The early 1970s saw important changes in the international setting of the cold war. In April 1971, the ‘ping pong diplomacy’ initiated by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai created a global sensation. The thaw in Sino-US relations, which had begun in 1968, experienced a breakthrough. Lastly, the publication of the Shanghai Communiqué signified that the United States and China had reached a reconciliation. Less than a year later, the lengthy Vietnam war came to an end when, following strenuous negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. In what ways were these events related?
Hanoi later concluded that Sino-US reconciliation represented a “betrayal” and “abandonment” of Vietnam, in that China sought to prevent Vietnam’s unification and to force North Vietnam “to acknowledge the southern puppet regime,” thereby selling out Vietnamese interests to the United States. Subsequent research and studies appear to have confirmed this conclusion. Yet this view still seems rather one-sided, and history presents a rather more complicated picture. Undoubtedly, between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, to enable it to cope with an environment of total international isolation, and in particular its vulnerability to being trapped between the United States and the Soviet Union, China shifted its foreign policy from “idealistic diplomacy” to “pragmatic diplomacy.” Nonetheless, due to an ideological outlook developed over many years, together with political struggles within their own power structures, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government never ceased to support world revolutions in general, and in particular, the diplomatic concept of supporting peoples’ revolutions in the Third World. On the basis of these principles , after China entered the United Nations, Mao Zedong gradually evolved his thesis of differentiating among three worlds. Realism forced China to reconcile with the United States, while ideology required China to support Vietnam’s anti-American struggle. Facing the concrete diplomatic issue of how to deal with Vietnam, China simultaneously had to contend with a tug of war between two interlocking triangles, the Sino-US-Soviet relationship, and its Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese counterpart. As the Sino-US relationship steadily improved, China became increasingly embroiled in a series of dilemmas over Vietnam. First, China needed to adjust its diplomatic strategies to the reality of the political power contest, yet it could not renounce the internationalist rhetoric it had consistently employed to support liberation movements by peoples all over the world. Second, China needed to continue to support and help the Vietnamese wage their struggle against American aggression and save their nation, but it also had to ensure that this would not create obstacles to the reconciliation process between China and the United States. Third, China sought to achieve and safeguard the security of its southern border once the United States pulled its troops out of Vietnam, but on the other hand, it had to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of its precarious situation and posing a new threat on that front. To sum up, it was necessary that China not only develop a relationship with the United States, but also support North Vietnam, the direct enemy of the United States.
Part One
From the time the United States began to escalate the Vietnam War, China consistently and steadfastly opposed peace negotiations and encouraged Vietnam to carry on its war of resistance to the bitter end. From the time the Paris peace talks began, the Chinese leadership had concluded that the conflict’s final resolution would still occur on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. In May 1970, Mao Zedong said: “You may negotiate [with the Americans]. I am not saying that you cannot negotiate, but your main energy should be put toward fighting.” Although China’s principal antagonist on this issue was still the Soviet Union, its position also opposed that held by the United States. In the course of America’s pursuit of normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China, the issue of how to resolve the Vietnam War was undoubtedly a major factor. On the one hand, in order to maintain the American strategic position in East Asia and to counterbalance Soviet power, which, within the triangular structure of states, would in turn attract China toward the United States, the Nixon administration had to resolve the Vietnam issue with dignity. On the other hand, Washington also expected that the reconciliation between China and the United States would offer it some diplomatic opportunities to persuade the Soviet Union, or perhaps even China itself, to pressure Vietnam to compromise, so that the United States could withdraw speedily from the Vietnam War. Yet only when Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser, visited China in 1971, did Beijing seem seriously to consider the link between Sino-United States reconciliation and the Vietnam War.
