t="on" Year="1951" Day="3" Month="1">3 January 1951, Peng informed Kim Il Sung by telegram that the enemy had quickly retreated after its defenses had been broken, and the victory was therefore not very meaningful. Only 3,000 troops were captured. If the enemy continues to escape southward, the KPA/CVA will pursue them to Suwon and await orders, Peng explained. The third campaign will pause to reorganize and re-supply after Seoul, Inchon, Suwon, and Lichon are taken. If the enemy mounts a heavy defense of Seoul, the CVA will not launch a strong attack, since conditions were not yet favorable.[51] Mao relayed Peng’s decision to Stalin.[52]

Because the CVA was not yet prepared to resume fighting and needed to rest and reorganize,[53] on January 8 Peng ordered the advance halted. This decision left the North Koreans extremely dissatisfied, and they strongly opposed it. In light of the lessons learned from previous setbacks during the war, Kim agreed to regroup for two months after crossing the 38^th parallel, but in his heart, he still hoped to claim a quick victory. He was diplomatic, however, always pushing Pak Hon-yong and the newly appointed Soviet ambassador V.N.Razuvaev to the forefront. The day the attack halted, Kim said to Chai Chengwen that the process of regrouping and reorganizing should not last very long, that one month should be sufficient. If too much time passes, he explained, the rivers and rice paddies would begin to thaw, hampering troop movements, while the enemy was attempting to slow the pace of the war in order to rest their forces and re-supply.

Kim was prepared to meet with Peng to discuss the issue, and Peng agreed to send a telegram with Kim’s proposal to Mao immediately.  The CVA commander nonetheless maintained that his army had to regroup and rest.[54] On the morning of January 9, when Stalin’s envoy to Beijing, Semen Egorovich Zakharov, was informed that the CVA and KPA had already stopped their advance, he expressed his objection, stating that he had never heard of any victorious army in the world not pursuing its enemies and not taking advantage of victory. This halt would give the enemy a chance to catch its breath, and would thus squander the advantage that had been won. Even after listening to a patient explanation by Nie Rongzhen, Zakharov held to this opinion.[55]  At this point, Stalin resolved the issue, sending a telegram saying that in order to avoid international condemnation of China, the CVA should remain north of the 38^th parallel and its two coastal regions, while allowing the KPA to continue its southward advance. Mao immediately relayed this message to Peng.[56]

On the evening of January 10, Chai Chengwen accompanied Kim to Peng ’s headquarters. During the subsequent meeting, Peng analyzed their own and the enemy’s situations, emphasizing that their forces needed to regroup so that, after full preparation, they could destroy even more of the enemy during the next campaign. Kim agreed to regroup for one month. Peng thought that pushing the enemy right now might force them to relinquish a little more territory, but prematurely forcing them into a narrow region around Pusan would not help to divide and conquer the UN forces. Kim argued that even if they could not exterminate the enemy, it was still important to expand their territory. Peng replied that exterminating the enemy was better than expanding territory, because after the enemy army was destroyed, they would naturally gain territory. However, Kim held his ground, arguing that it would be beneficial to have more territory and an increased population during the post-war elections and peace settlement. Peng replied that it was not necessary to consider this; the most important thing at present was to win victories and annihilate the enemy. Since the two could not agree, Peng showed Kim the telegram from Mao Zedong on the 9^th. Kim still would not give ground, however, claiming that he was not expressing his individual opinion, but the collective opinion of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party.  To reinforce this point, Kim called Pak Hon-yong to join the meeting.[57]

On January 11, Peng received an emergency telegram from Mao concerning Kim’s proposal to shorten the rest and reorganization period. Based on Stalin’s telegram, Mao suggested that the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th People’s Army Corps should be deployed at the First Corps’ line south of the Han river, while the CVA should withdraw to Inchon and north of the Han river, to rest and reorganize for two or three months. The CVA would take charge of defending Inchon and Seoul and the KPA would be re-supplied with the soldiers training in northeastern China. If Kim felt it unnecessary to re-supply and reorganize the Korean troops, they could continue their advance and the North Korean government could directly command their movements. The CVA would take charge of defending Inchon, Seoul, and the areas North of the 38th parallel.

That day at dusk, Peng Dehuai, Kim Il Sung, and Pak Hon-yong had a very heated debate. Kim and Pak thought that Stalin’s idea of sending the KPA ahead alone was a sign that they held the advantage, and that the American army would retreat from Korea. Pak mentioned several recent news items and intelligence reports provided by the Soviet Union indicating that the US army would soon retreat from Korea. They would not leave unless the Sino-Korean forces pursued them, however, Pak maintained, because they needed an excuse. Peng retorted that if the Chinese and Koreans did not pursue, the Americans could still withdraw on their own, with a perfectly good excuse. Pak answered that unless they pursued the Americans, the UN forces would not withdraw. China and Korea should utilize the internal contradictions of the American capitalist class, Pak declared. Peng replied that it was only after Sino-Korean forces had destroyed a few more US divisions that they could deepen these contradictions. Only after the CVA had regrouped could it continue to fight.

Kim interjected at this point, repeating his idea of sending the 3rd Volunteer Army Corps south within half a month, then sending the remaining forces forward after a month’s rest. Losing patience, Peng raised his voice and excitedly declared that their ideas were wrong, and that they were dreaming.  

In the past, you said that the US would never send troops. You never thought about what you would do if they did send troops. Now you say that the American army will definitely withdraw from Korea, but you are not considering what to do if the American army doesn’t withdraw. You are just hoping for a quick victory and are not making concrete preparations, and this is only going to prolong the war. You are hoping to end this war based on luck. You are gambling with the fate of the people, and that’s only going to lead this war to disaster. To reorganize and re-supply, the Volunteer Army needs two months, not one day less, maybe even three. Without considerable preparation,<SPAN lang=EN-US style="mso-farea