Following a meeting in Shenyang in January of representatives of the logistical department of each army corps of the CVA and the relevant departments of the Northeast People’s Government,[68] railroad transportation was restored to service.[69]  However, the basic contradictions in logistical work were still unresolved. Besides the destruction caused by US bombing, the most serious problem was the chaos surrounding the internal management of railroad transportation, which still lacked unified coordination. Because the various departments and work units were not cooperating, but were constantly emphasizing their own importance and fighting with each other for vehicles and time, there was constant conflict and friction.  Lack of manpower was a frequent problem, more than a paucity of vital materials. Moreover, enemy forces occupying mountain caves near the front added pressure and succeeded in delaying trains. The area north of the Hee Chun caves was severely congested. For example, at the end of December 1951, there was a backup of 329 train cars, which had yet to arrive to their destination.[70]

Even though the Railroad Management Bureau had been established, a great rift still existed between the Chinese and Koreans. The two sides had not yet decided whether to adopt a military management system or simply institute a system of military representatives. A debate also raged over whether military supplies or supplies for civilian use and economic construction would be given priority. Moreover, since the Bureau’s organization had not yet been completed, and the ideology and morale of railway personnel was insufficiently stable, rail transport continued to face extremely difficult problems.  Peng complained to Mao that “if we don’t find a way to quickly resolve this, it will definitely prolong the war.”[71]

Keeping the railroad running smoothly and safely was the most pressing concern related to joint coordination and unified command. When Kim Il Sung visited Beijing in early December, the two sides worked out the basic principles for the establishment of a Sino-Korean joint rail transportation command structure. Alluding to the objections among Koreans that such an arrangement would violate their national sovereignty, Kim told Chai Chengwen after his return from Beijing that “previously, we discussed the issue of a military management system for the railroad many times, but on our side, there were always some who did not understand that without military victory, principled discussions would be pointless.” He stated to Chai that the matter had been taken care of in Beijing and asked him to “please inform comrade Gao Gang and let him appoint railway personnel.”[72] However, the discussions between the two sides proved to be extremely difficult.

On 19 February 1951 (1952?), chief Chinese negotiators Ye Lin (Minister of Transportation for the Northeast Government of China), Zhan Mingyuan (Vice-Commander of the East Logistical Corps), and Peng Min ( a railway soldier), reported that during negotiations, the North Koreans frequently did not put enough thought into issues, and the ideas they raised often contradicted each other.  Moreover, the Koreans objected to the Chinese principle to “see first to the transportation needs of the army,” and instead thought more about North Korean economic recovery.  Pak Hon-yong commented that economics is politics. The issue was thus left to Kim and Gao to resolve by themselves.

The Koreans also requested that the North Korean Ministry of Transportation participate in the management of the railroad. They agreed to establish a joint military transportation command structure headed by the Chinese and led by the Sino-Korean joint command, but they insisted that the new structure work together with the DPRK Ministry of Transportation. Pak suggested that China also establish a unit such as the Korean Military Transportation Bureau, and he opposed instituting a system of military management for the railroads. He suggested instead that they restore the old Korean management bureaus and change the provisional railroad management bureau, which had already been established, into the Ding Zhou management bureau.[73]

By mid March, the two sides still had rather different opinions on the basic principles of railroad management. Merging military management and railroad administration during wartime was an effective way to maximize the efficiency of the railroad, and the railroad military management bureau was a form of organization through which China and Korea could implement joint military management. The North Koreans therefore could not oppose this point directly.  Instead, they established their own military transportation bureau to control the railroad and take over the work of the original management bureau organization and its jurisdiction (Order No. 21 of the transportation ministry). This action weakened and limited the Military Management Bureau, and made it unable to exercise full power.

To resolve this problem as quickly as possible, Zhou compromised, agreeing that “aside from maintaining the established unified military management command, and jointly conducting railroad repair, during the present situation, the Korean railroad administration will still manage the Korean railroad.” Kim expressed his basic agreement with this proposal, but during talks between the Chinese representative and the minister of the North Korean Transportation Department Park, the Koreans raised additional demands.  Not only should railroad administration be directed by the DPRK Transportation Minister, but the Military Management Bureau should not be responsible for developing plans. Its role would be restricted to inspecting and supervising railway transportation. The North Koreans also demanded that railway maintenance work have a separate organization headed by the DPRK Ministry of  Transportation.

In actuality, these demands amounted to canceling the Sino-Korean joint military organization. Given the unpredictability of the North Koreans during negotiations and the rift in basic thinking between the two sides, the Chinese representative felt the problem to be very complicated. Even though an agreement had been reached on paper, it was still difficult to change anything in actual practice.  He thus requested that “an authoritative and influential comrade be dispatched again to discuss the matter further.” Peng suggested that he offer for Kim’s consideration the opinion of the transportation minister, and let the two governments meet to resolve the matter. He requested only that the Koreans “guarantee timely completion of all military transportation work [and] confirm the particulars of railroad management and transportation.”[74]

Shortly thereafter, Gao Gang offered five suggestions that he believed were in accordance with North Korean principles: 1) to continue the military management system of the Korean railroad, but institute a military representative system and establish military representatives at all levels, under the joint transportation command headed by the Chinese, with military representatives making final decisions on all military transportation matters; 2) that the Joint Transportation Command established in Shenyang appoint one person to the DPRK Transportation Ministry to serve as chief representative with the power to supervise implementation of plans for military transportation; 3) the Korean side would guarantee that the Joint Transportation Command, and its chief representatives and military representatives at all levels, would have uninterrupted telephone communication. 4) setting up a unified maintenance command, which would be led