At a Politburo meeting on March 3, 1971, China confirmed its policy of enhanced support for Vietnam. Zhou Enlai pointed out that, to provide full backing to the people of Vietnam in their war against the United States, the Chinese people were willing to make the utmost sacrifices. Zhou Enlai subsequently visited Vietnam, where he spoke at a popular rally, stating: “Our supreme leader Chairman Mao Zedong, under the lofty principle of Proletarian internationalism, has taught us that those among us who advocate that we should not assist the people of Vietnam to save their homeland against the American invasion, those people are in fact betraying us and are betraying the cause of revolution.” That same month Le Thanh Nghi, the vice-premier of North Vietnam, visited China and requested that China increase its assistance by twelve complete projects, at a total cost of 150 million renminbi. China’s Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Foreign Trade concluded that, “under the guidance of the Central Committee’s full commitment to support the Vietnamese people in their effort to save their country against the United States, China agrees in principle to satisfy Vietnam’s requests for an additional twelve projects, pending further discussion of a few items.”
A Chinese Politburo Central Committee report on the Sino-American negotiations, dated May 29, 1971, reflected the adjustment China had to make in its basic diplomatic principles. After reviewing the progress of Sino-American reconciliation efforts over the past several years, the report set out various counter-demands which should be made during the forthcoming visits by Kissinger and President Richard Nixon. First, the United States should withdraw all its military forces and close all its military installations in Taiwan Province and the neighboring Taiwan Strait, a demand which was crucial to the normalization of relations between China and the United States. Second, the United States should recognize Taiwan as the territory of the People’s Republic of China and its liberation as purely an internal matter for the PRC, one in which China would not tolerate interference by foreign forces, and would be particularly vigilant against the activities of Japanese militarism. Third, China would make diligent efforts to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means, and to conduct Taiwan affairs cautiously. Fourth, China would resolutely oppose any activity which might lead to “two Chinas,” or “one China, one Taiwan.” Fifth, in the event that the first three requirements were not met, China and the United States would not establish diplomatic relations, but both sides could establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals. Sixth, China would not take the initiative to raise issues related to the United Nations. Seventh, China would not take the initiative to open the subject of bilateral trade. Eighth, in order to maintain peace in Asia, China contended that the United States should withdraw all its forces from Indochina, Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asian nations. Bearing in mind the influence of the opposition (Democratic) party in the United States, the report concluded that, “even if none of the above can be successfully negotiated, and even if our disagreements make Nixon’s China visit impossible, this does not harm our position at all.”
A section toward the end of the report discussed whether the Sino-American negotiations would impede progress in the Paris talks or other ongoing discussions on the war in Indochina. According to the report, “there might be occasional interruptions. . . . However clearly stating our position on such issues would eventually help the anti-invasion war in Indochina and help the Paris talks, because Nixon had already reached the conclusion that the main points of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union lie in the Middle East and Europe, not Asia. If progress occurred in the Sino-American negotiations, this could only encourage America’s withdrawal from Indochina and assist the Paris talks. Even though the causal relationship among these events was (is?) not yet clear, the talks would help the anti-invasion struggle in Indochina.” The report further pointed out that, so long as the peoples of the three Indochinese nations planned to continue fighting on a long-term basis, ultimately they would win victory. Clearly the Chinese government, in managing its relations with the United States, assigned the foremost importance to Taiwan. The Chinese government concluded that, even if the subject of Vietnam came up during the Sino-American negotiations, a reconciliation with the United States would benefit -- and certainly do no harm to -- Vietnam.
The agenda for Kissinger’s secret July 1971 visit to China, in addition to reiterating the strategic basis for a reconciliation between China and the United States, included another important item -- the war in Indochina. During his talks with Zhou Enlai Kissinger devoted more time to explaining United States policy toward Indochina than to any other issue, and he obviously hoped that Beijing would persuade North Vietnam to speed up the peace negotiations. In order to link China’s wish to solve the Taiwan problem with the American desire to end the Vietnam War as quickly as possible, Kissinger informed Chinese leaders that, once the Vietnam War had ended, within a short period of time the United States would prepared to withdraw two-thirds of its military forces from Taiwan. Responding to Kissinger’s proposal, however, Zhou feigned ignorance, and avoided the topic of Vietnam altogether, neither promising to encourage North Vietnam to modify its negotiating position, nor showing any interest in Kissinger’s request that Hanoi alter its policy on American prisoners-of-war. When Kissinger subsequently reported on his trip to Nixon, he said: “Profound differences and years of isolation yawn between us and the Chinese. They will be tough before and during the summit [Nixon’s first visit to China] on the question of Taiwan and other major issues.”
