Before sending the letter to Stalin, Kim Il Sung asked Soviet Ambassador Shtykov how best to broach the subject of requesting Soviet troops. Shtykov avoided his question, and a “confused, lost, hopeless and desperate” Kim Il Sung, along with his Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong, swallowed their pride, and sent the letter to Moscow. [27]  Stalin replied on October 1 that the best plan was to send the CVA, after first consulting with the Chinese.[28] With no other choice, Kim urgently summoned the Chinese ambassador late that night, and requested that China send the 13^th Army Corps, which had already been massed along the Yalu River, to support the North Korean war effort.[29]

Two factors led the North Korean leaders initially to refuse direct military assistance from China. The first was Kim’s excessive confidence in his estimates of the military situation. The second was the long history of Chinese interference in Korean affairs, which gave North Korean leaders cause for alarm. For these two reasons, Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war. Even after Chinese troops entered the war, these two issues would continue to strain Sino-Korean relations.

Creating A Unified Sino-North Korean Command

Because of the differing opinions of the Chinese and Soviet leaderships concerning whether to send Soviet air force units to provide cover for Chinese troops, the dispatch of Chinese forces to Korea was repeatedly delayed. However, Mao’s personal commitment to the cause never wavered.[30] When Zhou went to the Soviet Union to discuss the issue of military equipment and air cover, the Chinese and North Koreans were already discussing specific issues concerning Chinese troop deployment. However, because of the pressing situation, the two sides had not yet had time to discuss command, communication, re-supply and transportation, much less arrive at an agreement on these matters.

On October 8, Mao informed Kim Il Sung that China had decided to send troops, and asked that Pak Il-u meet with Gao Gang and CVA Commander Peng Dehuai in Shenyang to discuss the various issues involved. At dusk on that day, Pak arrived in Shenyang, but on Kim's orders would only discuss the American troop escalation, while urging the Chinese to send troops immediately to control the areas of Hamhung and Sinuiju. He also specified that the CVA would use only North Korean currency while in the DPRK, for which they would be reimbursed later according to the exchange rate. Their firewood would be purchased by the local North Korean governments, and supplied to the Chinese army according to the market price. Pak explained that Kim Il Sung was then in Duk Chaeon, and was of the opinion that the CVA command should be established there. The issue of joint command for Chinese and Korean forces was thus raised. According to Chai’s observations, Kim’s initial thinking was rather simplistic. Considering the urgent circumstances, he believed that since he had asked China to send troops to help the KPA, the power to command those troops would naturally belong to Korean leaders. Only after receiving word that China was preparing to send several hundred thousand troops to Korea did he understand the enormity of the situation. He then realized that it was not feasible to have Koreans command the CVA, and suggested that the two sides merge their command structures.[31]

Naturally, Peng saw the situation differently. First, Stalin had clearly stated in his telegram of October 1 suggesting Chinese deployment that “the CVA must naturally be commanded by Chinese leaders.”[32] Second, their experience in Korea made the Chinese question the North Korean command capability. In his report to the Central Military Commission, Peng stated:

The Korean party's recruitment situation is extremely serious. All men between the ages of 16 and 45 have been inducted into service. No one is caring for the families of drafted workers, and the masses have nothing to eat. There are no long-term plans, and adventurism is all one can see! Military control has been extremely childish. On the 19^th Pyongyang issued an order to defend to the death. As a result, 30,000 defenders could not escape [from advancing UN forces]. The North Koreans agreed to conduct party and political work in the KPA, but they have not agreed to construct a political commission system.

 After the Shenyang meeting, Peng Dehuai exclaimed to Chai Chengwen, “I have a responsibility to the Chinese and Korean people, and to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers!”[33] In Peng’s view, there was simply no question of giving North Koreans control over Chinese forces. He did not even understand the views the North Koreans advocated concerning the command of their own troops. The KPA’s main force had already been routed and new troops were currently organizing and training in China. There was no way for them to participate directly in military maneuvers.  This was not the time to point out such facts, however, so when Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai met for the first time on October 21, neither leader raised the issue of a unified command structure. During their discussions about how to coordinate the actions of their two armies, Kim agreed to send Pak Il-yu to serve as Peng’s liaison officer.[34] On September 25, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formally appointed Pak as Assistant Commander of the CVA, Assistant Political Director and Assistant Secretary of the Party Committee.[35]

With the expansion of the war, the issue of unified control of the two armies gradually reappeared on the agenda. During the first campaign, Peng repeatedly reported that the lack of coordination between the Chinese and North Koreans caused confusion over language, problems with Chinese unfamiliarity with the terrain, and the obstruction of roads from party, government, army, and civilian withdrawal, as a result of which “the CVA’s ability to fight has been hindered.”[36] Of special importance were the many times the Volunteer Army was mistakenly attacked by North Korean troops. One such instance occurred on November 4, when the 39^th Volunteer army encircled the US 24^th division southeast of Park Chaeon. They were mistakenly attacked by a KPA tank division that had been ordered to proceed to Shun Chaeon, and the enemy was consequently able to escape. Re-supply and transportation efforts were also hampered by a lack of coordination.[37]

Because of such problems, Peng asked the Chinese embassy in Beijing to raise the issue of a coordinated command structure with Kim Il Sung, hoping that the KPA would relocate its headquarters closer to the CVA.  Since Shtykov supported Peng’s suggestion, when Kim met Peng on November 7 he reluctantly agreed to the Chinese proposal to open new fronts in the enemy’s rear areas.  He accordingly decided to send the Bang Hosan and Choi Inyang Army Corps behind enemy lines. However, although Kim continued to send advisers to act as liaison officers and trade intelligence, he did not agree to relocate the army's headquarters, or to establish any kind of unified command. Kim disregarded Peng's personal letter explaining the Chinese policy toward prisoners of war, which was prompted by North Korea’s severe mistreatment of prisoners of war, particularly the misfortune brought upon British and American embassy workers. Kim agreed to allow the CVA to help return the Korean deserters to service, but in actuality planned to try them for treason.[38]

Peng next asked the Central Military Commission to relay a message to Kim that the KPA’s 6th division still had more than 6,200 soldiers, who had merged with the CVA 125^th division. He hoped those men could remain with the Volunteer Amy, but Kim refused. Later, more than 5,000 men of the 7^th division merged with the 125^th Volunteer Army division, and again Peng requested that those men remain. Kim did not respond. The North Korean leaders and Soviet military advisors still opposed Peng’s proposal to withdraw several kilometers and prepare ambushes. They proposed instead that the CVA continue to pursue the enemy south along the Chongchon River.[39]

At the core of these problems lay the issue of who commanded the army. In order to solve the problem, Mao decided to invite the top-level commanders of the two armies for face-to-face talks, hoping to coordinate the positions of two sides and to gain Moscow’s support. On November 15, Kim and Shtykov were invited to the CVA headquarters, and Gao Gang joined them from Shenyang