[80] Zhuanye Qinwu, pp. 6-7; Jibenjingyen, pp. 66-67.
[81] At least until November, 1951, Mao still believed that the POW problem would not be difficult to solve; See, e.g., Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 14 November 1951, in K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin 6/7, pp. 70-71.
[82] Telegram from Mao to Stalin,
[83] The first quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in А.Volokhova, “Peregovor o peremiriia v Koree, 1951-1953 gg.,” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, 2000 No.2, p.104.
[84] Ibid.
[85] The second quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in А.Volokhova, p. 104.
[86] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol 1, p.249-250.
[87] Zhou Enlai Junshiwenjian, Vol. 4, pp. 289-290. For the full text, see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin 6/7, p.78.
[88] Zhou Enlai Junshi Huodong Jishi, pp. 280.
[89] Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin,
[90] Telegram from Razuvaev to Huaxiliefushiqi
[91] Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 449.
[92] Zhou Enlai Junshi Huodong Jishi, pp. 242.
[93] From the book, : Volokhova, p.106, and 108.
[94] Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol. 1, p. 250.
[95] Telegram from Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong,
[96] Record of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai,
[97] Record of meeting between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August and
[98] Concerning discussions on this question, see “1953 Nian Chaoxian Tingzhan – ZhongSu Lingdaoren de Zhengzhi Kaolu” (Shijie Shi)No.3 2001.