Seeking to avoid arousing any suspicions in Hanoi, the day after he said farewell to Kissinger, Zhou Enlai suggested that he himself make a secret visit to North Vietnam. On July 13 and 14 Zhou held conversations with Vietnam’s premier and foreign minister, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, to whom he furnished information on the ongoing Sino-American negotiations. Referring to a covert reference by Hanoi to these negotiations in an editorial in the Vietnamese People newspaper, Zhou Enlai told his Chinese foreign ministry colleagues Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan: “[T]he editorial shows the Vietnamese comrades’ worry and appraisal. I think it can be published in its entirety. There is no need for a summary. We need to show that we have nothing to hide.” He then added: “[T]he course of events will prove that China, as led by Chairman Mao, consistently supports the continuing efforts by the three countries of Indochina to resist foreign invasion.” Soon afterward, Zhou Enlai spoke repeatedly to the international press, further clarifying China’s position. Zhou emphasized that, in order to reduce world tension, the United States must withdraw its military forces completely from Asia, especially from the three countries of Indochina, and allow the peoples of those nations to solve their respective problems independently. China viewed this as a matter of principle. Zhou said that the subjects under discussion in the Sino-American negotiations were only bilateral issues, involving no third party. Since the United States and China had different political systems and broad disagreements on matters of principle, it would be difficult for them to solve all the issues of contention between them. The Chinese people resolutely supported the Indochinese people in their struggle for independence against the United States, and China would provide such support until the very end, when victory finally arrived. It was the sovereign right of the peoples of the three countries of Indochina to solve their own conflicts, in which no other party had the right to interfere. Where the Vietnam War was concerned, North Vietnam’s representatives must deal directly with their American counterparts. Unlike the Soviet Union, which publicly claimed no role but was prepared to make a private deal with the United States, China had betrayed none of its principles.
The Joint Communiqué which China and Vietnam signed on November 25, 1971, demonstrated that China’s support for the Indochinese people in their war against the United States was an “unquestionable and established policy,” and that China would consistently “fulfill her own international obligations.” It continued: “The Vietnamese people, together with all the peoples of the countries of Indochina, are determined to fight until the end. The Chinese people are determined to support such efforts until the end. In order to assist the peoples of Vietnam and of Indochina, the Chinese people are prepared on every all front; they are prepared to accept all the consequences of their uttermost sacrifice.” China’s fundamental position on the resolution of the conflicts in Indochina remained unchanged: that it supported the people of Vietnam, and the United States must withdraw its troops completely and renounce its support for the Southern Vietnamese regime.
Simultaneously, China continually increased its material aid to Vietnam. On September 27, 1971, the Chinese and North Vietnamese governments signed an agreement in Hanoi that China would provide Vietnam with economic and military assistance throughout 1972. Including this agreement, in 1971 alone China had agreed to send Vietnam seven assistance packages, outright aid with no strings attached, totalling 3.614 billion renminbi, or 48.67 percent of China’s total foreign aid for that year. Bearing in mind China’s increased obligations to aid Third World countries after she joined the United Nations, the amount of support Vietnam received indubitably proved that China assigned the highest significance to its assistance program for Vietnam. In military assistance alone, the amount China donated to Vietnam in 1971 and 1972 surpassed the total quantity it had given over the previous twenty years.
Part Two
Nixon’s trip to China marked a significant milestone in the evolution of Sino-American relations. Before and after his visit, the United States initiated two rounds of diplomatic maneuvers, to try to persuade Beijing to acquiesce in Washington’s policy of pressuring Vietnam through additional military initiatives. While Beijing was preoccupied with preparations for Nixon’s visit, it also had to maintain friendly relations with Vietnam. Beijing therefore adopted the prudent approach of neither supporting nor opposing Washington’s policy.
