Sino-North Korean Conflict and Resolution during the Korean War: A Case Study of Socialist Camp Relations During the Cold War
=#800080>[94] Two days later, Stalin replied in a telegram to Mao, “Your position regarding the peace negotiations is completely correct.”
[95]
In August and September, Zhou Enlai had several discussions with Stalin in Moscow, joined in the later meetings by Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong, and Peng Dehuai. Besides questions of Chinese economic development, the conversations focused on finalizing policy regarding the war. Zhou stated that the Sino-Korean forces are strong enough to launch longer offensives and had entrenched themselves well enough to withstand bombing raids. Regarding the POW issue, Stalin first pointed out that the Americans wanted to solve the issue according to their own wishes, whereas according to international law, hostile parties must repatriate all POWs, with the exception of war criminals. Stalin asked what Mao thought about the POW issue: “will he give in or will he hold his own?”[96]
Zhou stated that the Koreans and Chinese had differing opinions on the matter, and that Mao’s view was that the Americans must repatriate all POWs. “The Koreans believe that the continuation of the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POW’s whose return is being discussed.” Mao, on the other hand, “believes that continuing the war is advantageous to us, since it detracts the USA from preparing for a new world war.” Stalin immediately affirmed that “Mao is right; this war is getting on America’s nerves. The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties that they suffered during the war.” Stalin also touched a nerve with Chinese leaders, by reminding Zhou that “one must be firm when dealing with America. The Chinese comrades must know that if America does not lose this war, then China will never recapture Taiwan.” Concerning the resolution of the POW question, Stalin and Zhou agreed to continue calling for full repatriation, and to force the US to make the first concession. They could not shrink before the American threats.[97] After these talks, Kim did not again ask for a cease-fire, but instead focused on how to gain more material support from the Soviet Union.[98] Nonetheless, since Kim Il Sung was not hoping to obtain victory in the war, he believed it would be best to end the war as soon as possible and push forward with economic reconstruction.
In conclusion, the conflicts between China and North Korea during the Korean War were the result of a clash between the interests of the entire camp (as expressed by the Chinese) and local interests (as expressed by the Koreans). As a result, Stalin was generally inclined to support the Chinese, since what China advocated was more in accordance with his view of the overall interest of the socialist camp in Asia. However, the problem was that common interests tended to be defined in accordance with the perceptions of the country that played the leading role in the socialist camp. As a result, as soon as a country within the camp ceased to recognize its interests as being in line with the common goals, or when a change in leadership occurred in the camp, the subordination of local interest to global interest no longer held, and the alliance ran the risk of breaking down. This was the case in Sino-Korean relations, as well as in Sino-Soviet relations.
[1] The most influential books and articles on this topic in the past decade include: Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, CA 1990); Mineo Nakajima, “The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 1, 1991; S. Goncharov, J. Lewis, Xue Litai Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA 1993); O.A. Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance(1945-1963) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu Mosike En En Yuan Yuan (Jiangxi: Peoples’ Publishing Co., 1999); Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 1998)
[2] During an international conference held in Hong Kong in 1996, Russian scholars discussed Soviet-North Korean relations during the Korean War. E.g., the paper by A. Mansourov, Soviet-North Korean Relations and the Origins of the Korean War; Chinese scholars also conducted discussions on Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Vietnam War at the international conference held in Hong Kong in 2000 entitled “China, Vietnam and the Indo-China War.” See, e, g., Li Danhui ed., China, and the Indo-China War (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 2000)
[3] See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Yang Kuisong, “Zhongguo Chubing Shimo,” Inchoen University conference, 1999; Shen Zhihua, “Lun Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian Juece de Shifei Cheng Bai”, 21st Century, October (2000).
[4] For the text of Stalin’s telegram to Kim Il Sung on 30 January 1950, see Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack or Not to Attack?: Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 5 (Spring 1995), p. 9. For additional details, see Shen Zhihua, “ZhongSu Tongmeng Tiaoyue yu Sulian Zai Yuandong de Zhanlue Mubiao” (Dang Shi Yanjiu Ziliao, No 9 1997), and “Sino-Soviet relation and the Origin of Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.2, No. 2, (Spring 2000), pp. 44-68.
[5] E. P. Bajanov and N. Bajanova, The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century--Based on Secret Soviet Archives (manuscript), pp. 40-42. For a detailed discussion of the documents presented by Bajanov and Bajanova, see Kathryn Weathersby, “’Should We Fear This?, Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 39, Spring 2002.
[6]Ministerstva inostrannykh del rossiskoi federatsii,(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), Khronologiia osnovnykh sobytiia na kanuna i nachal’nogo perioda koreiskoi voiny, ianvar’ 1949-oktiabr’ 1950 gg. (Chronology of basic events on the eve of and in the first period of the Korean War, January 1949-October 1950) (Manuscript), pp. 30-31.
[8] Li Haiwen “Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiujing Heshi Jueding Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuozhan” (Dangde Wenxian) No. 5 (1993), p. 85.
[9] Research on Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhou Enlai Nianpu (1949-1976), Vol. 1 (ZhongYang: WenXian Publishing Co., 1997) p. 54; Khronologiia, p. 38.
[10] Khronologiia, pp. 35-37.