Sino-North Korean Conflict and Resolution during the Korean War: A Case Study of Socialist Camp Relations During the Cold War
gotiator] Nam Il,
he expressed this view; he advocated signing the cease-fire agreement and turning over all unsolved problems to a political meeting for further research.” According to Kim, “delaying negotiations was not beneficial, because the US air force was continuing to inflict damage on the DPRK. He does not see the rationale behind continuing the debate over POWs, because this debate is now leading to great losses.” Moreover, Kim believed that most of the Chinese POWs were former soldiers of Jiang Jieshi’s army, and were thus politically unreliable. Therefore, “expending a lot of effort on them is somewhat meaningless.” Kim instructed Nam Il “to get a clear sense of the Chinese attitude on this question,” and suggested making concessions on the POW problem “in the name of [PRC negotiator] Li Kenong.” [83]
The Chinese concerns were quite different. Razuvaev reported that the Chinese leaders worried that much of the Soviet military aid would decrease or cease altogether once the war ended. They therefore believed that resolving the POW problem too quickly “could only lead to a weakening of Sino-Korean forces. Li Kenong believes that if they do not mobilize the forces of international opinion, and do not prepare for a protected war, the Americans will not yield. Comrade Mao shares this same judgment about the prospect of negotiations, and has given Li Kenong these directions: ‘Only by adopting an unyielding position can you win the initiative and force the enemy to yield. To achieve these objectives, you should prepare for a test of strength against the enemy through several more months of negotiation.’”[84]
By May 2, the negotiators at Panmunjom had reached agreement on four of the five points. However, with regard to the repatriation of POWs, the American side proposed returning only those who wished to go back, while the Chinese insisted upon the repatriation of all POWs. As a result, negotiations became deadlocked. Korean leaders had hoped that the Americans would sign a cease-fire agreement by May, and had planned to begin political and economic work by the second half of 1952. They never expected that the dispute over the POW issue would delay the negotiations so long. Razuvaev reported that “this has made the Korean leaders extremely disappointed.” Kim suggested that the Chinese comrades make concessions on the POW issue, and strive for a cease-fire agreement.[85] On July 13, after ignoring repeated concessions by the Chinese and North Koreans (including dropping their demands for full repatriation of POWs), the US suggested a repatriation totaling 83,000 men (including 80% of the men captured from the KPA and 32% of those captured from the CVA).[86] They claimed that this was their final, unalterable offer. The Chinese and Koreans were forced to make a decision.
The Chinese leaders were very resolute in their position. On July 15 Mao sent a telegram to Kim saying that in the face of the horrific bombardment by the enemy, to accept the enemy’s offer, which was provocative and seductive but represented no real concessions, would be extremely disadvantageous for the Sino-Korean side, both politically and militarily. Although continuing the war would mean continued destruction for the Korean people and the CVA, the Chinese and Korean people were growing stronger with the war and were strengthening the cause of peace throughout the world. The war was keeping the Americans tied down in East Asia and was draining their strength, while Soviet construction grew stronger, thus promoting the development of people’s revolutions in all countries and delaying the outbreak of another world war. Mao guaranteed that the Chinese people would give all possible help to the Korean people to resolve their difficulties. In sum “to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our prestige.” Finally, Mao told Kim that he would relay the Koreans’ proposal to Stalin and request his recommendations.[87] On the same day however, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin informing the Soviet leader that the Chinese “resolutely refuse this provocative and seductive plan of the enemy and are prepared to expand the war. Kim Il Sung does not agree with this proposal.”[88]
Two days later Kim capitulated, endorsing Mao’s analysis of the situation and thanking China for its promise of full support.[89] However, in a telegram to Stalin that same day, Kim complained that because of poor defensive strategy, Korean cities and their citizens were suffering great losses from enemy bombing. Although he agreed with Mao’s viewpoints, he still hoped for a quick cease-fire. “We must quickly and resolutely negotiate a cease-fire, stop actual fighting and exchange all prisoners in accordance with the Geneva conventions. These demands are supported by all peace-loving people and will rescue us from our present passive position.”[90]
Part of the reason the two sides differed in their views on resolving the POW issue was that they had different policies toward POW’s in general. Because of China’s recent civil war and its lack of experience in international conflict, from the very beginning of the war the Chinese did not want to detain POWs. On 17 November 1950, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission saying he was preparing to release one hundred POWs before the start of his campaign. On the 18th Mao replied that “releasing a group of POWs is a very good idea. From now on, periodically release POWs, you do not need my permission.”[91] In actuality, the number of POWs the Chinese had was comparatively small. In November 1951, the Chinese and Koreans decided that the KPA would henceforth be responsible for South Korean POWs, while the CVA would handle POWs from other countries.[92] Thus, the small number of POWs in CVA custody limited Chinese influence on the issue during the negotiations and was one reason Beijing demanded full repatriation.
By contrast, because of their need for labor after the war, the Koreans secretly detained large numbers of POWs. According to reports from Ambassador Razuvaev, “the Korean comrades believed that it would be better to retain large numbers of South Korean POWs, without considering their wish to return home.” As a result, they detained 13,094 of Syngman Rhee’s troops. Of those, 6,430 men served in the KPA, doing various work for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Railroad Ministry. They also detained 42,262 South Korean POWs who were “mobilized” in the early stages of the war for service in the KPA.[93] Under these circumstances, the Korean leaders could hardly call for “full repatriation.”
The issue was ultimately resolved in Moscow. In a July 15 telegram, Mao told Stalin that “in the American plan, the proportion for the two sides was extremely unequal. The enemy is attempting to use this to break the wartime unity of the Korean and Chinese people. It would be extremely disadvantageous for us to submit to the enemy’s pressure.” Mao declared that even if talks broke down he would not concede, “because this is a question of politics, not just for Korea and China; it also has repercussions for the entire revolutionary camp.”