In December 1971, facing the largest assemblage of enemy military forces it had yet encountered in South Vietnam, the Nixon administration, ignoring public opinion and angry protests from the United States Congress, launched a two-day bombing campaign against the Vietnamese auxiliary base south of the twenty-second parallel. Simultaneously, Washington sent one of its strongest warnings to Moscow and Beijing, that any retaliation by North Vietnam would only provoke yet more severe attacks. The American intention was to protect its position in the forthcoming high-level talks with Hanoi’s allies. China made no immediate response. In January 1972, when the American advance team preparing for Nixon’s visit, led by Alexander Haig, arrived in Beijing, Zhou Enlai reiterated Beijing’s moral support for Hanoi, urging a speedy end to the Vietnam War in order to reduce Soviet influence in Indochina. Speaking of Nixon’s forthcoming trip, Zhou Enlai stated that China would do all it could to ensure that this high-level visit brought successful and positive results. Zhou also pointed out that fundamental differences over Vietnam still existed between China and the United States, and added that the continued implementation of the existing United States policy toward Vietnam would involve “undesirable factors” in Nixon’s visit. In a public address on January 25, 1972, Nixon urged North Vietnam to resume peace talks. He also contacted Moscow and Beijing, warning that the United States had reached the limit of the compromises it was willing to make, and that if Hanoi launched a military attack, the United States would respond strongly. Zhou Enlai “returned a tart reply,” stating that China was unfamiliar with Hanoi’s internal affairs, while accusing the United States of trying to embroil China in Vietnam’s problems. In addition, this letter bore an implicit message: that while China had never asked the United States to make any commitments on the subject of Vietnam, China itself had likewise made no pledges on this subject.
The meeting between Nixon and Mao Zedong was more relaxed than the president’s earlier meetings with Soviet leaders in Moscow. Whereas the highest leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union argued constantly over specific issues, Mao Zedong showed an unusual interest in lecturing Nixon on broad philosophy. Where issues of substance were involved, Mao preferred to limit his discussions to the enunciation of principles. During Nixon’s visit, however, his talks with Zhou Enlai, as well as those between Kissinger and Qiao Guanhua, China’s vice foreign-minister, both touched upon Vietnam. From the American perspective, China still maintained its position of preferring to hold aloof from the talks between the United States and North Vietnam. China repeatedly emphasized that it would continue to provide moral and material support to North Vietnam, not for ideological reasons or to further China’s national interests, but because from the historical viewpoint it felt obliged to do so. The Chinese government maintained that the Paris peace talks concerned only the United States and North Vietnam, and China therefore proposed to have no opinion upon them. Kissinger observed that, although China urged the United States to withdraw its troops, it did not really insist upon the complete official line as given by Hanoi. Moreover, China issued no warning against any potential action the United States might take.
In late March 1972, North Vietnamese troops finally launched a full-scale, carefully planned attack on the South. From Hanoi’s viewpoint, “winning a military victory on the battle field would have decisive and strategic significance,” and this round of attacks would determine the war’s outcome. Hanoi therefore concentrated all available troops on the advance into the South. The United States had anticipated these moves, and responded with large scale air strikes and the planting of mines. Simultaneously, Washington also exerted pressure on Beijing and Moscow, hoping the two big powers could and would force Hanoi to return to the negotiating table. American officials threatened that, unless the Soviets did so, they would break off high-level talks with Moscow. After intense debates and deliberations, the Soviets decided to continue with their preparations to receive Nixon. Finally, the Soviet Union not only considered and agreed to relay to Vietnam the “constructive” suggestions made by the United States, but also itself suggested that the North Vietnamese should unconditionally resume the negotiations.
By contrast, China expressed continuing support for Vietnam, but continued to hold aloof from the peace talks. On April 3, Kissinger sent a secret letter to China, explaining that it was of the utmost importance to his government that the United States undertake military action to force a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam War. Kissinger also reminded Beijing that, if the United States were humiliated in Indochina, this would not be in China’s long-term interests. In response, the Chinese government deployed its Foreign Ministry to criticize publicly the air strikes on Hanoi. Through secret back-channels China also replied to the United States, expressing its support for Vietnam and warning the United States not to become ever more deeply embroiled in Vietnam. Kissinger noted, however, that China’s reply contained no threats and, in addition, at the end of this message Beijing reiterated its desire to normalize relations with Washington. On the same day that China dispatched this communication to the United States, Zhou Enlai received Nguyen Tien, the North Vietnamese deputy chief of mission in Beijing, and stated that by supporting North Vietnam’s efforts to carry the war to victory the Chinese government and people were backing a just cause.
