, 1929-1969 (Witness to history, 1929-1969), Liu Qiu et al., trans. (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1975), pp. 436-437.
[56] McGeorge Bundy, Meiguo Hezhanlue (
[57] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi, vol. 3, p. 406, 411.
[58] Memorandum on Molotove-Bohlen conversation, May 28, 1953, АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.6-13.
[59] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, pp. 304-305.
[60] Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan, vol. 4, p. 322.
[61] Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 553; Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji, vol. 6, p. 350; Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi, vol. 3, p. 431, 425.
[62] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi, vol. 3, pp. 451-452, 432.
[63] Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affair’s coded telegram no. 17286, July 3, 1953, АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.136-147, cited in А.В.Торкунов,Загадочная война:корейский конфликт 1950-1953годов,Москова,2000,с.280-281;E.P. Bajanov and N. Bajanova, “The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century—Based on Secret Soviet Archives,” unpublished manuscript, pp.193-196.
[64] Meeting minutes of the Soviet Communist Party Presidium no. 14, July 4, 1953, АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,л.135.
[65] Molotov to Kuznetsov,July 5, 1953,АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.148-150. After the armistice was concluded, the Soviet Ambassador said differently when meeting with Mao: “The Soviet leadership agrees completely with the Chinese analysis. Now the conditions for ending the confrontation in
[66] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, p. 313.
[67] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi, vol. 3, p. 453.
[68] Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Shi, vol. 3, p. 448.
[69] Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji, vol. 6, p. 354.
[70] Kuznetsov to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 29, 1953, АПРФ,ф.3,оп.65,д.830,лл.187-189.
[71] Crane, pp. 84-85.