Khrushchev, Mao Zedong and Unfulfilled-Soviet Military Cooperation
Shen Zhihua*
Making use of newly declassified Russian documents and the recollections of those concerned on the Soviet side this paper makes an analysis, from the perspective of relations between socialist allies, of two issues in Sino-Soviet military cooperation during the late 1950s: the long-wave radio station and the combined fleet, including the historical background, origins, and the motives and working styles of the leaders of the two countries.
After the conclusion of the 1957 Moscow Conference, the Chinese military delegation stayed in Moscow for further visits. On November 27, Khrushchev made an extemporaneous speech at the farewell dinner given by Peng Dehuai, sincerely thanking the Communist Party of China (CPC) for its understanding and support of the Soviet Union and highly praising the solidarity and friendship between the two parties and nations. The Chinese present were much moved by the atmosphere and scene. Rumors even circulated widely among high-ranking officials in Moscow that the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty would be brought in line with the Warsaw Pact Treaty and that Chinese and Soviet armies would join hands in their defense.[i][1] These rumors were not groundless, for in both Moscow and Beijing there was a mood to promote economic and military integration in the socialist camp.
According to the Russian archives China submitted a memo to the Soviet Union on 14 December, suggesting the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet Committee to manage the defense industry, “meeting one or two times per year.” The major responsibilities of the joint committee, as envisioned by the Chinese proposal, were to exchange military and technological materials related to the development of the defense industry, discuss standardization and technological specifications of weapons and equipment, invite and dispatch professionals and delegations, exchange experiences and lessons regarding the adoption of new equipment and technology, and research the problem of safeguarding technological information for weapons production. In the following months the two sides kept in close contact, exchanging information and coordinating their policies, in an attempt to promote their unity in diplomatic, economic and political fields.
It was against this backdrop of friendly Sino-Soviet cooperation and unity that the issues of the long-range radio station and combined fleet were raised. In Khrushchev’s view, the conditions were ripe and no difficulty would be encountered. In December 1958, the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine successfully completed a trial voyage. The Soviets fulfilled their dream of having a submarine fleet in the open seas. However, a new problem cropped up, namely, communication between the submarine fleet at sea and the homeland. The Soviet navy held repeated discussions on the problem, and submitted two plans to the National Defense Committee. The first called for construction of a long-wave radio station on Soviet territory; it was vetoed because it was too expensive and there was no guarantee of communication. The second plan was to set up two long-wave radio stations, one on China’s Hainan Island and the other in India, responsible for communicating with the Soviet Submarine Fleets of the South Pacific and Indian Ocean respectively. Khrushchev crossed out India without any hesitation, as he did not want to create any misgivings for Nehru and damage the newly established good Indo-Soviet relations. As for the plan to set up a long-wave station on Chinese territory, Khrushchev thought it was feasible and envisaged no difficulty for its implementation because China was a socialist country and shared common security interests with the USSR, and moreover, its navy was being developed with Soviet aid.[ii][2] Therefore, on 6 January 1958, Admiral Platonov of the Soviet Ministry of National Defense sent a letter to the Chinese Commander of Navy Xiao Jinguang, inquiring about the possibility of the two countries jointly constructing and using a long-wave radio station, with a draft agreement as an attachment.[iii][3]
Meanwhile, the Chinese side advanced a similar request. As early as 1954 when the first Chinese submarine force was established, China had set out to build long-wave radio stations. With Soviet help, China imported equipment and set up three long-wave radio stations in Qingdao, Ningbo and Zhanjiang in 1957. But all the stations were small in power. With the growth of the Chinese submarine force, and an increase of training missions in distant waters, a high-power long-wave radio station was urgently needed. Since it was difficult for China to undertake such a project alone, the Chinese navy began to contact the Soviet departments concerned and consult with them in an effort to get help from them.[iv][4]
On 18 April, the Soviet Minister of National Defense wrote to his Chinese counterpart Peng Dehuai suggesting construction of a 1000-kilowatt long-wave transmitting station and a long-range receiving center in South China. The total investment of 110 million rubles would be shared between the two countries to the tune of 70 million from the Soviet Union and 40 million from China. When completed, the two installations would be used jointly by the USSR and the PRC. On 24 April, Mao Zedong instructed the competent department to give the Soviets a reply to the effect that China agreed to set up the installations on the Chinese territory, but would bear all expenses by itself and be the sole owner. In accordance with Mao’s ideas, Peng Dehuai insisted at the 152nd meeting of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on 10 May that the long-wave station should be built solely with Chinese funds instead of joint Sino-Soviet investment. Peng also said that the station would supply intelligence to the USSR in time of peace and the USSR could place personnel at the station during times of war. However, under no circumstances would the USSR be allowed to establish military bases on Chinese territory. On 23 May the Military Commission met again and adopted a decision not to run a long-wave radio station jointly with the USSR. On 4 June Peng talked with the Soviet General Military Adviser in China and conveyed to him the Chinese position on this question. On 5 June, Peng submitted the transcript of the talk to Mao Zedong and reported that the USSR still held to their original idea of jointly building the station, and that they proposed to dispatch specialists to China in early June for selection of the site, reconnoitering and design, and discussion of a draft agreement. In order not to hold up the reconnoitering and design Peng suggested the Soviet specialists be allowed to come to China for technical preparation, leaving the questions of investment and use to be discussed later. Mao wrote on the transcript on 7 June, “I agree to your suggestion. The cost of the project must be born by China rather than the Soviet Union. But the installations could be used by both countries.” If the Soviets applied pressure, “don’t give any reply, but just stall for time. Maybe the central authorities need to talk over the problem and then give them a reply. An agreement on the issue should be signed by the two governments.”[v][5] By this time, Mao had become a little impatient with the persistence of the Soviet side.