At this time China initiated a large-scale campaign to aid North Vietnam. On May 9 and 10, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials and Politburo members held several meetings to devise measures to counter Nixon’s public announcement that the United States would impose a blockade and launch combined air and naval assaults against North Vietnam’s coast. On May 13 and 14, Zhou Enlai met with Xuan Thuy to discuss the problems of transport congestion caused by the American air strikes. Although he refused one new request, that China should open its ports to Soviet ships, Zhou Enlai agreed to provide assistance to rebuild railroads, open protected ocean routes, increase transfers of military hardware, and provide food and fuel, as well as to sweep and disarm mines laid around Vietnamese ports. From May 18 to 22, China’s Ministry of Planning and the Office of Defense Industry held a national conference in Beijing, gathering together officials from twenty-six provinces in charge of industrial transportation and defense industries and 224 representatives from state-owned enterprises, together with members of the State Council and People’s Liberation Army auxiliary staff. The conference considered carefully Vietnam’s requests for increased or expedited assistance, and fully implemented ninety-eight of the 133 existing projects and ninety-two of those additional projects Vietnam had requested. The conference also decided that whatever material each factory needed the Chinese central government would itself supply directly. When raw materials were needed urgently, those units responsible could purchase or borrow these to meet production needs, and the central government would either reimburse them or pay the costs directly. Factories whose productivity was inadequate to meet production needs were ordered to upgrade their technology, double or multiply workers’ shifts, and otherwise improve productivity. The central government also ordered that, when North Vietnam critically required specific items, Vietnam’s needs would have the highest priority. At this conference vice-premier Yu Qiuli stated that increasing production to assist Vietnam against the United States was an urgent task. “We must find all possible avenues to satisfy their needs. . . . The task of providing aid to Vietnam is an honorable, important, and long-term endeavor. There is no room for compromise. This work must be completed.”
According to Chinese sources, between May 18 and August 22 China and North Vietnam held bilateral talks during which they discussed and resolved a series of concrete matters concerning aid to Vietnam. On May 18, it was decided that two additional field oil pipes would be laid between Pingxiang and Hanoi, and 200 tons of steel plates Vietnam had purchased in Hong Kong would be rush shipped to Vietnam. Talks on May 20 agreed that the Chinese navy would assist with mine sweeping, and that China would promptly deliver 200 trucks, transfer equipment for emergency bridge repair, and dispatch army missile specialists to Vietnam, who would serve under Vietnamese command. On June 8 the two sides decided to open up a concealed sea route. Besides agreeing to supply one hundred 50-ton freight ships the Vietnamese had requested in their shipping list, China provided an additional fifty ships, and volunteered to supply them with the food, water, and fuel they needed for their delivery runs, to repair any ships that broke down, and also to supply salvage equipment for sunken ships. On June 16, it was decided that China would immediately dispatch highway transportation specialist delegations to Vietnam, who would begin to open up road transportation. On June 18, Zhou Enlai replied to Le Duc Tho, agreeing that China would temporarily store the 1.4 million tons of aid supplies which the Soviet Union and other East European countries had promised North Vietnam under their 1972 aid agreement, but which had not yet been delivered, a move undertaken to facilitate the signing of the 1973 aid agreement between Vietnam and these countries. At Vietnam’s suggestion, it was decided that, although two divisions of the Chinese corps of railroad engineers who had been assigned to Vietnam for emergency railroad and bridge repair could not make this trip, China would transport all the necessary repair equipment and materials to the Vietnamese. On July 6, China informed Vietnam that it had assembled a delegation of forty experts, whom the Vietnamese had invited over to undertake emergency railroad repairs, and within ten days they would be ready to depart for Vietnam. On August 16 Vietnam agreed to open up additional highway transportation facilities, while China agreed to provide 3,000 additional freight trucks Vietnam had requested, and promised to make every effort to deliver these before the year ended.
