st-font-family: Batang; mso-fareast-language: KO"> not one division can advance south. I resolutely oppose this mistake you are making in misunderstanding the enemy. If you think I am not doing my job well, you can fire me, court marshal me, or even kill me.

Basing his remarks on a telegram from Mao, Peng Dehuai stated to Kim that the CVA would be responsible for all coastal defense, rear maintenance, transportation, and defense from north of the line between Inchon and Yangyang. “The 4^th Army corps, consisting of about 120,000 men, has already had approximately two months’ rest. Command them yourself; let them advance south as you see fit. If the American army really does withdraw from Korea as you think, I will happily exclaim ‘long live the liberation of Korea.’ If the American army does not withdraw, the CVA will go ahead and attack south as planned.” Under these circumstances, Kim had no choice but to admit that because the KPA was not prepared, and had not recovered its strength, it could not advance alone. He admitted that he had hoped for quick victory, and reluctantly agreed to the CVA plan to regroup for two months. In the end, the two sides decided to call a joint meeting of top officers of the two armies to share experiences and unify their thinking.[58]

After Stalin was informed of the argument concerning military command, he stated in a telegram, “the leadership of the CVA is correct. Undoubtedly, the truth lies with commander Peng Dehuai.” He praised Peng’s ability to defeat the supremely powerful American imperialist forces using inferior equipment, and said that he was a contemporary military genius. Stalin also criticized the Soviet ambassador for a lack of understanding of military matters, and forbade him to interfere with Peng again.[59] At this time, Mao also stepped up the pressure. On January 14 he sent a telegram to Kim pointing out:

In the next two to three months, the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean troops must carry out serious and major work, in particular to replenish the troops with newly trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly trained soldiers imitate the experience of the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop armaments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store food and ammunition, to improve the work of transport and the rear service. Carrying out this work can secure the final victory.

Mao believed that “it is necessary for us to carry out good preparation so that it will be possible to continue to fight.  In the opposite case, we can repeat the mistakes the Korean troops allowed between June and September 1950…The Chinese and Korean comrades must be patient and carry out the necessary preparation.” The next day Mao sent a copy of this telegram to Stalin.[60]

During meetings with Peng from January 16-18, Kim admitted that the idea of the KPA advancing south alone was risky. The Politburo then discussed the matter and decided that the Chinese were correct in suggesting that in order to conduct better offensives in the future, it was necessary to spend two months reorganizing.[61] From a military perspective, Peng’s plan was of course the most realistic for many reasons.  The naïve enthusiasm of North Korean leaders was clearly influenced by political factors. However, the disagreement between the Chinese and North Koreans was only over tactics, not overall strategy. In this, Beijing was in agreement with Pyongyang and Moscow in wishing to use military means to force UN troops off the Korean peninsula and solve the Korean problem completely. It was in this spirit that Mao and Kim ignored UN calls for a cease-fire, losing a good opportunity to bring the war to an early end.[62]

The Struggle Over Railroad Management

Because of the successful UN counter offensive in the spring of 1951, the Sino-Korean plan to regroup was not carried out. After armistice negotiations opened in July 1951, the war became a matter of “negotiating while fighting.” This new situation highlighted the importance of the Sino-Korean army’s supply line, and as a result, the conflict between China and North Korea over how to manage the railroad system intensified. Due to the severe damage to the Korean infrastructure inflicted by American bombing and the difficulties of operating on foreign soil, the CVA faced a supply shortage. The army could not get supplies locally, and because the American army was so well equipped and maneuverable, getting supplies delivered in a timely manner was difficult. Most goods and equipment were imported from China and had to travel along lengthy, difficult mountain routes. Road conditions were extremely poor and the CVA faced a shortage of transportation from the very beginning.  Moreover, US planes continued to bomb day and night, causing great damage and placing even greater strain on railroad transportation.[63]

Consequently, in late October and early November Peng Dehuai requested that the Northeastern Bureau of the Party take steps to strengthen rail transportation, including establishing a unified management structure with the Koreans. He also asked the central government to dispatch railway solders to Korea to improve maintenance ability. A group of railroad soldiers and workers were immediately dispatched and began working alongside the KPA railroad construction forces and the Korean railway workers.[64]  Peng then met with Gao Gang on November 16 to suggest the establishment of a joint Sino-Korean railway command.[65] Chinese representatives were sent to Korea to discuss the issue and attempted several times to meet with Korean officials, but with little result. Only after Kim’s personal trip to Beijing to speak with Chinese leaders on December 3 did the two sides arrive at an agreement in principle.[66]  In late December, the Chinese established the Northeastern Military District Railroad Transportation Command (later renamed the Northeastern Military District Military Transportation Command), headed by Chinese military and political officers. At the same time, the Korean Railroad Military Management Bureau in Qiu Chang was established, managed by both Chinese and North Koreans.<