On 12 June, Peng sent an official reply to his Soviet counterpart, Malinovskii, reaffirming the position of the Chinese government and suggesting that the two countries sign an agreement on the issue. On 28 June Letvenskii, Assistant to the Chief of Communication of the Soviet Navy, led a group of six Soviet specialists to China, bringing with them a draft agreement. The Soviet side still insisted on jointly constructing the long-wave radio station and sharing the costs equally with China. Subsequent discussions between the two sides failed to reach an agreement. On 21 July, Peng wrote once again to Malinovskii in accordance with the discussions of the Military Commission, reaffirming the principle of building the long-wave station with China’s own money. On the same day, the Soviets raised the issue of a “combined fleet.”[vi][6]
The “National Defense New Technology Agreement” signed between the two countries in October 1957 provided possibilities for China’s army and air force to develop new weaponry. The navy, naturally, did not to want to be left in the cold. During the Moscow Conference Xiao Jinguang had asked Gorshkov, the Soviet Naval Commander, to help China build nuclear-powered submarines and submarines armed with guided missiles. The Soviets turned down the request. On Xiao’s return to Beijing Chinese naval leaders, after careful study and exposition, submitted a report to Peng Dehuai and the Military Commission in April 1958. It was of vital importance, it stated, to obtain new technology for development of the Chinese navy. The Soviets had improved on the power and structure of some of their ships, and had succeeded in developing several kinds of guided missiles for submarines and torpedo boats. However, the Chinese navy was still building their ships according to drawings for five different ships provided by the Soviet Union during the first five-year plan period. Therefore, it was urgent for the Chinese navy to acquire new design drawings and other information for building more advanced ships. They also suggested that the request be made to the Soviet side in the name of the Chinese government. So, on the advocacy of Peng Dehuai and the other Military Commission leaders, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev on 28 June, expressing hope that the Soviet government would offer new technological assistance to the Chinese navy and, conditions permitting, provide design drawings and materials for construction of new models of fighting vessels.[vii][7] The proposal of a “combined fleet” was put forth in response to the request; but it was also possible that the proposal served as an alternative for solution of the question of a long-wave station.