During this period, the greatest assistance China rendered Vietnam was the removal of mines from coastal defense harbors. Sea transportation was the primary channel whereby aid supplies entered Vietnam. According to American estimates, as much as seven times as many such goods entered North Vietnam through defense harbors as were transported by rail. One may readily imagine, therefore, the difficulties that North Vietnam faced when the United States sealed off all the seaports and river outlets along Vietnam’s northern coast with 7,963 mines. In response, Vietnam asked China for emergency help with mine clearance. After consultation, the Chinese Navy dispatched its mine-sweeping team, consisting of 318 persons, twelve mine-sweepers, and four escort battleships, who began to arrive in Vietnam from May 28 onward. The mine-sweeping team worked in Vietnam for a year, during which time it carried out 586 missions, accumulated over 27,800 sea miles, and managed to dredge one by one all the sea routes in northern Vietnam. Due to China’s help, in 1972 almost twice as many aid supplies were shipped into Vietnam or transported from the north to the south as in 1971. As the Vietnamese negotiating representative Le Ban stated, the Vietnamese Communist Party and government were very satisfied both with China’s supplementary assistance and by her all-out efforts to “meet all Vietnam’s needs for basic commodities.”
Part Three
In 1972, as military operations in the Vietnam War and the peace talks both entered their most intensified and critical phase, Nixon’s visit to Moscow and the signature of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty made Beijing uneasy. The rapprochement between Washington and Moscow undoubtedly threatened China’s diplomatic strategy and the developing Sino-American relationship. Simultaneously, China hoped that the United States would speedily withdraw from Vietnam, and thereby encourage Soviet-American conflicts in other areas to intensify. Subtle changes took place in Beijing’s policy toward Vietnam, especially in Beijing’s attitude toward the Paris peace talks. On the one hand, China protested the heavy military operations the United States launched in North Vietnam; on the other, its bilateral ties with the United States continued to develop until March 1973, when both sides agreed to establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals. Simultaneously, while Beijing satisfied all North Vietnam’s requests for material assistance, it also maintained that when an opportunity came North Vietnam should end the war.
After the Soviet -American summit, between June 19 and 23 Kissinger paid another visit to Beijing. Even though the United States had made little progress with China on Vietnam, Kissinger sensed that Zhou Enlai had become increasingly interested in implementing a cease-fire there. Kissinger’s perception was accurate. During this meeting Zhou Enlai did not alter China’s principles or stance on Vietnam, but in subsequent dealings with the North Vietnamese he made slight changes in China’s position. Before the Soviet-American summit, Zhou Enlai had reassured Hanoi that China would not interfere in the Paris peace negotiations, would support North Vietnam’s continuation of the war, and favored ousting Nguyen van Thieu, the South Vietnamese president. After the summit, however, China hinted that Vietnam should return to the negotiating table. On July 6, 1972, Zhou Enlai met Xuan Thuy and pointed out that the following four months would be critical in deciding the outcome of the Vietnam War, and could bring either the continuation of the war or a softening of the United States position. A few days later, Zhou told North Vietnam’s peace negotiator, Le Duc Tho, “the strategy that you have adopted since 1968, of simultaneously fighting while talking, is the correct one. When you first started peace talks, some of our comrades thought you had taken the wrong approach. However, it turned out you had made the right decision.” Zhou shared with Le Duc Tho China’s own experiences in negotiations during the Chinese Civil War, and proposed that North Vietnam talk with the leaders of other nations. He also suggested that Hanoi should open direct talks with Nguyen Van Thieu and his representatives, since Thieu spoke for the conservative right, and no one could replace him. Given that at this time North Vietnam had withdrawn from the peace talks and was undertaking large-scale military operations, China’s emphasis on the merits of peace negotiations was naturally intended to persuade North Vietnam to resume talks. Since Vietnam had requested that, as one condition of a cease-fire, the United States should remove Thieu, Zhou Enlai’s words clearly implied that in this case Beijing did not support Hanoi’s position.
