[12] Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 5 July 1950, sending message for Zhou Enlai.  For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), page 43.

[13] Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 8 July 1950.  For full text see Ibid., p. 44.    

[14] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 1, p. 51.

[15] David Tsui, “Did the DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Security Pact?” paper presented at the Hong Kong Conference in Jan. 1996.

[16] In a military meeting on 26 August 1950, Zhou Enlai said that the main reason for not dispatching a military mission to North Korea immediately was due to Chinese considerations.  See Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjioushi ( the CCP Central Committee Office of Archives and Manuscripts), Junshi Kexueyuan(Chinese PLA Academy of Military Sciences), ed., Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxian, Vol 4, Renmin Press, pp. 45-46, 1997.  However, he later told the Soviet Ambassador that the reason was that North Korea did not agree. See Khronologiia, pp. 52-54; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.163.

[17] Gao Gang, Talks during the Shenyang military meeting of 13 August 1950, cited in Kangmei yuanchao zhan shi (The War to Oppose America and Support Korea) edited by the Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (Publishing Co., 2000), pp. 91-92.

[18] Khronologiia, pp.45-47.

[19] Ibid, pp. 48-49; Chen Jian, Op.Cit., p.273.

[20] Based on recollections of North Korean officers. Soviet military advisers also suggested the possibility of UN forces landing in rear ports.  See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.171.

[21] Collection of materials from Chai Chengwen.

[22] Collection of materials from Chai Chengwen.

[23] In a letter to Gao Gang, Mao Zedong said that based on the situation, we have to send our troops. You have to hastily prepare. See Chai Chenwen, Zhao Yongdian, Panmundian Negotiations, Liberation army Publishing Co., 1989, p. 79.

[24] Khronologiia, pp.52-54.

[25] Ibid. pp.56-58.

[26] Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, pp.174-175.

[27] A. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: September 16-Oct.15, 1950” CWIHP Bulletin 6-7, (Winter 1995-6), pp. 97-98.

[28] Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov and Matveev, 1 October, 1950.

[29] Chai Chengwen, Zhao Yongdian, Op. Cit., p. 80.