Mao Zedong met with Iudin, the Soviet ambassador to China, by the swimming pool in Zhongnanhai at ten o’clock in the evening of 21 July at his urgent request. During the meeting Iudin said Khrushchev wished to establish a combined fleet with the Chinese comrades, possibly including Vietnam as well. He hoped the Central Committee of the CPC would send Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai to Moscow to discuss the matter in detail. Mao pointed out immediately that though China had asked for Soviet aid, it had never considered setting up a “cooperative” with the Soviet Union. Mao repeatedly queried Soviet intentions: Was a “cooperative” the prerequisite for Soviet aid? Would the Soviets otherwise refuse to help the Chinese? Iudin explained again and again that it only was a tentative proposal. But Mao emphatically pointed out that the guiding principle must be decided upon first: Would it be a joint venture or an undertaking by the Chinese with the help from the Soviet government? If the Soviet government were reluctant to offer aid, China would give up the plan to develop its nuclear submarine force. On returning to their residence Iudin and his subordinates deliberated over the matter through the night, concluding that Mao opposed the establishment of a Sino-Soviet combined fleet. Iudin drafted a report at once and transmitted it to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party early in the morning.[viii][8]
Mao summoned Iudin and his subordinates to Zhongnanhai for further talks at 11 o’clock the following morning. Present on the Chinese side were all the Politburo members in Beijing. Mao reiterated China’s stance against a combined fleet and announced withdrawal of its request for Soviet aid. The reminiscences of Counselor Vereshchagin at the Soviet embassy in Beijing have filled in numerous gaps in the documents as published in China, which mainly concerned criticisms of the USSR. For example, Stalin had had listening devices installed in the Chinese embassy during Mao’s first visit to Moscow; former Soviet Ambassador Roshchin tried to recruit intelligence agents in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Beriia colluded with Gao Gang (a disgraced Party leader whose power base had been in the Northeast); Beriia had often sent people to contact Gao; the Soviet consulate in Xinjiang had collected intelligence through illegal channels, etc. Peng Dehuai also chipped in with another example: During talks over the “Sino-Soviet Far East Air Defense Agreement,” the Soviet side had taken advantage of the Chinese delegates’ ignorance of Russian to cheat them into signing. Although Mao repeatedly stated that all these wrongdoings constituted only ten percent while the remaining ninety percent represented the bright side of the relations between the two countries, the Soviets got the impression that “all these questions pertain to state and Party relations between the two countries.” They felt “heavy-hearted.” and realized that they “lacked full understanding of China’s policies; had overestimated the importance of a common ideology, and had underestimated the gap in national interests between the two.”[ix][9]
Mao’s words astonished Moscow and unsettled the Soviet leaders. Khrushchev felt it was incumbent on him to straighten things out with Mao face to face, but he was prevented from doing this because of his prearranged visit to the United States over the Middle East crisis.
On instruction from Moscow, Iudin asked to meet again with Chinese leaders. On 27 July, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping summoned Iudin. Iudin informed them that Khrushchev found it strange that the Chinese comrades believed the Soviets appeared to attach political conditions to helping China develop its navy. Liu asked if the Central Committee of the CPSU had proposed to help China build up a fleet under the condition that this fleet would be owned jointly by the USSR and the PRC. Iudin made it quite explicit that neither were there any conditions imposed by the Soviet side, nor even hints of any. When Zhou Enlai brought Iudin to account over the long-wave radio station, the ambassador said there were no political conditions in this regard, either. Liu Shaoqi then concluded that, as he saw it, the Soviet government had agreed to help China build up its fleet. Iudin said he had talked about this at the last meeting. Thereupon Liu once again asked for Soviet assistance in building up the Chinese fleet. At the end of the meeting the ambassador informed the Chinese leaders that Khrushchev would not be able to pay a visit to China in the near future.[x][10] It seemed the storm had passed.
However, Khrushchev’s concerns had not been ameliorated When he was sure that the problem of the Iraq invasion was not raised at the London Conference of the Baghdad Pact Organization countries, he promptly called off the scheduled visit to the United States, and immediately left the Soviet Union on a secret visit to Beijing.
Mao Zedong and Khrushchev held talks in the Huairen Hall of the Zhongnanhai from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on 31 July. During the talks, Khrushchev categorically denied the Soviet side had ever used the terms “combined fleet” or “joint fleet.” He believed Iudin had made a mistake in conveying the Soviet request and the whole matter was “a misunderstanding.” He stated that when he discussed the issue with the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, “they never thought of jointly commanding the Chinese fleet with China as the Chinese comrades believe, and never had a shadow of the thought of jointly owning the fleet.” Mao took the initiative to end the quarrel over the “cooperative.” Both sides agreed they “would never mention these things.” With regard to the issue of a long-wave radio station, Khrushchev stated that this had been raised by the military but the Central Committee had never taken it up. The Soviet Union intended to build such a station in South China for the purpose of directing the Soviet Pacific Fleet in time of need. The Soviet side would be pleased to be allowed to take part in the construction of the project in the form of a loan to China. The station would be owned by China; the USSR wanted only to sign an agreement with China to ensure its access to it. At the same time, the PRC could use Soviet stations in Vladivostok, the Kurile Islands and the North Sea. However, if China refused, the USSR was ready to withdraw the proposal. Mao stressed that Malinovskii had set his sights on the ownership of the station when he offered the money for the construction thereof. China agreed to the construction of the long-wave radio station, but all expenses incurred would have to be met by China. The proprietary right belonged to China, but the Soviet Union could use it. Khrushchev said again that the proprietary right would definitely belong to China; but since the USSR would use it, it was reasonable for them to pay for a share of the expense of the project, perhaps in the form of loans. Mao resolutely turned down Khrushchev’s offer of loans and said China would give up the project if the USSR insisted on making the loans. [xi][11] This ended the talks.