The peace talks continued to be delayed, as North Vietnam attempted to take advantage of the American presidential elections to pressure the United States into further compromises, while Washington had not yet ironed out its differences with the Saigon government. In the face of this situation, Nixon decided to gamble and stake everything on a final assault on North Vietnam. On December 18, the United States issued an ultimatum to the North, and simultaneously began mass bombing strikes on Hanoi, the North Vietnamese coastal defense line, and all of North Vietnam, mobilizing its air forces on an unprecedented scale and utilizing, among other planes, several hundred B-52 bombers. Unable to withstand further heavy bombardment, North Vietnam yielded to American demands. Only to save face did the North, citing Le Duc Tho’s ill health as an excuse, delay the resumption of negotiations from January 3, 1973, the date suggested by the United States, to January 8. Meanwhile, North Vietnam “appealed to the Soviet Union to use all its prestige and influence to exert pressure on the United States to prevent the latter from further escalating the war, to persuade the Americans to return immediately to the state of affairs existing prior to December 18, 1972, and through serious negotiations to resolve the remaining issues dividing them so as to reach an early agreement.” Not wishing to risk another setback on Vietnam, China urged the Vietnamese representatives participating in the Paris peace talks to work diligently to bring about a successful agreement. On December 29, while meeting Madam Nguyen Thi Binh, North Vietnam’s Foreign Minister and chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks, Mao Zedong stated that, if successful, the peace agreement would mean that not only southern Vietnam, but also, to a large extent the North, would normalize its relationship with the United States. On December 31, Zhou Enlai told Truong Chinh, chairman of the Standing Committee of North Vietnam’s National Assembly, that Nixon did indeed wish to pull out of Vietnam, so that this time the peace talks must be conducted with all sincerity and they must succeed.
One should, however, point out that Beijing’s intention was not to force Vietnam to yield, but to achieve a cease-fire at the earliest date possible, so that the Vietnamese situation would not block China’s broader objective of aligning itself with the United States against the Soviet Union. At that time China regarded the Soviet Union as its greatest enemy, and considered Soviet socialist imperialism “more deceptive, and hence more dangerous, than old line imperialism.” For this reason, China was also simultaneously exerting pressure on the United States, even as it tried to persuade Vietnam to compromise. After the Paris talks resumed, Huang Hua, China’s ambassador to the United Nations, in a message of October 25 to the United States ambassador, explicitly condemned Saigon for making trouble, expressed China’s belief in Washington’s sincerity, and urged the United States “to seize this ‘extremely opportune time to end the Vietnam War.’” When objections from Saigon led the United States to postpone signing the cease-fire agreement, China again vehemently condemned the South Vietnamese government and asked the United States government resolutely to oppose Saigon’s actions. Simultaneously, China reminded the United States that, were it to prolong the war and delay negotiations, “then how are people to view the U.S. statements about its preparedness to make efforts for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East?” So, when Kissinger entertained Qiao Guanhua on November 13 and again asked Beijing to persuade North Vietnam to yield, Qiao advised the United States to make concessions instead, arguing that a great country could afford to adopt a more generous attitude: “One should not lose the whole world just to gain South Vietnam.” Besides, China’s desire for a speedy end to the war did not imply that China intended to leave the Saigon regime intact. In the opinions of Chinese leaders, ending the war should not affect the North Vietnamese government’s objective of unification. On January 3, 1973, Zhou Enlai pointed out to Le Duc Tho, “Nixon has many international and domestic issues to deal with. It seems that the US is still willing to get out of Vietnam and Indochina. You should persist in principles while demonstrating flexibility during the negotiations. The most important [thing] is to let the Americans leave. The situation will change in six months or one year.” Mao Zedong’s words of February 2, 1973, to Le Duc Tho expressed China’s position more clearly: “[A[fter Paris Agreements have been signed you need at least six months to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam [and] to strengthen your forces.”
