Scholarship on intra-alliance relations during the Cold War, particularly on the Cold War in Asia, has focused primarily on relations between great powers, such as the Soviet Union and China.[1] Relatively little research has been done on the development of relations between larger and smaller countries within the communist camp.[2] Sino -Korean relations during the Korean War, the subject of this case study, have been characterized as a friendship, forged by shared difficulties, that was “as close as lips and teeth.” While this ancient description of relations between China and Korea aptly describes some aspects of the wartime alliance, the simile fails to capture the significant conflict that existed between the two countries at the highest levels. This paper, which is based on archival documents and the recollections of individuals involved in the events, explores tensions in Sino-Korean relations at the highest levels during the Korean War and the methods of mitigating them, which were shaped by the larger pattern of Cold War relations in Asia. Space limitations prevent me from making a comprehensive analysis of the cultural and historical causes behind these tensions and their repercussions, which would shape Sino-Korean relations for the remainder of the Cold War.  It is my hope that this paper will serve to broaden future studies on this subject.

China's Deployment of Troops to North Korea

 Based on research into archival materials that have become available in the past several years, scholars have reached a near consensus of opinion that the leadership of the PRC—or at least Chairman Mao Zedong—firmly intended to assist North Korea even before the Korean War began.[3] What has not become well known, however, is that the North Korean leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of assistance until forced to do so by the UN advance across the 38th parallel.[EAM1] 

As Russian archival documents have established, in January 1950 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin informed his North Korean protege Kim Il Sung that he would support the latter’s request to mount a military offensive against South Korea and would allow Kim to visit Moscow to discuss the matter.[4] In the three meetings between the Soviet and North Korean leaders that followed, held April 10-25, Stalin emphasized two preconditions that had to be met before he would give his final approval for military action against South Korea: that he could be assured that the US would not interfere, and that China would agree to support North Korea. Kim assured Stalin that since the DPRK had the support of the USSR and the PRC, the US would refrain from interfering, because it would not risk a major war.  On the second point, Kim stated that Mao Zedong had always supported the idea of liberating all of Korea.  Kim explained that Mao had repeatedly expressed his view that China would help Korea once it completed its own revolutionary victory, and, if necessary, would provide military assistance. Kim insisted that his own forces were sufficient, however. Stalin nonetheless emphasized that the Soviet Union was not prepared to directly involve itself in Korea, especially if the United States risked deploying troops, and that Kim therefore had to consult with Mao and obtain his support.[5]

Accordingly, on May 13 Kim secretly visited Beijing and informed Mao of his plan to attack the South. Mao was surprised by this plan, but after he received a telegram from Stalin the following day confirming that the Soviet leader had agreed to the campaign, he expressed his support. In a meeting with Kim on the 15^th, Mao suggested that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) should fight a quick, decisive war.  It should outflank the larger cities, in order to avoid a protracted war, and concentrate instead on destroying the enemy’s main areas of strength. Mao explained that he had intended to help North Korea attack the South once Taiwan was liberated, but since North Korea had decided to attack now and this was their common cause, China was prepared to provide the necessary aid. Mao promised the North Koreans that if the Americans intervened in the war, China would send troops. He also asked whether it was necessary to deploy Chinese forces on the Korean border, and whether they should provide weapons and ammunition. Kim expressed his thanks for this offer, but did not accept it.[6] In Kim’s view, since Moscow had already agreed to give all necessary support, his trip to China was undertaken only to satisfy Stalin's order to secure Mao’s approval to launch the war. Consequently, as soon as the meeting with Mao was concluded, Kim announced to Soviet Ambassador N.V. Roshchin, in Mao’s presence, that he and Mao were in complete agreement on the matter.[7]  It is easy to picture how awkward Mao’s position was in front of the smug Kim Il Sung.

The Chinese leadership received no prior notification of the launching of the attack on South Korea on June 25.  They, in fact, learned of it via foreign news services.[8] Some Chinese leaders resented this lack of notification, but they nonetheless expressed their support for North Korea once the US became directly involved. In early July, the Chinese government agreed to send to the KPA two hundred Chinese cadres of Korean descent who were stationed in the Northeast Military Region. At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai informed Ambassador Roshchin that China agreed to the Soviet government’s requests to use the Chinese Changchun Railroad to transport military supplies and to travel through Chinese air space en route to North Korea.[9]

Chinese leaders also raised the issue of providing military support to the North Koreans during other conversations with Soviet representatives. In a meeting with Ambassador Roshchin on July 2, Zhou Enlai relayed his government’s estimate that the US might increase its forces in Korea by landing in southern ports and proceeding north via railroad. He thus recommended that the KPA hasten its southward push to occupy those ports.  He also presciently recommended that the KPA strengthen the defenses around the western port of Inchon, both to protect Seoul and to prevent the US army from landing there. Zhou complained to the Soviet ambassador that the North Korean leaders had ignored Mao’s repeated warnings that US military intervention was imminent.  He emphasized that if US forces crossed the 38^th parallel, China would organize an expeditionary force dressed in North Korean uniforms to engage the US army.  Zhou reported that 120,000 troops of the 3^rd Army Corps had already assembled in the Northeast, and he hoped the Soviet Union would be able to provide air cover for them.[10] On July 4, the head of the Chinese intelligence bureau, Zhou Dapeng, even described to Roshchin a plan to transport North Korean forces to South Korea via a port on the Shandong Peninsula, as well as to send Chinese military experts to South Korean battlefields to help the KPA.[11]

 Stalin immediately expressed his support of the Chinese suggestions. "We consider it correct,” the Soviet leader wrote to Mao on July 5, “immediately to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Sino-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38^th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units."[12]