While the atmosphere at the talks had been tense and Mao was by no means polite to Khrushchev, he was not as bitter as he had been with Iudin. Khrushchev clearly felt that the Chinese leaders’ reactions were strong and powerful enough to adversely affect bilateral relations as a whole. He had no alternative but to choose a scapegoat. Iudin was relieved of his post and left for home at the beginning of 1959.
According to declassified archival documents and the recollections of those involved in these events, Iudin had not misrepresented Khrushchev’s meaning. The proposals concerning the long-wave radio station and combined fleet were both raised following discussion among the CPSU’s leaders. The intention underlying these proposals was to have a base for Soviet oceangoing submarines on the Chinese coast. However, all the considerations were directed against the United States, and they had no intention of controlling China. As Gorshkov, Commander of the Soviet Navy, explained to Khrushchev, the Soviet navy insisted on establishing a long-wave radio station on Hainan island because the US navy had bases on the Hawaiian Islands, Midway Island, and, most importantly, in the Philippines and Taiwan. If vessels of the Soviet Pacific Fleet could be docked and repaired at Chinese ports in emergencies, it would save a lot of time navigating to and fro and greatly improve the fleet’s fighting capabilities.[xii][12] It is still not known whether the Soviet leaders had ownership in mind when they insisted at the early stage on providing funds for the construction of long-wave radio station (a loan was suggested by Khrushchev later in Beijing), but even they did, it was an accepted practice of international cooperation and as such did not imply a violation of Chinese sovereignty.
The catch was that while the Soviet leaders were intent on coping with the United States, they did not take into consideration Chinese sensibilities. Khrushchev’s train of thought was: “This proposal is in the common interests of the socialist camp;” “China and the Soviet Union are both socialist countries and have signed an alliance treaty. Moreover, the long-wave radio station and the fleet-repairing base are needed by China as well; further, the Chinese fleet can have access to Soviet bases.” Therefore, “a friendly China that is building socialism will readily accept” this proposal. Even after receiving the telegram from Iudin, Khrushchev still believed “all problems will be easily solved if he has a personal talk with the Chinese comrades.” It was only long after the incident that Khrushchev admitted the Soviet proposal “touched a raw nerve in a country that had long been under foreign rule” and “touched on Chinese sovereignty.” He wrote regretfully in his memoirs: “if we had known in advance what their reaction was to be, we would never have raised the proposal.”[xiii][13]
As far as the Chinese side was concerned, as a nation long subjected to aggression and humiliation China might have taken umbrage at the Soviet proposal, but it is beyond comprehension that Mao Zedong as an ally of the Soviet Union, and as paramount leader of a major country, should have been so agitated and furious. From a historical perspective, Mao’s overreaction, while not unrelated to his personality, was rooted in the delicate changes in the development of Sino-Soviet relations at the time and Mao’s own mentality during these changes. The Korean War greatly heightened the CPC’s status among the socialist camp countries. After Stalin’s death, Mao was second to none in revolutionary seniority throughout the socialist camp. In particular, after the 20th congress of the CPSU and the Poland and Hungary affairs, the Soviet Union was discredited and, in a sense, it was Mao who helped Khrushchev through these difficulties. The time when the CPSU could order other parties around had passed; the CPC had become its equal, in the international communist movement at least. Obviously Khrushchev did not perceive the fact that in connection with relations among socialist countries, Mao stressed independent development and the parties’ equality before the Moscow Conference. But after the Moscow Conference he emphasized the importance of solidarity and unity among the socialist camp and coordinated action among the various parties. The shift of emphasis pointed to a change in the status of the CPC: it was no longer “a little brother.” Mao Zedong was no longer the man who had paid his first visit to the Soviet Union in 1950! Under these circumstances, how was Mao to tolerate Khrushchev acting as Stalin had?
While meetings between the top leaders finally resolved the disputes over the long-wave radio station and assistance to the Chinese navy in accordance with Mao Zedong’s wishes, Sino-Soviet relations took no turn for the better. On the contrary they became increasingly strained. Mao’s censure had cast an ineradicable cloud over Khrushchev’s psyche. Without mutual trust, an unexpected action by either side might provoke the other, triggering a further deterioration of relations. Sino-Soviet relations developed along precisely these lines. The bombardment of the island of Quemoy (Jinmen) by the PLA without giving a prior notice to the USSR and the delayed delivery to the Soviets of the US Sidewinder missile falling on Chinese territory made the Soviet side very unhappy. Later, the USSR was strongly denounced by the Chinese for failing to supply the Chinese with of nuclear weapon samples in accordance with the “National Defense New Technology Agreement.” Subsequently, China took military action along the Sino-Indian border without consulting Moscow, further infuriating Khrushchev. In return, the Soviet Union’s completely neutral stance on the conflict incensed Beijing. Finally, the direct confrontation between the Chinese and Soviet leaders in Beijing in October 1959 and in Bucharest in June 1960 led to an ultimate open split between the PRC and the USSR: Khrushchev unilaterally and indiscreetly decided to tear up the contracts with China and withdraw all Soviet experts from the country, bringing military cooperation between the two countries to a premature end and reducing the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty to a useless piece of paper.