The war ended on January 27, 1973, when the Paris Peace Accords were signed. Mao Zedong believed that China could now continue with its strategy of “joining with the United States against the Soviet Union.” During a conversation with Kissinger on February 17, Mao expressed his satisfaction with the way in which the relationship between China and the United States was developing. He also emphasized that a present and growing Soviet threat did indeed exist. Mao hoped that China and the United States could cooperate to contain the Soviet Union and that the United States would take bolder initiatives to prevent the worldwide spread of Soviet power, especially in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. At this time, however, the relationship between China and North Vietnam began to deteriorate. Only six months after concluding the 1973 agreement for Chinese aid to North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho returned to Beijing, asking that China agree on a new aid package for 1974, a giant request which overall totalled 8 billion renminbi. Zhou considered it unrealistic for China to agree to such a huge package, which surpassed its financial capabilities, but agreed to a more modest aid package amount to 2.5 billion renminbi. In practice, although China and the United States greatly improved their bilateral relations between 1971 and 1973, this was also the period when China provided the most substantial aid to Vietnam, worth a total of 9 billion renminbi. During the heaviest period of United States bombing, there were 58 groups, comprising 719 Chinese experts, in Vietnam. If one compares the aid packages China provided North Vietnam between 1971 and 1975 with their counterparts in the period 1965 to 1970, it is clearly apparent that, far from China reducing its aid after the Sino-American reconciliation took place, the amount actually rose. To give specific examples, the quantity of textiles increased by 160%, steel by 125%, coal by 1,710%, fuel by 1,785%, and automobiles by 643%. The effort of providing such assistance to the cause of world revolution, especially in Vietnam, did, however take a heavy toll on Chinese economic strength. From the early 1970s, the damaging effect of the Cultural Revolution on China’s economy also began to become apparent, making China genuinely unable to satisfy Vietnam’s growing appetite for aid.
In an effort to recruit that country and retain its loyalties, in the same years the Soviet Union simultaneously increased its own stake in North Vietnam. In April 1971, the 24th Soviet Party Congress passed a resolution claiming that Indochina could prove the key to its entry into Southeast Asia. According to this resolution, Soviet assistance to Vietnam would switch from an ad hoc and transitional to a planned and long-term cooperative basis. Diplomatic cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam also intensified. For example, during the Paris peace talks, on July 12, 1971, the Soviet Union pre-approved and supported a proposal by the North Vietnamese representatives to link United States troop withdrawals with the removal of South Vietnam’s President, Nguyen van Thieu. North Vietnam even turned over to the Soviet Union a confidential report from its central military committee to the Vietnamese politburo, which contained many top secrets, including a status report on the assassination of leaders in Saigon by Hanoi’s defense and intelligence agents, and a complete list of the numbers and conditions of American prisoners-of-war. Soviet aid to Vietnam continued to increase, surpassing Chinese aid by a large margin. North Vietnam believed that it could capitalize on and maximize its gains from the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. For this reason, therefore, only one month after Beijing turned down its request for further assistance, the Vietnamese sought -- and received -- aid from the Soviet Union. The Soviets decided to convert their previous assistance to Vietnam from loans to outright aid, thereby eliminating Vietnam’s obligation to repay these loans, and agreed to offer Vietnam additional assistance amounting to $1.07 billion in 1975. In practice, serious conflicts also existed between the Soviet Union and Vietnam and Hanoi did not trust the Soviet Union. For instance, North Vietnam’s leaders resented the development of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Nixon’s visit to Moscow infuriated them. The Soviet Union also disliked North Vietnam’s attitude, that all outstanding issues must be resolved by military conflict. Even so, tempted by the real financial benefits that might accrue to it, Vietnam calculatingly leaned toward the Soviet Union.
The research undertaken for this study reveals that, although China did not take extreme measures to reduce American military pressure on Vietnam, because this might have damaged the ongoing process of Sino-American reconciliation, neither did it do any harm to the interests of North Vietnam, its ally. China pursued a consistent foreign policy of providing moral and material support to Vietnam. The Nixon administration understood this attitude and their differences over Vietnam did not affect the reconciliation between Beijing and Washington. While the United States looked to North Vietnam’s allies to pressure that country into ending the war, its focus was on the Soviet Union rather than China. China’s limited economic and military strength, together with the unfavorable regional political environment, made it impossible for the Chinese leadership to satisfy all North Vietnam’s demands while reorienting their own foreign policies, and so prevented the Chinese government from maximizing either its global or regional position. In sum, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the realigned Chinese foreign policy achieved its fundamental goal of normalizing relations with the United States. This new policy meant that China could no longer maintain friendly relations with her Vietnamese “comrades and brothers.” As Vietnam gradually moved into the Soviet camp, China had to face a new challenge from the south.