A general survey of the history of this period shows that the politics of alliance relations among socialist states rendered Sino-Soviet cooperation fragile. Meanwhile personal factors of Khrushchev and Mao also played an important part. Within the socialist camp, the demarcation between ruling-party relations and state relations was unclear; state relations were a continuation of inter-party relations: i.e., the communist parties brought the political formations and criteria of their relations prior to their accession to power into the state relations after they became ruling parties. The communist movement was international in nature and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was always in a leading position. However, the relations themselves between leaders and led were unequal and the sovereignty and independence of followers were often jeopardized. Alliances between socialist states were therefore inherently unstable. As soon as the leadership of a party (or state) was challenged, these relations were shaken and cooperation became hard to maintain. In the final analysis, the failure of China and the Soviet Union to further their military cooperation in the late 1950s, and the subsequent deterioration of their bilateral relations, originated in the politics of state relations in the socialist camp, and neither side was to blame.
Notes
1. Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian banian (Eight Years as an Envoy to the Soviet Union) (Beijing: The CPC Historical Materials Publishing House, 1986), p.13.
2. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 6-7, winter 1995/1996, Washington, D.C., pp.160-161.
3. S. Khrushchev, Missiles and Crisis – Khrushchev in His Son’s Eyes, Chinese edition translated by Guo Jiashen et al., (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2002), pp. 264-265; N. Khrushchev, “Memoir of Khrushchev” (translated by Ma Guifan) in Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao, Vol. 71, pp. 208-209.
4. Xiao Jinguang, Xiao Jinguang Huiyilü (Memoir of Xiao Jinguang) (sequel) (Beijing: China People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 1988), pp.200-201.
5. Wang Yan, ed., Peng Dehuai nianpu (Chronological Life of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998), p. 680-681; China Military Museum, ed., Mao Zedong junshi huodong jishi (Chronicles of Mao Zedong’s Activities in Military Matters) (Beijing: China People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 1994), p. 907; Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Texts of Mao Zedong after the Founding of the PRC) (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1992), vol. 7, pp. 265-266.
6. Han Nianlong, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao (Diplomacy of Contemporary China) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1988), pp.112-113; The Compilation Committee of Book Series of PLA Historical Materials, ed., Haijun huiyi shiliao (Historical Recollections of the Navy) (Beijing: China People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 1999), pp. 508-509; Wu Lengxi: Shinian lunzhan: Zhong Su guanxi huiyilü (Ten Years of Polemics: Recollections of Sino-Soviet Relations) (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1999), pp. 157-160.
7. Xiao Jinguang, op. cit., pp. 175-184; Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronological Life of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1997), vol. 2, p. 149.
8. See the records of conversations between Mao and Iudin on 21 July 1958, see Wu Lengxi: Shinian Lunzhan pp.157-160. Chen Chunhua, tr., “Khrushchev’s Visit to Beijing in July and August, 1958,” Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, 2000, no.4, pp.100-101.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Foreign-policy Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, World Affairs Press, 1994), pp. 322-333; “Khrushchev’s Visit to Beijing in July and August, 1958’ in Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, 2000, no. 4, pp. 101-103.
10. “Khrushchev’s Visit to Beijing in July and August, 1958, Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, 2000, no. 4, pp. 103-104.
11. The records of the conversations between Mao and Khrushchev on 31 July and 3 August 1958 are from the private collections of Soviet military historian Dmitrii Volkogonov, collected by the American Library of Congress. Volkogonov collected a large amount of literature on Soviet history. The US declassified his collections in 2002. American researcher of National Security Archives V. Zubok compiled and published the two documents. Cf. the English version in CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 12-13, Fall/Winter 2001，pp.250-262.
12. S. Khrushchev, Missiles and Crisis–Khrushchev in His Son’s Eyes, pp. 264-265.
13. Khrushchev, “Memoirs of Khrushchev” in Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, Vol. 71, pp. 208-221; S. Khrushchev, Missiles and Crisis – Khrushchev in His Son’s Eyes, pp. 264-265; Zubok, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 12-13, Fall/Winter 2001，pp.250-262.
—Translated by Deng Ying
Revised by David Kelly